12. The Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Author(s):  
John Baylis

This chapter examines issues regarding the control of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and its implications for international security. It begins with a discussion of the shift that took place during the cold war from disarmament to arms control, and the shift in relative importance that occurred in the early post-cold war period from arms control to more forcible means to tackle proliferation. It then considers concerns that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s about the continuing utility of arms control as an effective means of dealing with WMDs. It also analyses new ideas that began to take shape, first during the presidency of Bill Clinton, and then under George W. Bush, about more militarily driven approaches, associated with counterproliferation. The chapter concludes with an assessment of ‘the return to arms control’ by the administration of Barack Obama and the challenges presented by new geopolitical tensions.

Author(s):  
John Baylis

This chapter explores a variety of questions on how to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). It begins with a discussion of the shift that took place during the cold war from disarmament to arms control, as well as the shift in relative importance that occurred in the early post-cold war era from arms control to more forcible means to tackle nuclear proliferation. It then considers the emergence of new ideas, first in the Clinton administration, and then in the Bush administration, that focused less on arms control and more on counterproliferation. It also examines a host of problems and dilemmas associated with counterproliferation, the Obama administration's policy of engagement and ‘tough but direct diplomacy’, and the challenges presented by new geopolitical tensions. Finally, it reflects on future prospects for strategic nuclear arms control.


2000 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-118
Author(s):  
Henrietta Wilson

The geopolitical positions currently occupied by the United States and Germany should be of interest to students of international arms control regimes. The former enters the twenty-first century empowered by its political, military, and economic weight, yet unable to respond to the global responsibilities entailed by this. In contrast, Germany has come to represent the less militaristic aspects of modern Western sensibilities, and has had to face the political problems of post-cold-war Europe more directly than other Western states.


2016 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-161
Author(s):  
Hans Blix

International institutions given the task to maintain collective security and to seek disarmament need to build on cooperation between major powers. The authors of the un Charter vested great powers in the Security Council but a consensus between the five permanent great powers was required for use of the powers. This inevitably paralyzed the Council during the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, the permanent members have remained unable jointly to pursue disarmament, but they have succeeded in several remarkable cases to reach consensus, notably on measures to prevent the further spread of weapons of mass destruction. The quick action to eliminate chemical weapons in Syria was a win-win case led by us-Russian diplomacy, while the comprehensive deal settling the controversy over Iran’s nuclear program was a victory for patient diplomacy involving all permanent members and the eu. These actions show the potentials of the Council.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carmen Wunderlich ◽  
Harald Müller ◽  
Una Jakob

The regimes for the control of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are essential ingredients of the global order. Yet this order is currently in transition: the bipolarity of the Cold War has given way to a more complex, multipolar world order characterized by conflicts of interest and great power competition rather than cooperative security. This competition brings with it rising strategic uncertainties which endanger stability and have far reaching implications for WMD-related agreements. To better understand the implications of this changing global context for WMD arms control and disarmament measures this report looks at the past, present and future prospects for WMD-related treaties. The report begins by outlining four broad yet interlinked approaches to arms control and disarmament before considering how these have been applied to chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in the past and how these measures could be applied in the future.


Author(s):  
Peter Viggo Jakobsen

This chapter examines how coercive diplomacy has emerged as a strategy for states in dealing with the opponent without resorting to full-scale war. Coercive diplomacy involves the use of military threats and/or limited force (sticks) coupled with inducements and assurances (carrots) in order to influence the opponent to do something it would prefer not to. This chapter first explains what coercive diplomacy is and considers its requirements for success. It then shows how states have employed coercive diplomacy to manage crises and conflicts during the three strategic eras that followed the end of the Cold War. It also discusses the importance of the strategic context in shaping the use of coercive diplomacy by presenting two case studies, one relating to the United States’s conflict with Libya due to the latter’s weapons of mass destruction, and the other relating to Russia’s military involvement in Ukraine.


2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-339
Author(s):  
Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus

O objetivo deste artigo é examinar as perspectivas para a dissuasão nuclear para as duas principais potências nuclearmente armadas - EUA e Rússia - durante os cinco primeiros anos da década de 2000. O argumento central aponta que as duas potências preocuparam-se com a dissuasão de ameaças advindas das principais potências, mas se mostraram mais preocupadas com as ameaças de potências regionais com armas de destruição em massa. Elas reduziram suas forças nucleares desde o fim da Guerra Fria, manifestaram um maior interesse em capacidades não-nucleares para a dissuasão e tentaram definir opções para o uso limitado de armas nucleares.     The aim of this paper is to examine the approaches for nuclear deterrence for the two greatest nuclear-weapon states - the U.S. and Russia - in the first half of the 2000s. The central argument shows that the two powers were concerned with deterrence of threats stemming from major powers, but were more concerned about the threats from regional powers with weapons of mass destruction. They have reduced their nuclear forces since the end of the Cold War, showed a greater interest in non-nuclear capabilities for deterrence and tried to define options for the limited use of nuclear weapons.      


2006 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 113-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashley J. Tellis

The shift in Indian positions on missile defense in the context of the growing transformation of U.S.-Indian relations since the end of the Cold War, and particularly since the advent of the George W. Bush administration, has been remarkable. New Delhi's traditional opposition to strategic defenses gave way to its current consideration of missile defense for a variety of reasons. These included structural factors related to the dissolution of U.S.-Indian antagonism associated with the bipolar configuration of the Cold War; the growing recognition in Washington and New Delhi of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and their associated delivery systems in the hands of hostile states intent on nuclear coercion; and the Indian and American desire to forge a new partnership grounded in democratic values but ultimately oriented toward promoting geopolitical equilibrium in Asia in the face of rising challengers such as China and problem states such as Pakistan. All of these factors combined to produce a dramatic new acceptance of strategic defenses as conducive to stability on the part of New Delhi. What is fascinating about this evolution is the manner in which missile defenses have come to reflect both an example of, and a means toward, the steady improvement in U.S.-Indian ties occurring in recent years. This, in turn, implies that a deepening bilateral relationship has become part of New Delhi's larger solution to increasing India's capacity to defeat those threats requiring active defenses in the future.


Author(s):  
John W. Young ◽  
John Kent

This chapter focuses on the United States’s predominance and the search for order in the post-Cold War period. George H. W. Bush, who came to power in January 1989, concentrated on world affairs and had a series of foreign successes before the end of 1991. Bush’s cautious, pragmatic, orderly approach carried both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand he escaped any major disasters abroad and avoided antagonizing the Soviet Union or rekindling the Cold War. On the other hand, he seemed to be undynamic and at the mercy of events — he failed to provide a sense of overall direction to US foreign policy once the Cold War ended. The chapter first considers US foreign policy in the 1990s before discussing the Gulf War of 1990–1991, US–Soviet relations in the 1990s, US policy towards the ‘rogue states’ during the time of Bill Clinton, and ‘humanitarian intervention’ in Somalia and Haiti.


Author(s):  
John Dumbrell

This chapter examines U.S. foreign policy debates and policy management under the direction of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton. It first provides an overview of post-Cold War American internationalism before discussing the so-called ‘Kennan sweepstakes’: a conscious effort to find a post-Soviet statement of purpose to rival George Kennan’s early Cold War concept of ‘containment’ of communism. It then considers U.S. foreign policy making in the new order and in the post-Cold War era. Both the Bush and Clinton administrations wrestled with the problem of deciding on a clear, publicly defensible, strategy for U.S. foreign policy in the new era. Clinton’s first term was dominated by free trade agendas and by efforts to operationalize the policy of ‘selective engagement’, while his second term involved a noticeable turn towards unilateralism and remilitarization. The New World Order was Bush’s main contribution to thinking beyond the Cold War.


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