Reputation Concerns in Risky Experimentation
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Abstract High-ability agents are more likely to achieve early success in risky experimentation, but learn faster that their project is not promising. These counteracting effects give rise to a signaling model with double-crossing property. This property tends to induce homogenization of quitting times between types, which in turn leads to some pooling in equilibrium. Low-ability agents may hold out to continue their project for the prospect of pooling with the high type, despite having a negative instantaneous net payoff. A war-of-attrition mechanism causes low-ability agents to quit only gradually over time, and to stop quitting for a period immediately before all agents exit.
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2018 ◽
Vol 8
(1)
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pp. 39-48
2015 ◽
Vol 32
(2)
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pp. 170-185
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1984 ◽
Vol 15
(5)
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pp. 342-351
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DESKRIPSI KEMAMPUAN SPASIAL SISWA SMP DITINJAU BERDASARKAN PERBEDAAN GENDER DAN KEMAMPUAN MATEMATIKA
2018 ◽
Vol 21
(3)
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