Part III Section 4 in “Practice”, 11 Other Questions

Unable ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kalt Brian C
Keyword(s):  
Vice President ◽  
Vice Presidents ◽  
Waiting Period ◽  
Careful Thought

This chapter addresses a number of issues regarding the use of Section 4. They include: (1) That a President who declares he has recovered can retake power before the four-day waiting period expires, as long as the Vice President or Cabinet agree; (2) That if a dispute case goes to Congress, which has 21 days to decide, the President can retake power earlier than that if he wins a vote before the 21 days are up; (3) That Vice Presidents and Cabinets can declare over and over that the President is unable, and the President can declare over and over that he has recovered—two situations that require careful thought about how deal with them; (4) The unclear matter of whether Cabinet members who are only acting secretaries, temporarily filling vacancies, are allowed to participate in a Section 4 vote.

Part II History: Fact and Fiction, 4 Presidential Disability Before Section 4

Unable ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kalt Brian C
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Vice President ◽  
The United States ◽  
Vice Presidents ◽  
History Of

The history of the United States is peppered with Presidents who were unable, for various reasons, to fulfil their duties. Despite this, power never transferred until and unless the President died. Although the Constitution permitted transfer of power to the Vice President, it provided no process to make that happen. Some also believed that a disabled President who handed over power would not be able to retake power if he recovered. This dissuaded Vice Presidents from picking up the reins. A brief glance at history, from President Washington, through Presidents Garfield and Wilson, and on to President Eisenhower, shows why it was so important to pass Section 4. Eisenhower’s leadership and the aftermath of the assassination of President Kennedy set the stage for the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s passage.

Part I How Section 4 Works, 3 Trickier Questions

Unable ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kalt Brian C
Keyword(s):  
Decision Maker ◽  
Vice President ◽  
Waiting Period ◽  
Take Back

This chapter asks and answers several questions that Section 4 does not resolve simply with its text. The questions include: (1) Who counts as “the Cabinet?” (2) Can Congress specify a decision maker other than the Cabinet? (3) What if there is no Vice President to invoke Section 4? (4) How are written declarations (of inability and ability) transmitted to Congress? (5) Can the President and Vice President agree to end the waiting period for his return early? (6) Could the Vice President and Cabinet or Congress manipulate the process to keep the President out longer? (7) If the President wins in Congress, does he take back power immediately? (8) What role do the courts have in resolving any disputes, if any?

scholarly journals Report of the Vice President and Treasurer of the Royal Society

1843 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 69-70
Keyword(s):  
Royal Society ◽  
Vice President ◽  
Vice Presidents

The Treasurer announced from the Chair that a deputation of the Society, consisting of His Royal Highness the President, the Vice Presidents, Treasurer, Secretaries, and other Members of the Council, waited yesterday on Her Majesty, for the purpose of receiving Her Majesty’s signature in the Charter-book of the Society, as Patroness of the Royal Society, when Her Majesty was graciously pleased to inscribe her name accordingly; on which occasion His Royal Highness made the following address

scholarly journals The Ideal Concept of Presidential Threshold Arrangement to Achieve Constitutional Rights of New Political Parties in a simultaneous general election in Indonesia

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 88
Author(s):  
Muhammad Mukhtarrija ◽  
I gusti Ayu Ketut Rachmi Handayani ◽  
Agus Riwanto
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Party ◽  
Vice President ◽  
General Election ◽  
Legal Issue ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Vice Presidents ◽  
Equal Rights ◽  
The People ◽  
General Elections

This study raises the legal issue against the enactment of Law No. 7 of 2017 on General Elections in Indonesia. The law has violated the constitutional rights of new political parties of the simultaneous general election participants that began in 2017. The injustice is seen in article 222 which requires the provision of presidential threshold for political parties nominating the president and vice-presidential pairs based on the results of general elections in 2014. If this provision is applied, automatically the new political parties of the simultaneous general election participants in Indonesia do not have the opportunity to nominate a couple of presidents and vice presidents. Based on the Constitution of the 1945 Constitution, the president and vice president are nominated by a political party or a coalition of political parties participating in the general election. Considering the constitution applicable in Indonesia should every political party participating in the general election have equal rights and opportunity in carrying the candidate of president and vice president to be elected by the people in a democracy.

NEW ORDERS OF INDONESIA — BINTANG KEMANUSIAAN AND BINTANG PENEGAK DEMOKRASI

2020 ◽  
pp. 192-200
Author(s):  
Anton O. Zakharov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Vice President ◽  
New Order ◽  
Dual Function ◽  
Vice Presidents ◽  
Economic Issues ◽  
Hierarchic Structure ◽  
General Elections ◽  
The Law ◽  
National Police ◽  
The Military

Since the fall of the ‘New Order’ in 1998, democratic reforms in Indonesia deeply changed the Constitution. The President may be elected only two times. The Presidential and general elections are general, direct, equal, secret polls. The Army reduced control over National Police. The Army lost its dual function, impliing its highest authority in politics and other social and economic issues. Democratic reforms include changes in the award system of Indonesia. Since the Independence, most orders, decorations and medals have been of the military kind. Even those awards, which should have been civilian by their statutes, were often given to the military personnel for particular services to the State. In 2009, then President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono signed the Law No. 20 ‘About the Titles, Decorations and Awards’ (Tentang Gelar, Tanda Jasa, Dan Tanda Kehormatan). The Act established the division of the orders into civilian and military groups. The civilian orders are higher than military ones. Both groups include seven orders each. The Law instituted two new civilian orders — Bintang Kemanusiaan and Bintang Penegak Demokrasi. The Bintang Kemanusiaan, or the Star of Humanities, has the only class. The Bintang Penegak Demokrasi, or the Star of the Upholder of Democracy, has three classes. Both awards are rewarded to President and Vice-President ex officio. There are no recipients of the Bintang Kemanusiaan, with the exception of Presidents Yudhoyono and Joko Vidodo and their Vice-Presidents. There are still only four recipients of the Bintang Penegak Demokrasi Utama, or first class. The Bintang Kemanusiaan and Bintang Penegak Demokrasi show the highly hierarchic structure of the Indonesian State.

Part III Section 4 in “Practice”, 10 The Four-Day Wait

Unable ◽  
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kalt Brian C
Keyword(s):  
Basic Structure ◽  
Vice President ◽  
Correct Interpretation ◽  
Waiting Period ◽  
Legislative History ◽  
Plain Text ◽  
The Public ◽  
Correct Understanding

When a President responds to a Section 4 action by declaring that she is not disabled, she does not take power back immediately—the Vice President and Cabinet are given four days in which to challenge her, during which time the Vice President remains in charge. But many people have misread this provision and think that the President retakes power immediately upon declaring she has recovered. Though the odds of a President following this misinterpretation may be small, the stakes are potentially enormous. A president who immediately regained control could purport to fire the Cabinet members who voted against her, which (according to her side) would prevent the remaining procedures in Section 4 from taking place. In that situation, the country could have two presidents leading two cabinets unless the correct understanding of Section 4 is widely known among the administration and by the public. This chapter offers proof of the correct interpretation of the four-day waiting period. It is clear from Section 4’s plain text, its legislative history, and its basic structure.

Economic and Social Council

1948 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 317-336
Keyword(s):  
Work Load ◽  
Vice President ◽  
Vice Presidents ◽  
Santa Cruz ◽  
Social Council ◽  
Sixth Session

The sixth session of the Economic and Social Council convened at Lake Success on February 2, 1948, to deal with record work load of some forty agenda items. With the adoption of the Council's agenda on February 2, five new items were added to the list of those which the Council would consider. The Council remained in session until March 11. Immediately upon the opening of the session, the Council turned to the election of its president and two vice presidents to succeed Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar (India), Jan Papánek (Czechoslovakia) and Herman Santa Cruz (Chile). The Council unanimously selected the representative of Lebanon (Malik) as its new president. The Council elected Mr. Santa Cruz as first vice president and named Mr. Kaminsky (Byelorussian SSR) as its second vice president

scholarly journals A Disproportionality Bias in the Bureau of the Regional Assembly of Madrid

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 92
Author(s):  
Omar de la Cruz Vicente ◽  
Fernando Tomé Bermejo ◽  
Rafael Ramiro Moreno
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Vice President ◽  
Absolute Rate ◽  
Vice Presidents ◽  
Actual Result ◽  
The Absolute

This paper analyses the voting behavior of the parliamentary groups in the Regional Assembly of Madrid to appoint the Bureau, its representative body, in all the legislatures since its inception (1983–2021). To this end, the actual result of the voting is compared with the mock result attained by following a Nash equilibrium (NE) and a d’Hondt (d’H) allocation in each vote. But the result of a d’Hondt allocation varies based on the number of stages in which the voting is performed (President, Vice-President, and Secretaries), so a bias towards disproportionality could exist as measured by the absolute index of disproportionality which calculates the number of seats non-proportionally allocated. The results show that, in view of the hypothesis on the importance of the number of seats, the NE was only followed in four of the 12 Legislatures for Vice-Presidents (it was always followed for Secretaries). Thus, parliamentary groups could gain more seats by modifying their strategies. Additionally, the absolute rate of disproportionality and the number of seats non-proportionally allocated indicate that, in general, parliamentary groups obtain voting results that are less disproportionate than they could be (due to the number of voting stages).

The New Presidential Succession Act

1947 ◽  
Vol 41 (5) ◽  
pp. 931-941
Author(s):  
Joseph E. Kallenbach
Keyword(s):  
Late Stage ◽  
Vice President ◽  
Vice Presidents ◽  
Presidential Succession ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Federal Statute

Among the responsibilities which the Constitution imposes upon Congress is the regulation of the succession to the office of president in certain contingencies. The framers of the Constitution themselves disposed of the problem in part by creating the post of vice-president and making that officer a first recourse in filling a vacancy in the presidential office. Realizing the need for designating more than one prospective successor, since vacancies might occur in both offices simultaneously, the convention at a late stage in its proceedings added as a seeming afterthought a clause authorizing Congress to make further provision by law on the subject. Although seven presidents and seven vice-presidents have died in office and one vice-president has resigned during the time the Constitution has been in operation, the situation envisaged by the framers has never actually arisen. Nevertheless, the power entrusted to Congress is important potentially. During nearly one-fourth of the time since 1789, a federal statute rather than a constitutional provision has governed the succession to the presidential office in an immediate sense.Two fundamentally opposed theories have been advanced concerning the officer upon whom Congress should cause the powers and duties of the presidency to devolve. One is that the presiding officer of the House or the Senate should be designated, in order to insure that any person becoming acting president shall achieve that status through an elective process.

scholarly journals The Possibility of Vice-Presidents’ Authority Arrangement in the 1945 Constitution through Constitutional Amendment

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 130
Author(s):  
Fajar L. Suroso
Keyword(s):  
System Design ◽  
Vice President ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
Vice Presidents ◽  
Presidential System

The debate over the vice-presidents’ authority reappeared in the administration of President Jokowi after the “authority expansion of the Chief of Presidency Staff” and the case of “Rizal Ramli vs Jusuf Kalla”. This article is intended to provide arguments for the idea of some parties to organize more explicit and detailed the authority of vice-president in the 1945 Constitution. The idea arises from the absence of further arrangement on the authority of vice-president in the 1945 Constitution. This article is systematized into 3 (three) sub-theme; 1) the arrangement of the vice-presidents’ authority in the constitution for several countries; 2) The authority of the vice president according to the 1945 Constitution, and 3) New resultant and the possibility of 1945 Constitution amendment. The result revealed a number of interesting things; 1) the constitutions of other countries do not specify the authority of the vice-president and put the vice-president as a “spare tire” when the president is absent; 2) no new resultant about the position and authority of the vice-president so that theoretically is not reason enough to regulate in detail the authority of the vice-president through the 1945 Constitution amendment; 3) arrangement in detail in the authority of vice-president in the 1945 Constitution holds the potential to confuse the presidential system design as the 1945 Constitution. Therefore, the possibility of vice-presidents’ authority arrangement in the 1945 Constitution through amendment is very small, both in terms of momentum and the substance of issues.

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