Shanghai

Urban Studies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mi Shih

This article primarily focuses on Shanghai since the late 1980s, a period in which the city began to undergo rapid urbanization, and the resulting sociopolitical, economic, and spatial consequences and dynamics. Shanghai’s acceleration into a highly urbanized society is manifested in several ways. The city’s urban area increased at least fourfold, to over a thousand square kilometers, between 1989 and 2016 (Chengshi Jianshe Tongji Nianjian (城市建设统计年鉴), Zhongguo Chengshi Tongji Nianjian (中国城市统计年鉴)). In the same period, investment in the city’s basic infrastructure grew 33 times to over 155 billion (renminbi) and construction of buildings increased tenfold to almost seventy-five square kilometers (Shanghai Statistical Yearbook, cited under Statistics and Other Official Sources). Urbanization, however, has also dismantled the city’s older fabric and socialist institutions. Several sources, including those cited in this article, show that more than one million households have been relocated from their original neighborhoods since the early 1990s. Large-scale residential relocation and prevalent privatization have, in turn, given rise to a new phenomenon of great sociopolitical significance—weiquan (维权) or rights protection. Contemporary Shanghai, therefore, is an excellent site for study of the unprecedented transformation (in the sense that everything is being turned on its head [fantianfudi, 翻天覆地]) that urbanization has brought to the Chinese people and cities in the reform era more broadly. Changes to institutions, power structures, societal dynamics, identities, the state-market duality, and cultural and historical meanings are all caught up in the urbanization process through which Shanghai has grown into a global city in the 21st century. To study Shanghai and its urbanization processes, this article aims to highlight two general approaches. First, while the role of the state is central to understanding why policies are designed as such, the actual implementation is always filtered through the agency of nonstate societal actors and their contestation and negotiation. Second, while external forces such as globalization and the free- market economy hold important shaping power, it is crucially important to understand how Shanghai handles these forces on its own terms. In other words, context-sensitive nuances, dynamics, particularities, and complexities help us to better understand Shanghai under urban transformation. The cited works to various degrees reflect these two approaches. Many other topics about Shanghai can be found in other Oxford Bibliographies articles, especially those in history, literature, and modernity.

Wacana Publik ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (02) ◽  
Author(s):  
Syamsul Ma'arif

After had being carried out nationalization and hostility against west countries, the New Order regime made important decision to change Indonesia economic direction from etatism system to free market economy. A set of policies were taken in order private sector could play major role in economic. However, when another economic sectors were reformed substantially, effords to reform the State Owned Enterprises had failed. The State Owned Enterprise, in fact, remained to play dominant role like early years of guided democracy era. Role of the State Owned Enterprises was more and more powerfull). The main problem of reforms finally lied on reality that vested interest of bureaucrats (civil or military) was so large that could’nt been overcome. 


2011 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacobus Delwaide

Massive government-financed rescue operations for banking and insurance industries in the United States and in Europe, seeking to contain the financial crisis that culminated in 2008, amounted to ‘the biggest, broadest and fastest government response in history.’1This ‘great stabilisation,’ asThe Economistcalled it, resulting in ‘quasi’ or ‘shadow nationalization,’2cast doubt on the notion, fashionable at the height of the neoliberal wave, that the state was essentially on its way out, as many of its tasks and responsibilities were oozing steadily and irreversibly toward the market. The state and, by the same token, the political seemed back – with a vengeance, triggering solemn announcements of ‘the return of the state’ and ‘the end of the ideology of public powerlessness.’3Observers concurred. ‘Free-market capitalism, globalization, and deregulation’ had been ‘rising across the globe for 30 years,’ yet that era now had ended: ‘Global economic and financial integration are reversing. The role of the state, together with financial and trade protectionism, is ascending.’4Triggering a perceived ‘paradigm shift towards a more European, a more social state,’ even in the United States and in China, the crisis was seen to herald a move ‘back towards a mixed economy.’5The question, meanwhile, remained: had the state indeed withdrawn as much during the neoliberal era as is often assumed?


considerable advantages, too, for the spread of producer co-operatives. In addition, while bypassing the obstacle posed by economic fragmentation, such investments would nevertheless be attacking it, thus raising the degree of economic integration. No doubt, these investments would require industrial inputs at a higher level than before and the financing of this might imply that the planners have to give up some of the surplus extracted from the agricultural sector for use by it within its boundaries. In our opinion, this approach provides the basis for achieving high growth targets in the medium term without compromising on the distributional front at the class, sector, or regional levels. Two qualifications need to be registered. First, this does not imply that the DTYP target of y = 7.5 per cent per annum becomes feasible in this strategy. Even in Case A, the argument was only partly that it was probably not achievable; rather, that achieving it with n = 3.5 per cent would almost certainly lead to a vicious inflationary spiral, thereby worsening income distribution. In Case B, the burden of financing would be shared in an egalitarian manner through the rationing system but its average level would not be any different. What is being argued is that, first, for any given n, y* (C) > y* (A, B), and second, the rate of growth of n would be substantially greater over time in Case C than in Case A or B. Thus, Case C could be viewed as laying the basis for an eventual second phase of an industrialisation drive of the type now being proposed, in our view, prematurely. Second, it is probable that under Case C, rural foodgrain consumption would rise in the short run. In this strategy, too, state farms would play a crucial part in the transitional phase and beyond. It is necessary therefore to assist them in achieving efficiency quickly, and to overcome the problems of haphazard location and early growth. A period of consolidation might be necessary prior to any further expansion on any large scale. Finally, we need to turn our focus to the problems of urban poverty and unemployment which are not directly handled in any of the three cases. A separate policy component is therefore called for. A two-pronged approach is necessary. The first of these is to ensure that all low-income earners are covered by the urban rationing system. In the present context, this would require extending the coverage to the smaller urban centres and even in the larger ones to that lowest strata which might not be registered in any urban kebele. Thus, the AMC needs to grow greatly and quickly. It is in this context that the current and future role of the state farm sector has to be seen. Even within the framework of Case C, it will be some time before the area of stable grain yields is extended to a point where the urban populations are not held to ransom by the weather all too frequently; in the meantime, the state farms provide an insurance cover which is indispensible. (A corresponding function would be performed in the food-insecure rural areas by the grain banks suggested earlier.) Further, the kebele shops need to move more into the inferior cereals, in particular, sorghum, maize and black teff. Improving the storage facilities of the AMC and state farms could achieve the welcome result of lowering cost by anything up to 15-20 per cent on some crops. All such gains registered should reflect themselves in lower prices for the inferior, rather than for the superior, cereals as appears to have been the case in the recent past.


Eminak ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 153-159
Author(s):  
Yulia Pasichna ◽  
Andriy Berestovyi

By the beginning of 1905, a crisis was impending in all spheres of Russian society. Agrarian problems caused by objective and subjective factors prompted the peasantry to declare their principled positions on solving agrarian problems. The period of 1905-1907 is a vivid example of the struggle of the driving independent force of the revolution, the peasantry, for carrying out an agrarian revolution. Goal: To study the social and political activity of the Russian peasantry in 1905-1907. During 1905-1907, Russia was unsettled by a tide of the social and political activity of the peasantry. The protests, which began in Poltava and Kharkiv Provinces, spread throughout the state and in a short time became uncontrollable by the authorities. Scholars give different figures for the total number of peasant unrests, but despite these differences, it is not difficult to determine that during 1905-1907 peasant unrests covered up to 50% of all European Russia in different periods of peasants� revolutionary activity. Manifestations of the social and political activity of the peasantry can be observed in early 1905 in the spontaneous seizure of landowners� estates, later the peasants started to pillage, plunder, damage agricultural implements, go on strikes, and cut down forests without permission. The manifestations of early 1905 did not become a novelty for Russian society, but 1905 � 1907 were a test for the power structures of the state. After all, the peasantry, although they still �believed in the tsar�, reacted to the unsystematic actions of the power in solving agrarian problems by radical actions and the large-scale protests.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Agur

This article examines Indian telecom policy from independence to the present. Dividing this period into three phases – from 1947 to 1984, 1984 to 1991 and 1991 to the present – the article explores the role of the state in India’s dramatic transformation from a telecommunications laggard to one of the world’s largest markets in mobile communication. It draws on a wide range of government documents, institutional surveys (domestic and international) of Indian telephony, memoirs and analyses by policy officials, and interviews with telecom executives. This article makes two arguments. First, it emphasizes the importance of external forces, including economic pressures, obligations to foreign creditors and the arrival of outsiders into key policymaking positions. Second, it provides an alternative to the simplistic argument that the state has ‘left telecommunications to the private sector’. Rather than abandon its role in network building and maintenance, the Indian government has deployed its power in specific and deliberate ways. While much of this policy development was unanticipated and at times accidental, Indian telephony has been transformed from an inward-looking and defensive statist monopoly to an internationalized, technocratic marketplace.


2018 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Pusey

This article, based on an edited transcript of a speech at The Australian Sociological Association (TASA) conference in Melbourne in December 2016, summarises the criticisms of ‘economic rationalism’, cum neoliberalism, that emerged from the ‘economic rationalism debate’ in Australia of the early 1990s to the present. Economic rationalism reversed Australia’s historic nation-building legacy. Free market neoliberal doctrines have captured the central Canberra policy-making apparatus and radically reduced the coordinating role of the state in most areas of public policy. Economic ‘reform’ is seen primarily as a political project led by international and domestic corporate interest groupings and aimed at the transformation of Australia’s institutions. The neoliberal orthodoxy continues to distort the policy process as it has become functionally indispensable for the process of policy making and government, despite its failing intellectual legitimacy.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacobus Delwaide

Massive government-financed rescue operations for banking and insurance industries in the United States and in Europe, seeking to contain the financial crisis that culminated in 2008, amounted to ‘the biggest, broadest and fastest government response in history.’ This ‘great stabilisation,’ as The Economist called it, resulting in ‘quasi’ or ‘shadow nationalization,’ cast doubt on the notion, fashionable at the height of the neoliberal wave, that the state was essentially on its way out, as many of its tasks and responsibilities were oozing steadily and irreversibly toward the market. The state and, by the same token, the political seemed back – with a vengeance, triggering solemn announcements of ‘the return of the state’ and ‘the end of the ideology of public powerlessness.’ Observers concurred. ‘Free-market capitalism, globalization, and deregulation’ had been ‘rising across the globe for 30 years,’ yet that era now had ended: ‘Global economic and financial integration are reversing. The role of the state, together with financial and trade protectionism, is ascending.’ Triggering a perceived ‘paradigm shift towards a more European, a more social state,’ even in the United States and in China, the crisis was seen to herald a move ‘back towards a mixed economy.’ The question, meanwhile, remained: had the state indeed withdrawn as much during the neoliberal era as is often assumed?


Author(s):  
Anthony R. Zito

New policy instruments have come onto the policy agenda since the 1970s, but there is a real question as to whether the ideas behind the design of such tools are actually all that “new” when you assess the role of the policy instrument in its particular institutional and policy context. Taking Hood’s 1983 categorization of instruments as tools that manipulate society to achieve public goals via nodality (information), authority, treasure (finance), or organization, we can find instances where innovations in these areas pre-date the 1970s. Nevertheless, the mention of these instruments in international organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and national institutions and debates as the means for both improving governance and protecting economic efficiency have increased in light of a number of interacting trends: the rise of neo-liberal and new management ideologies, the increasing perception of a number of wicked problems (e.g., climate change) and nested, politically sensitive problems (e.g., health and welfare policy), a rethinking of the role of the state, and other reasons. A typology is offered for differentiating changes and innovation in policy instruments. There have been some very notable and complex policy instruments that have reshaped politics and public policy in a particular policy sector: a notable example of this is emissions trading systems, which create market conditions to reduce emissions of climate change gases and other by-products. Information and financial instruments have become more prominent as tools used to achieve policy aims by the state, but equally significant is the fact that, in some cases, it is the societal actors themselves that are organizing and supporting the management of an instrument voluntarily. However, this obscures the fact that a much more significant evolution of policy instruments has come in the area that is associated with traditional governing, namely regulation. The reality of this “command and control” instrument is that many historical situations have witnessed a more flexible relationship between the regulator and the regulated than the term suggests. Nevertheless, many OECD political systems have seen a move towards “smart” or flexible regulation. In promoting this new understanding of regulation, it is increasingly important to see regulation as being supplemented by, supported by, and sometimes reinforcing new policy instruments. It is the integration of these “newer” policy instruments into the regulatory framework that represents perhaps the most significant change. Nevertheless, there is some reason to question the real impact new policy instruments have in terms of effectiveness and democratic legitimacy.


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