MORAL JUDGMENT OF PRESCHOOL KUWAITI CHILDREN

2002 ◽  
Vol 30 (6) ◽  
pp. 539-545
Author(s):  
Fatima Nazar ◽  
Kamiar Kouzekanani
Keyword(s):  
Preschool Children ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Socialization Process ◽  
Kuwaiti Children

This study examined the moral judgment of 108 Kuwaiti preschool children. The children were tested on two dimensions of Piaget's moral theory, namely moral realism and justice. Four stories patterned after Piaget's work were used to assess the children's moral judgment. Two stories dealt with moral realism, and two other stories dealt with the issue of justice. Results suggest that the children in this present study are well advanced in their moral judgments in terms of equality and justice, as contrasted with Piaget's original findings. The results of the present study were interpreted in the light of previous research, as well as with regard to the socialization process of children.

Representing and Caring that Pain is Bad

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Marshall
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Moral Motivation ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Perception ◽  
Partial Analysis ◽  
Judgment Internalism ◽  
Present View

This chapter extends Compassionate Moral Realism with an eye towards the issue of judgment internalism, that is, whether moral representation is necessarily connected to motivation. The challenges of giving a uniform account of the cognitive and motivational aspects of moral judgment are illustrated, and the possibility of a non-uniform, pluralist view is considered. After noting Compassionate Moral Realism’s compatibility with judgment pluralism, accounts are offered of both emotionally hot and emotionally cool moral judgments, using Chapter 12’s partial analysis of objective badness. In each case, a necessary connection to moral motivation is identified. For emotionally cool judgments, an agent who is not motivated is epistemically lacking by a standard that she acknowledges in that very judgment. Finally, it is explained how the present view can offer an attractive understanding of moral perception, as understood by Lawrence Blum and others.

HUME AND SMITH ON SYMPATHY, APPROBATION, AND MORAL JUDGMENT

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 208-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Affective Reactions ◽  
Adequate Account ◽  
Moral Thought

AbstractDavid Hume and Adam Smith are usually, and understandably, seen as developing very similar sentimentalist accounts of moral thought and practice. As similar as Hume's and Smith's accounts of moral thought are, they differ in telling ways. This essay is an attempt primarily to get clear on the important differences. They are worth identifying and exploring, in part, because of the great extent to which Hume and Smith share not just an overall approach to moral theory but also a conception of what the key components of an adequate account of moral thought will be. In the process, I hope to bring out the extent to which they both worked to make sense of the fact that we do not merely have affective reactions but also, importantly, make moral judgments.

scholarly journals Impartiality through ‘Moral Optics’: Why Adam Smith revised David Hume's Moral Sentimentalism

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Christel Fricke ◽  
Maria Alejandra Carrasco
Keyword(s):  
Visual Perception ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Moral Sentiments ◽  
Moral Sentimentalism ◽  
Critical Response ◽  
Main Challenge ◽  
Moral Theories

We read Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments as a critical response to David Hume's moral theory. While both share a commitment to moral sentimentalism, they propose different ways of meeting its main challenge, that is, explaining how judgments informed by (partial) sentiments can nevertheless have a justified claim to general authority. This difference is particularly manifest in their respective accounts of ‘moral optics’, or the way they rely on the analogy between perceptual and moral judgments. According to Hume, making perceptual and moral judgments requires focusing on frequently co-occurring impressions (perceptions of objects or reactive sentiments) for tracking an existing object with its perceptual properties or an agent's character traits. Smith uses visual perception for the purpose of illustrating one source of the partiality of the sentiments people feel in response to actions. Before making a moral judgment, people have to disregard this partiality and accept that they are all equally important. Smith and Hume's different ways of relying on the same analogy reveals the still-overlooked and yet profound differences between their moral theories.

Metaethics

Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Miller
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Subject Matter ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Philosophical Study ◽  
False Response ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Moral Requirements ◽  
Moral Facts

Metaethics can be described as the philosophical study of the nature of moral judgment. It is concerned with such questions as: Do moral judgments express beliefs or rather desires and inclinations? Are moral judgments apt to be assessed in terms of truth and falsity? Do moral sentences have factual meaning? Are any moral judgments true or are they systematically and uniformly false? Is there such a thing as moral knowledge? Are moral judgments less objective than, say, judgments about the shapes and sizes of middle-sized physical objects? Is there a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation? Are moral requirements requirements of reason? Do moral judgments have a natural or non-natural subject matter? A useful way of starting on metaethics is to distinguish between realist and non-realist views of morality. Moral realists hold that moral judgments express beliefs, and that some of those beliefs are true in virtue of mind-independent moral facts. Opposition to moral realism can take a number of forms. Expressivists deny that moral judgments express beliefs, claiming instead that they express non truth-assessable mental states such as desires or inclinations. Error theorists and (revolutionary) fictionalists claim that moral judgments are systematically false. Response-dependence views of moral judgments allow that moral judgments express beliefs and that at least some of them are true, but hold that they are true in virtue of mind-dependent moral facts. Moral realism itself comes in many varieties: reductionist, non-reductionist, naturalist, non-naturalist, internalist, externalist, analytic, and synthetic.

Is Empathy Required for Making Moral Judgments?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Deigh
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Psychopathic Personality ◽  
Critical Examination ◽  
Psychological Profile ◽  
Main Thesis ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Additional Support

This essay is a study of the nature of moral judgment. Its main thesis is that moral judgment is a type of judgment defined by its content and not its psychological profile. The essay arrives at this thesis through a critical examination of Hume’s sentimentalism and the role of empathy in its account of moral judgment. The main objection to Hume’s account is its exclusion of people whom one can describe as making moral judgments though they have no motivation to act on them. Consideration of such people, particularly those with a psychopathic personality, argues for a distinction between different types of moral judgment in keeping with the essay’s main thesis. Additional support for the main thesis is then drawn from Piaget’s theory of moral judgment in children.

Effect of Power on Moral Judgment

1978 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 387-394
Author(s):  
Russell Hamby
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Low Power ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Factorial Design ◽  
High Power ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Need For Power ◽  
Experimenter Effects

Ambiguous effects of power on attributions of moral responsibility for an accident are interpreted to result from the intervening effects of need for power, which is aroused by the anticipation of exercising power over another. 160 subjects from introductory social psychology classes participated in a questionnaire-type experiment comparing effects of high/low carelessness, severe/minor consequences, and high/low power of the attributor in a 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design. In a follow-up experiment 30 subjects were assigned to conditions of high or low power, and their needs for power and moral attributions were measured. High power seemed to arouse need for power, which was curvilinearly related to moral judgments. Those high and low in need for power attributed more moral responsibility to the perpetrator of an accident than those with moderate levels of need for power. The results suggest complicated models of both moral judgments and experimenter effects related to the level or arousal of motivations.

scholarly journals Small-scale societies exhibit fundamental variation in the role of intentions in moral judgment

2016 ◽  
Vol 113 (17) ◽  
pp. 4688-4693 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. Clark Barrett ◽  
Alexander Bolyanatz ◽  
Alyssa N. Crittenden ◽  
Daniel M. T. Fessler ◽  
Simon Fitzpatrick ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Narrow Range ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Small Scale ◽  
Cultural Variation ◽  
Moral Assessment ◽  
Mitigating Circumstances

Intent and mitigating circumstances play a central role in moral and legal assessments in large-scale industrialized societies. Although these features of moral assessment are widely assumed to be universal, to date, they have only been studied in a narrow range of societies. We show that there is substantial cross-cultural variation among eight traditional small-scale societies (ranging from hunter-gatherer to pastoralist to horticulturalist) and two Western societies (one urban, one rural) in the extent to which intent and mitigating circumstances influence moral judgments. Although participants in all societies took such factors into account to some degree, they did so to very different extents, varying in both the types of considerations taken into account and the types of violations to which such considerations were applied. The particular patterns of assessment characteristic of large-scale industrialized societies may thus reflect relatively recently culturally evolved norms rather than inherent features of human moral judgment.

Preschoolers' Imaginativeness: Subtypes, Correlates, and Maladaptive Extremes

1985 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 349-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roni Beth Tower
Keyword(s):  
Preschool Children ◽  
Child Development ◽  
Healthy Child ◽  
Observational Studies ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Research Questions ◽  
Negative Implication

In a study of forty-three preschool children, ratings of four types of the children's imaginativeness were correlated with observational, behavioral, and interview measures. Research questions were: 1) Do correlates of imaginativeness found in observational studies replicate if trait rather than state measures are examined? 2) Do different types of imaginativeness have different correlates? and 3) What characteristics distinguish children at the maladaptive extremes of imaginativeness from those at more moderate levels? The conceptual and empirical utility of considering imaginativeness to have two dimensions, Expressive and Constructive, was demonstrated. While optimal levels of Constructive Imaginativeness correlated significantly with other indices of healthy child development, the correlations were fewer and tended to be weaker for Expressive Imaginativeness. The negative implication of extremes was documented.

Developmental Study of Moral Judgments by Japanese Children

1991 ◽  
Vol 68 (3_suppl) ◽  
pp. 1131-1136
Author(s):  
Hirotsugu Yamauchi
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Causal Attribution ◽  
Helping Behavior ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Developmental Study ◽  
Two Dimensional ◽  
Frequency Data ◽  
Japanese Children ◽  
Dual Scaling ◽  
Evaluative Feedback

The purpose of this study was to examine the determinants of causal attribution in the contexts of moral judgment and the developmental shifts of the determinants. Subjects were children in Grades 2, 4, and 6 ( ns = 83, 122, and 84). Moral judgments were measured by asking subjects to provide “evaluative feedback” to an hypothetical child's helping behavior. The method of dual scaling was applied to the frequency data of moral judgments. Two-dimensional solutions show that subjects judged whether the hypothetical child should be rewarded or punished and what amount of reward or punishment was given to the hypothetical child. Developmental shifts were found for moral judgment.

scholarly journals Famine, Affluence, and Amorality

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
David Sackris
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
First Person ◽  
Moral Decision ◽  
Moral Decision Making ◽  
Distinct Kind ◽  
Ordinary Case ◽  
Made In ◽  
The Way

I argue that the debate concerning the nature of first-person moral judgment, namely, whether such moral judgments are inherently motivating (internalism) or whether moral judgments can be made in the absence of motivation (externalism), may be founded on a faulty assumption: that moral judgments form a distinct kind that must have some shared, essential features in regards to motivation to act. I argue that there is little reason to suppose that first-person moral judgments form a homogenous class in this respect by considering an ordinary case: student readers of Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”. Neither internalists nor externalists can provide a satisfying account as to why our students fail to act in this particular case, but are motivated to act by their moral judgments in most cases. I argue that the inability to provide a satisfying account is rooted in this shared assumption about the nature of moral judgments. Once we consider rejecting the notion that first-person moral decision- making forms a distinct kind in the way it is typically assumed, the internalist/externalist debate may be rendered moot.

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