Modularity

Philosophy ◽  
2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edouard Machery
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Psychology ◽  
Massive Modularity ◽  
Philosophical Project ◽  
The Mind

One of the liveliest debates within cognitive science and the philosophy of psychology concerns the extent to which, and in which sense, the mind is modular. Several different notions of module have been developed over the years, and clarifying the weaker and stronger notions of module is an important, substantial philosophical project. A range of arguments has been conceived to show that modular processes subserve all cognitive competences, some of them, or none of them, and these need to be scrutinized with care. Of particular importance are, first, Fodor’s view that modules subserve only input systems (roughly, our senses) and linguistic systems, while nonmodular, domain-general processes subserve thinking and deciding; and, second, evolutionary psychologists’ massive modularity hypothesis, according to which cognition is modular through and through.

Fodor, Jerry Alan (1935–)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Godfrey-Smith
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Information Processing ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Primary Concern ◽  
Philosophy Of Psychology ◽  
Internal Representations ◽  
Jerry Fodor ◽  
The World ◽  
The Mind

Jerry Fodor has been one of the most influential figures in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of psychology, and ‘cognitive science’ through the latter part of the twentieth century. His primary concern has been to argue (vigorously) for a certain view of the nature of thought. According to this view, thinking is information processing within ‘the language of thought’. The mind can be understood as a computer, which directs action with the aid of internal representations of the world.

Beérkezett könyvek

2005 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 425-427
Author(s):  
Csaba Pléh
Keyword(s):  
Social Interaction ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Evolutionary Psychology ◽  
Well Being ◽  
General Intelligence ◽  
Human Thought ◽  
Number Of Genes ◽  
History Of ◽  
Origin Of Mind ◽  
The Mind

Ádám György: A rejtozködo elme. Egy fiziológus széljegyzetei Carpendale, J. I. M. és Müller, U. (eds): Social interaction and the development of knowledge Cloninger, R. C.: Feeling good. The science of well being Dunbar, Robin, Barrett, Louise, Lycett, John: Evolutionary psychology Dunbar, Robin: The human story. A new history of makind's evolution Geary, D. C.: The origin of mind. Evolution of brain, cognition and general intelligence Gedeon Péter, Pál Eszter, Sárkány Mihály, Somlai Péter: Az evolúció elméletei és metaforái a társadalomtudományokban Harré, Rom: Cognitive science: A philosophical introduction Horváth György: Pedagógiai pszichológia Marcus, G.: The birth of the mind. How a tiny number of genes creates the complexities of human thought Solso, R. D.: The psychology of art and the evolution of the conscious brain Wray, A. (ed.): The transition to language

Information and mechanical models of intelligence

2005 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 565-582 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Eunice Quilici Gonzalez
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Computer Simulations ◽  
Advanced Technology ◽  
Main Topic ◽  
Social Environments ◽  
Meaningful Information ◽  
Intelligent Behavior ◽  
Mechanical Models ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Impact

The impact of new advanced technology on issues that concern meaningful information and its relation to studies of intelligence constitutes the main topic of the present paper. The advantages, disadvantages and implications of the synthetic methodology developed by cognitive scientists, according to which mechanical models of the mind, such as computer simulations or self-organizing robots, may provide good explanatory tools to investigate cognition, are discussed. A difficulty with this methodology is pointed out, namely the use of meaningless information to explain intelligent behavior that incorporates meaningful information. In this context, it is inquired what are the contributions of cognitive science to contemporary studies of intelligent behavior and how technology may play a role in the analysis of the relationships established by organisms in their natural and social environments.

Modular Representations of Cognitive Phenomena in AI, Psychology and Neuroscience

2011 ◽  
pp. 66-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joanna J. Bryson
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Modular Representations ◽  
Domain Specific ◽  
Massive Modularity ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Individual Domain ◽  
Behavior Based

Many architectures of mind assume some form of modularity, but what is meant by the term ‘module’? This chapter creates a framework for understanding current modularity research in three subdisciplines of cognitive science: psychology, artificial intelligence (AI), and neuroscience. This framework starts from the distinction between horizontal modules that support all expressed behaviors vs. vertical modules that support individual domain-specific capacities. The framework is used to discuss innateness, automaticity, compositionality, representations, massive modularity, behavior-based and multi-agent AI systems, and correspondence to physiological neurosystems. There is also a brief discussion of the relevance of modularity to conscious experience.

The Heterocosmic Self: Analogy, Temporality and Structural Couplings in Proust’s Swann’s Way

2020 ◽  
pp. 95-112
Author(s):  
Marco Bernini
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
The Self ◽  
Extended Self ◽  
The World ◽  
The Mind

The idea of a distribution of the mind into the world has been largely considered as an empowering of the mind’s domain, an enlargement of its cognitive territory (a cognitive positivity). Experientially, however, it might generate a feeling of disconcerting fluidity or even an anxiety of groundlessness (an ontological concern), especially if we apply the idea of distribution to the self. What if we consider the self too as unbounded, extended and constantly constituted by ever-changing structural couplings with the world? This chapter focuses on the consequences of this question as explored by Marcel Proust’s Swann’s Way. If extended and enactive frameworks can provide important insights on Proust’s literary endeavour, Proust’s devious use of analogies and his focus on analogical experiences as tell-tale markers of the extended self can offer back to cognitive science new avenues of research about phenomenological and ontological aspects related to extended or enactive models of mind, memory, self and cognition.

Situated approaches to musical experience

2019 ◽  
pp. 11-33
Author(s):  
Christoph Seibert
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Research Tool ◽  
Musical Experience ◽  
Musical Practice ◽  
Conceptual Clarity ◽  
Musical Practices ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Theoretical Considerations ◽  
Systematic Framework

Informed by a review of recent attempts in cognitive science to overcome head-bound conceptions of the mind, this chapter investigates the contribution of ‘situated’ approaches to understanding music and consciousness, focusing on musical experience. It develops a systematic framework for discriminating between situated approaches, and based on this framework and an analysis of specific scenarios discusses the ways in which musical experience may be conceptualized as ‘situated’, elucidating the implications and explanatory potential of different approaches. Finally, there is a consideration of the framework’s value as a research tool for the analysis of situated aspects of musical practices. The aim is to advance an understanding of music and consciousness by contributing to conceptual clarity and by enriching the relationship between theoretical considerations and observation of musical practice.

Ethics, Law and the Challenge of Cognitive Science

2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (6) ◽  
pp. 577-615 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Mahlmann
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
General Relation ◽  
Ontological Status ◽  
Legal Standards ◽  
Cognitive Accessibility ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Ethics Law

Many questions come to the mind if one starts thinking about morality and the law - questions about the epistemological or ontological status of morality, its content, motivating force or cognitive accessibility. They concern the content of norms, the enigma of justice and the demands of human solidarity. The universality, particularity or relativity of morality and material legal standards is as much an issue as the general relation of morality and the law.

On the Philosophy of Cognitive Science

1998 ◽  
pp. 32-36
Author(s):  
Henrique de Morais Ribeiro
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Body Problem ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Philosophy Of Cognitive Science ◽  
Irreducible Elements ◽  
Framework Model ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Ontological Problem

Psychophysical dualism — the distinction between mind and body — is the counterposition between essentially irreducible elements: the mind and body. Such a dualism implies the main ontological problem of the philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of mind: the mind-body problem (MBP). The dualism and the referred-to problem has been insistently discussed in the philosophical tradition and several solutions have been proposed. Such solutions are properly philosophical or require a scientific approach. First, I will expound the philosophical solution to the MBP proposed by Descartes, to be followed by an exposition of Ryle's criticisms to the solution. Second, from Ryle's criticism, I will deduce a scientific solution to the MBP related to the neural framework model of mind in cognitive science by means of what I call 'the principle of the embodiment of the mind.' Finally, I shall point out the philosophical difficulties that are to be found in using such a principle.

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