Clientelism and Vote-Maximizing in Indigenous Latin America

2020 ◽  
pp. 178-199
Author(s):  
Karleen Jones West
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Survey Data ◽  
Vote Buying

The analysis presented in this chapter indicates that indigenous voters are disproportionately targeted as clients in vote-buying schemes, which is why the distribution of patronage has become a necessary vote-maximizing strategy for ethnic-party candidates to utilize to earn votes. This finding gives further credence to the argument that ethnic-party candidates must compete using the tactics employed by mainstream candidates to win votes. As such, it was unfair to expect that ethnic-party candidates could ever be more consistently policy-focused, given the expectations of patronage that indigenous constituents have during campaign season. To demonstrate the power of clientelism as a technique to attract indigenous supporters, this chapter analyzes AmericasBarometer survey data from fifteen countries across Latin America. The results show that not only are indigenous voters more likely to be targeted for clientelism, but ethnic-party supporters specifically are also more likely to be approached to sell their votes. These findings therefore provide evidence of the generalizability of the argument that ethnic-party candidates face strong incentives to engage in the clientelist behavior of mainstream parties in order to win votes across Latin America.

Protest Issues and Political Inequality in Latin America

2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (9) ◽  
pp. 1299-1323
Author(s):  
Nicolás M. Somma ◽  
Matías Bargsted ◽  
Felipe Sánchez
Keyword(s):  
Socioeconomic Status ◽  
Latin America ◽  
Survey Data ◽  
Latin American ◽  
Political Behavior ◽  
Regression Models ◽  
Policy Changes ◽  
Political Field ◽  
Political Inequality ◽  
Socioeconomic Resources

Many studies reveal that socioeconomic resources increase protest participation, lending more political voice to the affluent and reinforcing preexisting political inequality. But existing studies ignore whether this holds across different protest issues. We argue that some issues reinforce political inequality, while other ones do not. We differentiate between survival protests—in which people react to direct threats to their material and social survival—and furtherance protests—which press authorities to make policy changes that seek to improve some aspect of society. Regression models with Latin American survey data show that people with higher socioeconomic status are overrepresented in furtherance protests, by implication reinforcing preexisting political inequality. However, survival protests attract people socioeconomically similar to national averages, contributing to a more balanced political field. Our results emphasize the need to reconsider the place of issues in the study of protest participation, political inequality, and political behavior in general.

Education and trust: A tale of three continents

2018 ◽  
Vol 40 (5) ◽  
pp. 676-693
Author(s):  
Cecilia Güemes ◽  
Francisco Herreros
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Social Status ◽  
Survey Data ◽  
Social Intelligence ◽  
Indirect Evidence ◽  
Weak States ◽  
Highly Educated ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Positive Effect ◽  
Theoretical Insight

To date, most research finds education to have a positive effect on trust. Education increases people’s social intelligence, making them better able to distinguish between trustworthy and opportunistic types. Alternatively, education allows people to attain privileged social status, making them more resistant to deceit and exploitation by opportunistic types. In this article we show that this is not always the case. The relationship between education and trust is mediated by state efficacy; where the state is relatively efficacious, trustworthy types largely survive, while the opposite is true with relatively weak states. In weak states, highly educated people should be the least trustful. We empirically demonstrate this theoretical insight with survey data from three continents, Europe and Africa at the extremes and Latin America in the middle. We provide some indirect evidence in favor of social intelligence as the key mechanism linking education and trust.

Survey Data for the Study of Aging in Latin America and the Caribbean

2006 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebeca Wong ◽  
Martha Peláez ◽  
Alberto Palloni ◽  
Kyriakos Markides
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Survey Data ◽  
The Caribbean

VOTE TRAFFICKING IN LEBANON

2012 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 483-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Corstange
Keyword(s):  
Survey Data ◽  
Electoral Politics ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Sensitive Questions ◽  
Parliamentary Elections ◽  
Political Alliances ◽  
List Experiment ◽  
Original Survey

AbstractVote buying and vote selling are prominent features of electoral politics in Lebanon. This article investigates how vote trafficking works in Lebanese elections and examines how electoral rules and practices contribute to wide and lively vote markets. Using original survey data from the 2009 parliamentary elections, it studies vote selling with a list experiment, a question technique designed to elicit truthful answers to sensitive questions. The data show that over half of the Lebanese sold their votes in 2009. Moreover, once we come to grips with the sensitivity of the topic, the data show that members of all sectarian communities and political alliances sold their votes at similar rates.

Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot

2008 ◽  
Vol 102 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
SIMEON NICHTER
Keyword(s):  
Survey Data ◽  
Alternative Explanation ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Secret Ballot ◽  
Empirical Tests ◽  
Machine Politics

Scholars typically understand vote buying as offering particularistic benefits in exchange for vote choices. This depiction of vote buying presents a puzzle: with the secret ballot, what prevents individuals from accepting rewards and then voting as they wish? An alternative explanation, which I term “turnout buying,” suggests why parties might offer rewards even if they cannot monitor vote choices. By rewarding unmobilized supporters for showing up at the polls, parties can activate their passive constituencies. Because turnout buying targets supporters, it only requires monitoring whether individuals vote. Much of what scholars interpret as vote buying may actually be turnout buying. Reward targeting helps to distinguish between these strategies. Whereas Stokes's vote-buying model predicts that parties target moderate opposers, a model of turnout buying predicts that they target strong supporters. Although the two strategies coexist, empirical tests suggest that Argentine survey data in Stokes 2005 are more consistent with turnout buying.

Crime Victimization and Political Participation

2012 ◽  
Vol 106 (3) ◽  
pp. 570-587 ◽  
Author(s):  
REGINA BATESON
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Political Participation ◽  
Survey Data ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Exposure To Violence ◽  
Crime Victims ◽  
Political Life ◽  
Crime Victimization ◽  
Violent Crimes ◽  
The World

Crime victimization is an important cause of political participation. Analysis of survey data from five continents shows that individuals who report recent crime victimization participate in politics more than comparable nonvictims. Rather than becoming withdrawn or disempowered, crime victims tend to become more engaged in civic and political life. The effect of crime victimization is roughly equivalent to an additional five to ten years of education, meaning that crime victimization ranks among the most influential predictors of political participation. Prior research has shown that exposure to violence during some civil wars can result in increased political participation, but this article demonstrates that the effect of victimization extends to peacetime, to nonviolent as well as violent crimes, and across most of the world. At the same time, however, crime victimization is sometimes associated with dissatisfaction with democracy and support for authoritarianism, vigilantism, and harsh policing tactics, especially in Latin America.

The Myth of Vote Buying in India

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pradeep K. Chhibber ◽  
Rahul Verma
Keyword(s):  
Survey Data ◽  
Tamil Nadu ◽  
National Election ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Club Goods ◽  
Common View ◽  
Election Studies ◽  
Buying In

A common view is that in Indian elections parties, politicians, and voters are engaged in a quid-pro-quo in which citizens vote for a politician who offers them individual benefits. We find no evidence that voters exchange votes for benefits. In fact, ideology is a better predictor of the vote than the receipt of private or club goods. The use of cash is indeed widespread in India during election time but money is needed to build the campaign, to mobilize votes and for candidates, and to establish candidates’ credibility as leaders of import. We show this using the survey data from national election studies, a case study, and the results of a small experiment in Tamil Nadu.

Patterns and Puzzles

2021 ◽  
pp. 44-80
Author(s):  
Carew Boulding ◽  
Claudio A. Holzner
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Political Participation ◽  
Political Interest ◽  
Political Activity ◽  
The Political ◽  
Poor People ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Government Officials ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter describes in detail patterns of political participation in Latin America with a particular focus on the political activity of poor citizens. It also introduces the book’s measures of poverty and political participation and engages in some preliminary statistical analysis in order to rule out alternative explanations. We identify three important findings: first, the poorest individuals in Latin America now participate in politics at least as much as, if not more than, more affluent individuals; second, the relationship between wealth and political activism is not uniform across countries or acts: in some places poor people participate more than the affluent, in most countries there is no difference in overall levels of participation across social classes, and in a few countries political stratification by class continues; third, the chapter shows that poor people do vote and protest a bit less than more affluent people but contact government more. It is the frequency with which poor people contact government officials that accounts for much of the equality in political participation that the book identifies. The analysis finds little evidence that individual-level factors explain these patterns. Instead, poor individuals participate as much or more than more affluent individuals despite possessing lower levels of education, political interest, and wealth. The chapter also explores the effect that efforts at vote buying and clientelist mobilization have on poor people’s activism, showing that although clientelism is common, it not the only mechanism through which poor people are mobilized into politics.

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