Indonesia

2021 ◽  
pp. 251-266
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter highlights the origins and growth of Indonesian judicial review. Indonesia today is a constitutional democracy that has attained surprising success in eliminating hyper-presidentialism by implementing important checks and balances on presidential power; by separating executive, legislative, and judicial power; and by attaining rapidly an astonishing amount of decentralization since 1998. That degree of checks and balances and of decentralization has undoubtedly made Indonesians much freer than they were under President Suharto’s dictatorship. The Indonesian Constitutional Court seems to function well and enjoys the confidence of the people. Looked at from an American perspective, however, Indonesia is a constitutional democracy, which does not yet fully protect freedom of expression, freedom of religion, or economic freedoms to the extent that those freedoms are protected by the U.S. Supreme Court. Indonesia’s Bill of Rights and its system of judicial review originated for rights from wrongs reasons, because of borrowing, and because power is sufficiently divided in Indonesia, as a result of the separation of powers and federalism, so that there is political space in which the Supreme Court can operate.

2021 ◽  
pp. 115-132
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter looks at the Japanese experience with judicial review. The Supreme Court of Japan does not enforce those parts of the Japanese Constitution, like Article 9, which prohibits war making; Article 21, which protects freedom of speech; or Article 89, which forbids taxpayer money from being used to hire Shinto priests. The Supreme Court of Japan thus refuses to enforce important articles in the Constitution of Japan. It does rubber stamp and thus legitimize actions taken by the political branches of the government. Why has judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation failed to take root in Japan? Japan does not need either a federal or a separation of powers umpire, since Japan is, firstly, a unitary nation-state with no need for a federalism umpire; and, secondly, a parliamentary democracy with a weak upper house of the legislature. Moreover, Japan has never atoned for the wrongs it committed during World War II nor has it truly admitted to even having done the horrible things that Japan did. A nation cannot get rights from wrongs judicial review and a Bill of Rights unless it admits it has done something wrong. Finally, the Japanese Constitution contains an inadequate system of checks and balances. As a result, the Supreme Court of Japan may not have the political space within which it can assert power.


2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 469-499
Author(s):  
Aminath Asfa Shafie ◽  
Shamrahayu Abdul Aziz

The Supreme Court of Maldives is entrusted with the responsibility of upholding the supremacy of the Constitution. However, within the last ten years, the Supreme Court has been criticized for the Court’s slow but steady progression to encroach on the powers of the parliament and as a result, undermine the supremacy of the Constitution. The objective and purpose of this article are to entail how the Supreme Court of Maldives had utilized its power to judicial review to undermine the supremacy of the Constitution over the years. This article uses library-based research. It analyses the principles of separation of powers, checks and balances and judicial review and how these principles are adopted in the Maldives. In addition, this article reviews and analyzes the decisions of the Supreme Court which are in contradiction to the Constitution. The findings of the article are evidential of how the Supreme Court had performed the constitutionally mandated legislative functions of the parliament through the Court’s power to judicial review. The Supreme Court had established guidelines, regulated the rights and freedoms specified in the Constitution, and determined procedures.  This article concludes by emphasizing the importance of exercising restraint when performing the constitutionally mandated functions of each branch, in order to ensure the supremacy of the Constitution as well the effective functioning of the three branches of government.


Author(s):  
Desyanti Desyanti ◽  
Sudarsono Sudarsono ◽  
Muchamad Ali Safa’at ◽  
Tunggul Anshari Setia Negara

There are differences in the characteristics of judicial review in the Supreme Court and in the Constitutional Court in terms of the object being tested and the use of test stones that are indeed by the authority granted by the 1945 Constitution. The principle of audi et alteram partem is a general principle in the study of law, so the judicial review process in the Supreme Court which is only one-way and closed should not be carried out. This article analyzes and explores the original intent of granting judicial review authority to regional regulations at the Supreme Court. This article is normative legal research conducted by examining legal materials (library studies) or secondary data. The original intent the granting of judicial review authority to the Supreme Court is intended to foster checks and balances between various high state institutions. In addition, the granting of the right of judicial review is intended to enforce checks and balances between the three branches of power.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 364
Author(s):  
Yanzah Bagas Nugraha ◽  
Dwi Andayani Budisetyowati

The establishment of the Regional Representative Council of the Republic of Indonesia so called Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD-RI) at least has two objectives. The first is to enhance justice for the people in the region. Secondly, to expanding and increasing the participation of local communities in national life. The process to form this state institution is done by amending the 3rd amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic Indonesia. However, in doing that  amendment there was an internal conflict within the body of DPD-RI involving the old and the new leaders of this institution last year. The length of leadership tenure which was initially made 5 years was amended to became 2.5 years. The different length of leadership tenure was then canceled by the Supreme Court and it was decided to be the same as other institution such as The People’s Consultative Assembly and The House of Representative in that the leadership tenure should be in accordance with the electoral cycle of 5 years. However, although the regulation of DPD-RI has been canceled, the Supreme Court keeps sending its representative to guide the oath of position of the new DPD-RI leadership. The only regulation that has been introduced by the state was regulation toward conflict between state institutions and this conflict can merely be resolved by the Constitutional Court. Therefore, there is an urgent need for the state to seek solution to solve this problem to prevent the same thing happened to other state institution in the future.


Author(s):  
Vakil Raeesa

This chapter explores how the jurisdiction of the Indian Supreme Court has evolved as an appellate court, a constitutional court, and a ‘final’ court. It begins by reviewing the four kinds of appeal that may be heard by the Supreme Court as specified in the Indian Constitution: civil, criminal, questions of constitutional interpretation, and appeals by special leave of the Court. It then considers the uncertainty and expansion in the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, with particular emphasis on the imbalance in jurisdictional reforms, the absence of guidelines for the exercise of discretion, and inconsistency in implementing constitutional provisions. It also discusses the Court’s advisory jurisdiction, adjudication of federal disputes, and jurisdiction to interpret the Constitution, along with its power to enforce justice and its claim to inherent powers. The chapter concludes by outlining some of the challenges faced by the Court today.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 2102-2117
Author(s):  
Alda Rifada Rizqi

Democracy with integrity will be realized if carried out in accordance with the will of the people as holders of sovereignty, the KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum) as the election organizer has the authority to make regulations that support a better democracy. KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum) Regulation No. 20 of 2018 as evidence that the KPU is committed to participating in preventing corrupt behavior. It was considered to have been considered as an effort to protect the interests of the people, but the regulation was submitted to a judicial review at the Supreme Court. Then, based on legal-formal considerations and based on the legal positivism of the Supreme Court, the request for the test is granted. The decision distanced itself from progressive legal values that justified the denial of what was regulated in legislation in order to put forward the values of public justice, because basically the law was made to fulfill human interests, accommodating the will of the people for the sake of order.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 247
Author(s):  
Sholahuddin Al-Fatih

Post-reform of the role of judicial institution is run by two institutions namely the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. The duties and authorities of the two institutions are regulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945 and the act that addresses the three institutions more specifically. Several powers possessed by the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, one of them is the authority to judicial review. The Constitutional Court is authorized to review the act on the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia 1945, while the Supreme Court is authorized to review under the Act on the above legislation.The unfairness of the regulatory testing function is feared to trigger bureaucratic inefficiency. Based on data released by the Supreme Court Clerk, it was recorded during 2016 that the Supreme Court received 18,514 cases, including the Hak Uji Materi (HUM) subject to legislation under the Act. While the number of cases of judicial review of the Constitutional Court in 2016-2017 amounted to only 332 cases. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct a bureaucratic reform and provide new ideas related to the model of one court of judicial review in Indonesia. So that in this paper will be discussed deeply about problematic of judicial review in Indonesia and the authority of the Constitutional Court to review the act under one roof with SIJURI mechanism.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 95
Author(s):  
Muhammad Yusrizal Adi Syaputra

Rule lower against the rules of higher then lower regulation it can test the material (judicial review) to be canceled entirely or partially canceled. The assertion of hierarchy intended to prevent overlap between legislation that could give rise to legal uncertainty. Position regulations set by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) House of Representatives (DPR), the Regional Representatives Council (DPD), the Supreme Court (MA), the Constitutional Court (MK), the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), Commission Judicial (KY) , Bank Indonesia (BI), the Minister, the Agency, Organization, or commissions, in the Indonesian legal system recognized by Act No. 12 of 2011 either were born because of higher regulatory mandate and within the scope and authority of the minister. Thus, no doubt that the regulations set by state institutions, have binding force that must be obeyed by the parties set forth therein. While the Regulations issued policy also recognized as an Freies Ermessen in the execution of its duties and functions.<br /><br />


Jurnal Hukum ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 612
Author(s):  
Widayati

Indonesia is a sovereign country folk. One implementation of the sovereignty of the people is the election that followed by political parties for members of Parliament and members of parliament and individuals for DPD.Political parties are the main pillars of democracy. Establishment of political parties must meet the requirements in accordance with legislation. Terms of founding a political party regulated under Article 2 of Law No. 2 of 2008 on Political Parties.As the main pillar of democracy, political parties should be able to carry out its functions properly. There are some restrictions on political parties, among others, are prohibited from engaging in activities contrary to the Constitution of 1945 NRI and legislation; engage in activities that endanger the integrity and safety Homeland. If the ban is violated, then the government may ask the parties to the freezing of the District Court. If the parties do not accept the decision of freezing the District Court, it can be appealed to the Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court confirmed the decision of the PN, then the Government may propose the dissolution of the parties to the Court.The procedure by which parties to the Court daitur dissolution under Article 68 paragraph (1) and (2) of Law No 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court. Constitutional Court's decision regarding the request for the dissolution of political parties must be decided upon within a period of 60 (sixty) days after pemoohonan recorded in the Register of Case Constitution.Keywords: Parati dissolution of political, constitutional systemIndonesia


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