In the Ruins of Self-Knowledge

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Garry L. Hagberg
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Psychology ◽  
Final Point ◽  
Philosophical Significance ◽  
Sources Of Knowledge ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
The Mind

Oedipus Tyrannus is an exacting study in philosophical psychology, portraying a mind that oscillates between competing conceptions of the sources of knowledge, between layered self-deception and moments of self-knowledge, and between competing self-narratives or self-descriptions. This essay explores the philosophical significance of this play by examining these inner tensions as they manifest in thought, word, and deed. This significance is described in terms of a self gradually becoming able to imagine itself and to describe itself in ways initially believed to be the imagining and describing of an unknown other, where a kind of “spectral presence” by steps becomes ever closer to the mind of Oedipus. This culminates at the final point where that imagined presence comes to correspond identically and tragically with the uncovered self that is the true Oedipus.

Nietzsche's Philosophical Psychology

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mattia Riccardi
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Main Theme ◽  
Philosophical Psychology ◽  
Systematic Account ◽  
Human Psychology ◽  
Philosophical Significance ◽  
Intellectual Context ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Ecce Homo ◽  
The One

The book offers a systematic account of Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology. The main theme is the nature of and relation between unconscious and conscious mind. Whereas Nietzsche takes consciousness to be a mere ‘surface’—as he writes in Ecce Homo—that evolved in the course of human socialization, he sees the bedrock of human psychology as constituted by unconscious drives and affects. But how does he conceive of such basic psychological items and what does he mean exactly when he talks about consciousness and says it is a ‘surface’? And how does such a conception of human psychology inform his views about self, self-knowledge, and will? These are some of the questions that are addressed in this book. This is done by combining a historical approach with conceptual analysis. On the one hand, Nietzsche’s claims are carefully reconstructed by taking into account the intellectual context in which they emerged. On the other hand, in order to work out their philosophical significance, the claims are discussed in the light of contemporary debates such as those about higher-order theories of consciousness and mind-reading.

Self-Knowledge

2021 ◽  
pp. 179-193
Author(s):  
Mattia Riccardi
Keyword(s):  
Traditional Conception ◽  
Reliable Source ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
The Mind

This chapter is concerned with Nietzsche’s scepticism about introspective knowledge. More precisely, it is claimed that Nietzsche rejects the traditional conception of introspective self-knowledge as something that is direct and privileged. To the contrary, he argues that self-knowledge is interpretive, for it is obtained by applying to oneself the same folk-psychological framework we apply in order to read the mind of other people. Furthermore, and relatedly, Nietzsche claims that introspective self-knowledge involves a falsification of what we actually think and do. Finally, it is argued that Nietzsche does not conclude from this that self-knowledge is impossible, but rather that third-person psychological and genealogical inquiry about oneself is a more reliable source of self-knowledge than introspection.

Who Do You Think You Are?

2020 ◽  
pp. 51-57
Author(s):  
Nicolas Bommarito
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
What Works ◽  
Special Challenge ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Tools And Methods

This chapter explores self-knowledge, which is critical for solving the practical problems involved in getting through life. An awareness of your own quirks, character, and preferences is important for figuring out what works for you. However, self-knowledge is also tricky because it is especially elusive. People commonly learn about themselves only indirectly; often it is only by reading the reactions of others that people can see how harsh, kind, or annoying they are. It is also because when trying to know the self, the thing the individual is trying to see is the very thing that does the looking. Buddhism offers many evocative images to illustrate this special challenge: Just as a knife cannot cut itself, the mind cannot be directed toward itself. This makes knowing the self, especially in a deep way, an especially difficult task. Knowing the self thus requires special kinds of tools and methods. The chapter then considers the concept of Buddha Nature.

The synthesis of consciousness and the latent life of the mind: Philosophy, psychopathology, and ‘cryptopsychism’ in fin-de-siècle France

2020 ◽  
pp. 095269512092602
Author(s):  
Pietro Terzi
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Psychology ◽  
Scientific Inquiry ◽  
Fin De Siecle ◽  
Human Sciences ◽  
Philosophical Psychology ◽  
Complex Process ◽  
Rational Explanation ◽  
Fin De Siècle ◽  
Life Of The Mind ◽  
The Mind

In fin-de-siècle France, we witness a strange circulation of concepts between philosophy, theoretical and experimental psychology, and the borderline realm of what we would now call meta- or parapsychology. This was a time characterized by a complex process of redefinition of the disciplinary frontiers between philosophy and psychology, which favoured the birth of hybrid conceptualities and stark oppositions as well. Furthermore, the great scientific advances in physics, physiology, and psychology fostered hope for a full rational explanation of reality, even of its most unfathomable layers and seemingly bizarre phenomena. Focusing on the case of Émile Boirac’s research on what he termed ‘cryptopsychism’, notably in his book Our Hidden Forces, this article aims to show how Kantian notions and models of consciousness belonging to the canon of French spiritualist philosophical psychology were taken up by scientists such as Pierre Janet and ended up being assimilated and discussed in the more obscure and precarious realm of scientific inquiry into metapsychical phenomena. Far from being a mere historical curiosity, this quest for a scientific account of the latent and subconscious life of the mind sheds light on the intricate relationship between philosophy and the human sciences between the 19th and 20th centuries.

scholarly journals Gregory Skovoroda’s Philosophy of Education: the Difference of a Modern Vision

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-210 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olga Gomilko
Keyword(s):  
Research University ◽  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Philosophy Of Education ◽  
Specific Situation ◽  
Critical Position ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Modern Vision ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Christian Thought ◽  
The Mind

The article is devoted to the analysis of the modern character of the Gregory Skovoroda’s philosophy of education. Unlike his contemporaries, he focuses on connections of philosophy and moral virtue. This position contradicts the tendency of a modern institutionalization of philosophy in the way of one more discipline of the modern research university. However, Skovoroda’s critical position does not put into question the modern content of his philosophy. On the contrary, Skovoroda’s understanding of philosophy reveals the salvific ways of its cognitive and practical rehabilitation. It is because his philosophy teaches people to be wise not only the university campus but in all spheres of their own lives. That is why he speaks not just of philosophy, but of the “philosophy of the heart”. Contrary to Christian thought, he believes that human’s transformation is possible not through faith and suffering, but through the discovery a “new body” on the ground of self-knowledge and love for oneself. Unlike the modern classical philosophy, Skovoroda considers self-knowledge, not as a function of mind alone, and the heart as a dichotomy to the mind. In accordance with contemporary educational theories based on the idea of anthropotechnical turn in philosophy, Skovoroda deems the heart an instrument for enhancing the mind. Involving the heart into the sphere of rational increases the thinking of knowledge about the specific situation of its embodiment and the cognitive capabilities of its carrier. According to Skovoroda, an important consequence of such human transformations should be the overcoming of fear and hatred of the “other”.

Transparency and Self-Knowledge

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Byrne
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
First Person ◽  
Unified Theory ◽  
Gareth Evans ◽  
Weak Evidence ◽  
The World ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Emotion Memory

T&SK sets out and defends a theory of self-knowledge—knowledge of one’s mental states. Inspired by Gareth Evans’ discussion of self-knowledge in his The Varieties of Reference, the basic idea is that one comes to know that one is in a mental state M by an inference from a worldly or environmental premise to the conclusion that one is in M. (Typically the worldly premise will not be about anything mental.) The mind, on this account, is “transparent”: self-knowledge is achieved by an “outward glance” at the corresponding tract of the world, not by an “inward glance” at one’s own mind. Belief is the clearest case, with the inference being from ‘p’ to ‘I believe that p.’ One serious problem with this idea is that the inference seems terrible, because ‘p’ is at best very weak evidence that one believes that p. Another is that the idea seems not to generalize. For example, what is the worldly premise corresponding to ‘I intend to ϕ‎,’ or ‘I feel a pain’? T&SK argues that both problems can be solved, and explains how the account covers perception, sensation, desire, intention, emotion, memory, imagination, and thought. The result is a unified theory of self-knowledge that explains the epistemic security of beliefs about one’s mental states (privileged access), as well as the fact that one has a special first-person way of knowing about one’s mental states (peculiar access).

Hume and Descartes On Self-Acquaintance

Dialogue ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 255-269
Author(s):  
David L. Mouton
Keyword(s):  
Philosophical Significance ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Knowledge By Acquaintance

The idea of self-knowledge divides naturally into two parts in accordance with the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. I know myself and I know things about myself. The latter I know partly from self-acquaintance, partly from the behavior, especially linguistic, of others, and partly from each of these. All aspects of self-knowledge are controversial, so I shall concentrate in this paper on the question of self-acquaintance. My purpose is both philosophical and historical. It is commonly believed that Hume and Descartes held diametrically opposed, or at least strongly contrasting, views regarding self-acquaintance since Hume is regularly ridiculed for his denial of ability to discover his own Self whereas it would occur to no one to ascribe that same view to the author of the Meditations. In this paper I shall argue that contrary to appearances these two philosophers either held the same position or Descartes occupied the more agnostic extreme; and also that the position usually ascribed to Hume is, when properly understood, both correct and of fundamental philosophical significance. Part of my reason for selecting Hume and Descartes for analysis and comparison is to show thereby that the thesis of this paper is true independently of the rationalist/empiricist schism in philosophy.

The Limits of Self-Knowledge

1974 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Audi
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Epistemic Authority ◽  
General View ◽  
Mental Life ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
The Mind

Hume maintained that “since all actions and sensations of the mind are known to us by consciousness, they must necessarily appear in every particular what they are, and be what they appear.” Descartes maintained a very similar doctrine, and Locke and Berkeley held at least part of the doctrine. I shall not try to set out precisely what any of these philosophers thought about self-knowledge; I cite them simply as proponents of the general view which I shall be examining in this paper: namely, that each of us has a special epistemic authority about his own mental life. This view is still widely held, particularly in the form of the thesis that one's sincere avowals of current mental states are incorrigible, i.e., such that, necessarily, no one ever has overriding reason to think them false.

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