Who Do You Think You Are?

2020 ◽  
pp. 51-57
Author(s):  
Nicolas Bommarito

This chapter explores self-knowledge, which is critical for solving the practical problems involved in getting through life. An awareness of your own quirks, character, and preferences is important for figuring out what works for you. However, self-knowledge is also tricky because it is especially elusive. People commonly learn about themselves only indirectly; often it is only by reading the reactions of others that people can see how harsh, kind, or annoying they are. It is also because when trying to know the self, the thing the individual is trying to see is the very thing that does the looking. Buddhism offers many evocative images to illustrate this special challenge: Just as a knife cannot cut itself, the mind cannot be directed toward itself. This makes knowing the self, especially in a deep way, an especially difficult task. Knowing the self thus requires special kinds of tools and methods. The chapter then considers the concept of Buddha Nature.

This chapter presents reflections on the use of self-as-subject research within doctoral education as a pathway to explore meaning of study phenomena to uncover new knowledge from the individual of the self. Knowledge is contextual and discoverable from within this rich internal experience of the researcher-participant and extant and contemporary perspectives are presented to illustrate the importance and appropriateness of the selection of self-as-subject research methods including autoethnography and heuristic inquiry for doctoral-level research. The importance of the relational aspects of the doctoral researcher and doctoral research supervisor is briefly considered as well as contextual and institutional aspects necessary to inform doctoral researchers who may choose these methods of inquiry.


2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (5) ◽  
pp. 575-596 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Georg Moeller ◽  
Paul J. D’Ambrosio

This essay attempts to provide a preliminary outline of a theory of identity. The first section addresses what the sociologist Niklas Luhmann has called ‘the problem of identity’, or, in other words, the mind–society (rather than the mind–body) problem: In how far can the internal (psychological) self and the external (social) persona be integrated into a unit? The second section of the essay briefly defines a basic vocabulary of a theory of identity. ‘Identity’ is understood as the existentially necessary formation of a coherence between the ‘self’ (the ‘I’ as it is experienced in thoughts and feelings), its body and its social ‘persona’ (the individual person with its social attributes). Three different major paradigms of identity formation are distinguished from one another: a sincere identity is constructed through a firm commitment of the self to its social roles; an authentic identity is constructed through the creation of a social persona on the basis of one’s unique and original self; a ‘profilic’ identity, as we call it, is shaped by successfully presenting a personal profile under conditions of second-order observation as they prevail, for instance, in the social media, but also in other contemporary social systems. In the third section of the essay, we present a sketch of the historical sequence of these three paradigms of identity. Although these paradigms are not mutually exclusive and can coexist, it seems that sincerity flourished in pre-modern society, while authenticity came to prominence along with the functional differentiation of modern society and is now, along with the increased significance of second-order observation, gradually overshadowed by the influence of profilicity.


Phronesis ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 280-300
Author(s):  
Mateusz Stróżyński

Abstract This article explores the conception of self-knowledge in book 10 of Augustine’s De Trinitate. Augustine starts from the worry in Plato’s Meno that one cannot search for something entirely unknown and engages with Plotinus, Ennead 5.3 in developing his own understanding of the mind’s self-knowledge. He concludes that this knowledge is paradoxical in nature: it is necessary and, at the same time, futile; and it is separated from the knowledge of God. Augustine reaches this point by rejecting the Aristotelian identity of the knower with the known, as well as by grounding self-knowledge in the fact of the mind’s intimate presence to itself. Ultimately, self-knowledge appears to be an ‘objectless’ knowledge, a knowledge that the mind exists rather than knowledge of what the mind is.


2002 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 159-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerry Suls ◽  
René Martin ◽  
Ladd Wheeler

Social comparison consists of comparing oneself with others in order to evaluate or to enhance some aspects of the self. Evaluation of ability is concerned with the question “Can I do X?” and relies on the existence of a proxy performer. A proxy's relative standing on attributes vis‐à‐vis the comparer and whether the proxy exerted maximum effort on a preliminary task are variables influencing his or her informational utility. Evaluation of opinions is concerned with the questions “Do I like X?”“Is X correct?” and “Will I like X?” Important variables that affect an individual's use of social comparison to evaluate his or her opinions are the other person's expertise, similarity with the individual, and previous agreement with the individual. Whether social comparison serves a self-enhancement function depends on whether the comparer assimilates or contrasts his or her self relative to superior or inferior others. The kinds of self‐knowledge made cognitively accessible and variables such as mutability of self-views and distinctiveness of the comparison target may be important determinants of assimilation versus contrast.


World Science ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (7(35)) ◽  
pp. 32-38
Author(s):  
Ободовська С. В. ◽  
Бохан Ю. В.

The article deals with the socio-philosophical aspects and proposes an analysis of the ideas and views of thinkers of different historical epochs and times on the problems of self-realization and self-motivation. The theoretical basis for the study of the aspects of this problem was the fundamental approaches to the self-knowledge and motivation of the personality of the philosophers of antiquity (Epicurus, Socrates, Plato), the Middle Ages (K. Alexandria, St. Augustine), the Renaissance (D. Alighieri, F. Petrarca, M. Montaigne), New Time (B. Pascal, B. Spinoza) and German Philosophy (I. Kant, I. G. Fichte, A. Schopenhauer). The proof of the history of studying the problem of self-realization and personality motivation during its formation allows to emphasize the important essence of the aspiration of individuals to self- motivation as to the ultimate realization of the personal potential of a person. The analysis of motivation and self-motivation as an effective system of self-development and self-realization of the personality is conducted. An attempt has been made to generalize author's studies and representations of the essence of the processes of motivation and self- motivation of the individual and highlighted a number of aspects that focus the attention of researchers in explaining the essence of these processes. The disclosure of the ideas reflected in the study contributes to the further study and development of the structure of the process of self-motivation of the person, the mechanisms for its activation, the creation of pedagogical conditions that stimulate this process in professional activity.


Author(s):  
Yuliia Pavlenko

The article presents a study of the everyday life discourse in writing about the Self of a fictional subject. It seems obvious that involvement of self-writing in everyday practice calls into question the power of self-writing in the context of everyday life for the self-knowledge of the individual. The purpose of this scientific research is to debunk this illusion and explain the connection between the everyday life and self-writing. It transforms the practice of incorporating one’s own «I» in writing into the dimension of constructing the subject’s identity. There are no works on this topic in modern literary criticism and this fact also indicates the relevance and novelty of the research that is unfolding in the following article. Nowadays, the history of everyday life is booming. It is evidenced by a whole array of scientific papers on this issue. The study of self-writing in the dimension of everyday life appeals to the semiotic approach of Y.M. Lotman and G. Knabe for the analysis of the sign-symbolic nature of everyday life, to the sociological studies of A. Schutz, P. Berger and T. Lukman to identify the ways of constructing everyday life as reality or as a «life world», to the works of V.D.Leleko in the field of aesthetics and culturology of everyday life. The works of the philosophical and anthropological school serve the basis for the research. Particular attention is given to the text-letter of the Enlightenment. The protagonists of the Enlightenment Age invest the issues of everyday life in the work of writing that is a daily practice in the XVIII century. Due to its characteristics, the sphere of everyday life is a measure of self-knowledge and self-affirmation of the individual that was first artistically embodied by enlightened characters. The study shows that everyday life asa strong ground for self-affirmation of the subject was discovered with the help of the personal writing in the novel of the XVIII century, but this discovery became a lost testament to the text-writing of the Enlightenment. Changing the picture of everyday life under the influence of new technologies does not interfere with the text-writing. In the dynamic picture of everyday life offered to us by the 21st century, writing about the Self of a fictional subject opens up new facets of the power of everyday life discourse for the anthropological laboratory of literature. The study is illustrated by thesuch texts as: «Robinson Crusoe» by D.Defoe, «Nun» by D. Diderot, «Memoirs of two young wives» by O. de Balzac, «Poison of Love» by E.-E. Schmitt, «Self-portrait of the radiator» by K. Boben.


1995 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 5-19

The notion of the ‘self, together with related ideas such as ‘personality’, ‘character’, can be used primarily in connection with human psychology, or ethical and social relationships, or a combination of these. In this chapter, I focus on the self as a psychological notion, taking up in Chapters III and IV related questions about ethical character and about the individual and society. On this topic, as on ethics and values, much recent debate has centred on the question whether we can trace a clear line of development within Greek culture, and on the related question of the relationship between Greek and modern conceptions of the self and the mind.


2021 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 301-324
Author(s):  
Ayşe Çelikkol

As the philosopher Charles Taylor argues, some experiences of the secular have surprisingly little to do with the “self-sufficient power of reason” that Kant celebrates in “What Is Enlightenment?” This essay argues that Algernon Charles Swinburne offers such a novel strand of secularity in his “Hymn to Proserpine” and “Hymn of Man.” In these poems, time is a power external to the self that is not transcendent yet which the mind cannot fully grasp. Exploring the age of the Earth and the process of evolution, Victorian scientists had been suggesting that the depths of time lie beyond what the human mind may observe or understand, and this notion of time surfaces in Swinburne's poetry. “Hymn to Proserpine” attends to the limits of reason as it evokes deep time. “Hymn to Man,” in which humans channel the power of time, presents logos as both external and internal to the individual subject. By representing and formally registering deep time, Swinburne's poems restore awe and wonder to a world in which God remains absent. Swinburne presents an enchanted vision of the secular and contributes to the pluralization of nontheistic perspectives.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcus Schmücker

By pointing out different forms of pre-reflective consciousness and comparing them to the concepts of self in Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, it could be shown that both schools apply a kind of consciousness that corresponds to Frank’s concept of self-consciousness and self-knowledge. As demonstrated, the first form of pre-reflective consciousness complies with the advaitic teaching of an unchangeable eternity of consciousness, which is subjectless and understood as being without time and space, even as being omnipresent. It appears impossible to relate it to something else without it being objectified. The Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta school reinterprets the concept of pure consciousness and accepts it as objectifiable consciousness, which is now considered “knowledge”. At the same time it presupposes a kind of individual consciousness which is called “I”. Moreover, this school uses the argument that consciousness is unobjectifiable against the Advaitin to establish that objectifying does not imply the cessation of consciousness, that is, in their case the consciousness of the individual self. Rāmānuja thus theorises, a thesis continued by Veṅkaṭanātha, that knowledges (saṃvit) can be remembered over time because, first, they are based on a constant self, that is, a pre-reflective “I”-consciousness, and secondly, through this “knowledge”, they can be known again by referring to itself in another state (avasthā) than it earlier held. But what does this mean for the familiarity of (self‑)consciousness? Is it mediated? The self, the “I”-consciousness, is always in a new, changed state of knowledge. As far as self-luminosity is possible, even if the self can be objectified, it is possible to say, without negating consciousness, that it is immediately aware of being in a special state if this can be proven through different means of knowledge.


2010 ◽  
Vol 365 (1538) ◽  
pp. 221-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Elster

Rational-choice theory tries to explain behaviour on the assumption that individuals optimize. Some forms of irrational behaviour can be explained by assuming that the individual is subject to hedonic, pleasure-seeking mechanisms, such as wishful thinking or adaptive preference formation. In this paper, I draw attention to psychic mechanisms, originating in the individual, which make her worse off. I first consider the ideas of counterwishful thinking and of counteradaptive preference formation and then, drawing heavily on Proust, the self-poisoning of the mind that occurs through the operation of amour-propre.


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