The Limits of Self-Knowledge

1974 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Audi
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Epistemic Authority ◽  
General View ◽  
Mental Life ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
The Mind

Hume maintained that “since all actions and sensations of the mind are known to us by consciousness, they must necessarily appear in every particular what they are, and be what they appear.” Descartes maintained a very similar doctrine, and Locke and Berkeley held at least part of the doctrine. I shall not try to set out precisely what any of these philosophers thought about self-knowledge; I cite them simply as proponents of the general view which I shall be examining in this paper: namely, that each of us has a special epistemic authority about his own mental life. This view is still widely held, particularly in the form of the thesis that one's sincere avowals of current mental states are incorrigible, i.e., such that, necessarily, no one ever has overriding reason to think them false.

Transparency and Self-Knowledge

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Byrne
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
First Person ◽  
Unified Theory ◽  
Gareth Evans ◽  
Weak Evidence ◽  
The World ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Emotion Memory

T&SK sets out and defends a theory of self-knowledge—knowledge of one’s mental states. Inspired by Gareth Evans’ discussion of self-knowledge in his The Varieties of Reference, the basic idea is that one comes to know that one is in a mental state M by an inference from a worldly or environmental premise to the conclusion that one is in M. (Typically the worldly premise will not be about anything mental.) The mind, on this account, is “transparent”: self-knowledge is achieved by an “outward glance” at the corresponding tract of the world, not by an “inward glance” at one’s own mind. Belief is the clearest case, with the inference being from ‘p’ to ‘I believe that p.’ One serious problem with this idea is that the inference seems terrible, because ‘p’ is at best very weak evidence that one believes that p. Another is that the idea seems not to generalize. For example, what is the worldly premise corresponding to ‘I intend to ϕ‎,’ or ‘I feel a pain’? T&SK argues that both problems can be solved, and explains how the account covers perception, sensation, desire, intention, emotion, memory, imagination, and thought. The result is a unified theory of self-knowledge that explains the epistemic security of beliefs about one’s mental states (privileged access), as well as the fact that one has a special first-person way of knowing about one’s mental states (peculiar access).

Social Metacognition: An Expansionist Review

1998 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
John T. Jost ◽  
Arie W. Kruglanski ◽  
Thomas O. Nelson
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Social Psychological ◽  
Social Nature ◽  
Cultural Expectations ◽  
The Social ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Human Thinking ◽  
Social Interface ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Social Metacognition

In this article we review recent social psychological contributions to the metacognitive movement. It is argued that social psychologists have long contributed to the study of “thinking about thinking,” even though their work has not yet been recognized as metacognitive. The present “expansionist” survey suggests that the domain of social metacognition should include (a) beliefs about one's own mental states and processes as well as beliefs about those of other people, (b) momentary sensations as well as enduring folk theories, and (c) descriptive beliefs about how the mind works and normative beliefs about how it ought to work. The contents and origins of metacognition are inherently social; at the same time, metacognitions are comprised of cognitive elements and are governed by the principles and laws applicable to human thinking in general. Accordingly, whereas metacognitions about self-knowledge may be derived from different informational sources than metacognitions about other people, the processes whereby different types of metacognitions are formed, activated, and applied are essentially the same. Focusing on the social nature of metacognition and the profound relevance of cultural expectations on cognitive performance makes clear the benefits of systematically exploring the cognitive-social interface in reference to metacognitive phenomena.

scholarly journals Theoretical Foundations to Guide Mindfulness Meditation: A Path to Wisdom

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nandini Karunamuni ◽  
Rasanjala Weerasekera
Keyword(s):  
Mindfulness Meditation ◽  
Essential Element ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Research Literature ◽  
Clear Understanding ◽  
Gradual Development ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
Mindfulness Interventions ◽  
The Mind

Mindfulness interventions are becoming increasingly popular across a wide variety of clinical and non-clinical settings where they are often employed to promote psychological well-being. Mindfulness in its original context presented in Buddhist practice is used to systematically understand one’s moment-to-moment experience, and to gradually develop self-knowledge and wisdom. Buddhist teachings describe wisdom as seeing things just as they are - a requisite for the complete freedom from suffering. In psychological writings, although the construct of wisdom lacks a commonly accepted definition, direct experiential self-knowledge is considered to be an essential element of wisdom. The purpose of this article is to examine the three major trainings of the Buddhist path, as well as some of the key Buddhist theoretical constructs, in order to explore their contribution to the gradual development of experiential self-knowledge and wisdom. In Buddhist traditions, mindfulness is practised in the context of a moral and philosophical system, and the mind is described as a sequence of momentary mental states, each distinct and discrete, their connections with one another being causal. We explain how a clear understanding of mindfulness within the context of this broader theoretical framework can be helpful to individuals engaging in different levels of the mindfulness meditation practice, and how this understanding can result in more sustained outcomes for mindfulness interventions. Further explorations are made into how various barriers and motivators to mindfulness meditation can be better understood by linking the theoretical aspects with current research literature on mindfulness.

A Constructivist Picture of Self-Knowledge

Philosophy ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 71 (277) ◽  
pp. 405-422 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Tanney
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Traditional View ◽  
First Person ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Self Knowledge ◽  
The Mind

How are we to account for the authority granted to first-person reports of mental states? What accounts for the immediacy of these self-ascriptions; the fact that they can be ascribed without appeal to evidence and without the need for justification? A traditional, Cartesian conception of the mind, which says that our thoughts are presented to us directly, completely, and without distortion upon mere internal inspection, would account for these facts, but there is good reason to doubt the cogency of the Cartesian view. Wittgenstein, in his later writings, offered some of the most potent considerations against the traditional view, and contemporary philosophy of mind is practically unanimous in rejecting some of the metaphysical aspects of Cartesianism. But anyone who repudiates Cartesianism shoulders the burden of finding another way to accommodate its apparent epistemological strengths.

Psychology: Volume 5

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
World View ◽  
Science Volume ◽  
Western World ◽  
Mental Life ◽  
Long Time ◽  
The Difference ◽  
New Perspective ◽  
Indian Setting ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Relationship

This survey of research on psychology in five volumes is a part of a series undertaken by the ICSSR since 1969, which covers various disciplines under social science. Volume Five of this survey, Explorations into Psyche and Psychology: Some Emerging Perspectives, examines the future of psychology in India. For a very long time, intellectual investments in understanding mental life have led to varied formulations about mind and its functions across the word. However, a critical reflection of the state of the disciplinary affairs indicates the dominance of Euro-American theories and methods, which offer an understanding coloured by a Western world view, which fails to do justice with many non-Western cultural settings. The chapters in this volume expand the scope of psychology to encompass indigenous knowledge available in the Indian tradition and invite engaging with emancipatory concerns as well as broadening the disciplinary base. The contributors situate the difference between the Eastern and Western conceptions of the mind in the practice of psychology. They look at this discipline as shaped by and shaping between systems like yoga. They also analyse animal behaviour through the lens of psychology and bring out insights about evolution of individual and social behaviour. This volume offers critique the contemporary psychological practices in India and offers a new perspective called ‘public psychology’ to construe and analyse the relationship between psychologists and their objects of study. Finally, some paradigmatic, pedagogical, and substantive issues are highlighted to restructure the practice of psychology in the Indian setting.

scholarly journals Propositionalism and Questions that do not have Correct Answers

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giulia Felappi
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Prima Facie ◽  
Mental Life ◽  
Do So

AbstractAs the label suggests, according to propositionalism, each intentional mental state, attitude or event is or involves a relation to a proposition. In this paper, I will discuss a case that seems prima facie not to be accountable for by propositionalism. After having presented the case, I will show why it is different from others that have been discussed in the literature as able to show that propositionalism cannot be correct. I will then consider what the propositionalist can say to fix the problem and I will show that no strategy that is genuinely propositionalist seems promising. I will not conclude that propositionalism is doomed. But I will show that if propositionalism can account for our case at all, it can only do so by losing its main appeal, i.e. its elegance and simplicity. But then propositionalism seems to have lost its advantage with respect to its obvious alternative, i.e. a pluralist account according to which mental states, attitudes and events are not all homogeneously relations to propositions, but rather our mental life should be accounted for in terms of a plurality of kinds of relata.

scholarly journals Activity in the brain’s valuation and mentalizing networks is associated with propagation of online recommendations

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisa C. Baek ◽  
Matthew Brook O’Donnell ◽  
Christin Scholz ◽  
Rui Pei ◽  
Javier O. Garcia ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Word Of Mouth ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Prior Work ◽  
Opinion Change ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Mentalizing System

AbstractWord of mouth recommendations influence a wide range of choices and behaviors. What takes place in the mind of recommendation receivers that determines whether they will be successfully influenced? Prior work suggests that brain systems implicated in assessing the value of stimuli (i.e., subjective valuation) and understanding others’ mental states (i.e., mentalizing) play key roles. The current study used neuroimaging and natural language classifiers to extend these findings in a naturalistic context and tested the extent to which the two systems work together or independently in responding to social influence. First, we show that in response to text-based social media recommendations, activity in both the brain’s valuation system and mentalizing system was associated with greater likelihood of opinion change. Second, participants were more likely to update their opinions in response to negative, compared to positive, recommendations, with activity in the mentalizing system scaling with the negativity of the recommendations. Third, decreased functional connectivity between valuation and mentalizing systems was associated with opinion change. Results highlight the role of brain regions involved in mentalizing and positive valuation in recommendation propagation, and further show that mentalizing may be particularly key in processing negative recommendations, whereas the valuation system is relevant in evaluating both positive and negative recommendations.

scholarly journals El autoconocimiento de las creencias: una objeción al método de la transparencia

2019 ◽  
pp. 429
Author(s):  
Javier Vidal
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reasoning ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Mental Life ◽  
The Unconscious ◽  
First Order ◽  
Rational Deliberation ◽  
Self Knowledge

According to the method of transparency, genuine self-knowledge is the outcome of an inference from world to mind. A. Byrne (2018) has developed a theory in which the method of transparency consists in following an epistemic rule in order to form self-verifying second-order beliefs. In this paper, I argue that Byrne’s theory does not establish sufficient conditions for having self-knowledge of first-order beliefs. Examining a case of self-deception, I strive to show that following such a rule might not result in self-knowledge when one is involved in rational deliberation. In the case under consideration, one precisely comes to believe that one believes that p without coming to believe that p. The justification for one’s not forming the belief that p with its distinctive causal pattern in mental life and behaviour, is that one already had the unconscious belief that not-p, a belief that is not sensitive to the principles governing theoretical and practical reasoning.

Mind, Body and Embarrassment in Henry James’s The Awkward Age

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Attridge
Keyword(s):  
William James ◽  
Fin De Siecle ◽  
Mental Life ◽  
Expressive Vocabulary ◽  
Fin De Siècle ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
Public Behavior ◽  
Modernist Novel ◽  
The Mind

This chapter considers James’s The Awkward Age (1899) in the context of fin de siècle mental science and its preoccupation, most evident in theories of emotion, with the materiality of the mind. Contributing to recent accounts that challenge the commonplace equation between psychological depth and James’s transition to modernist novel, the chapter argues that The Awkward Age represents mental life – and in particular awkwardness – as public behavior rather than introspection, self-presence and interiority. In a similar fashion to late-Victorian mental scientists (including his brother, William), James was concerned with finding a vocabulary for representing mental life in physical terms, demonstrating the interrelation of mind and body. James’s use of a behavioural rather than expressive vocabulary for embarrassment determines the shape of the novel’s plot and forms part of its critique of a Victorian prudery that presupposes a mind-matter separation.

Negative and Positive Mind-Wandering

2021 ◽  
pp. 177-192
Author(s):  
Frederick Travis
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Processing ◽  
Mind Wandering ◽  
Essential Elements ◽  
Current Situation ◽  
Mental Life ◽  
Negative Thoughts ◽  
The Mind

Mind-wandering is considered by many as a sign of an “unhappy mind” and associated with ill-health. Since the mind wanders half of the time, it is unlikely that mind-wandering plays no role in cognitive processing. Mind-wandering can be filled with negative thoughts ‑ negative mind-wandering associated with worry and rumination; or it can be filled with positive thoughts ‑ positive mind-wandering associated with imagination and fantasy, essential elements of a healthy, satisfying mental life. Mind-wandering with positive thoughts enables the mind to escape the constraints of the current situation and explore novel solutions.

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