Systematic Government Access to Private-Sector Data in Canada

Author(s):  
Jane Bailey ◽  
Sara Shayan

This chapter focuses on Canadian law as it applies to government access to private-sector data. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms implicitly provides constitutional protection of privacy by prohibiting unreasonable search and seizure by the state (s. 8) and by limiting government intrusion on life, liberty and security of the person (s. 7). With some exceptions, the Charter requires law enforcement agencies to seek prior authorization before accessing personal information. However, Canada’s national security intelligence agencies are subject to more relaxed standards. The Privacy Act regulates federal government institutions’ relationship with personal information, whereas the private sector is regulated by the Personal Information and Protection of Electronic Documents Act. However, numerous exceptions in both statutes allow for (and in some cases encourage), information sharing between private-sector and state entities.

Author(s):  
Dan Jerker B. Svantesson ◽  
Rebecca Azzopardi

The chapter provides a summary of Australian privacy law including the Privacy Act and the Australian Privacy Principles. After describing the national legal context and fundamental principles governing Australia’s federal system of government with power distributed among six states, two territories, and the federal government, it describes laws separately governing law enforcement and intelligence agencies, including the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). The authors suggest that, although the Australian government has a range of powers to obtain private-sector data, those powers appear primarily aimed at obtaining specific data for specific purposes. Little was found by way of direct unmediated access by the government to private-sector data or government access to private-sector data in bulk.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc-Aurele Racicot

These days, is there a topic more significant and provocative than the protection of privacy in the private sector? The importance of this topic has been highlighted since the Canadian Parliament adopted the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act which came into full force on 1 January 2004 and which is scheduled for review in 2006. Although it seems that everywhere we turn, the word "privacy" and its companion PIPEDA are at centre stage, many say that this attention is unwarranted and a knee-jerk reaction to the information age where one can run but cannot hide. Like it or not, we are subject to the prying eyes of cameras in public places, the tracking and trailing of Internet activities, the selling of address lists and other such listings, and the synthesizing by marketers of frightful amounts of personal information that, when pulled together, reveals a lot about our personal life, our ancestry, our relationships, our interests and our spending habits.


Author(s):  
Motohiro Tsuchiya

The Japanese legal system has been based on the German legal system since the mid-nineteenth century, but the American legal system was grafted onto it following Japan’s defeat in World War II in 1945. The postwar Constitution contained an article regarding the secrecy of communications and protected privacy in terms of respect of individuals. Now, as the Personal Information Protection Law in the Executive Branch, which was enacted in 1988, and the Personal Information Protection Law, which was enacted in 2003, strictly regulate privacy, there have been fewer problematic cases regarding governmental access to private-sector data. Data gathering for law enforcement or intelligence activities has also been weaker following World War II. Private-sector corporations/organizations might share data with government agencies, but based on voluntary arrangements, not by any mandatory system. More focus is being cast not on governmental access to private-sector data, but on citizen’s access to data.


Author(s):  
Omer Tene

Israel is a democracy committed to the protection of human rights while at the same time trying to contain uniquely difficult national security concerns. One area where this tension is manifest is government access to communications data. On the one hand, subscriber privacy is a constitutional right protected by legislation and Supreme Court jurisprudence; on the other hand, communications data are a powerful tool in the hands of national security and law enforcement agencies. This chapter examines Israel’s attempt to balance these competing interests by empowering national security agencies while at the same time creating mechanisms of accountability. In particular, Israel utilizes the special independent status of the attorney general as a check on government power.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 66-70
Author(s):  
Lisa Deveau

In this critical review and social innovation narrative, we analyze the literature regarding Canadian law enforcement agencies’ approach to de-escalation and crisis intervention. Using an interdisciplinary approach, we consider how the skills and values of social work can be used to inform and train officers on essential skills such as de-escalation and conflict resolution. We look at the systemic barriers to bringing about change within Canadian police forces as the current culture continues to be influenced by colonization and law enforcement continues to value and endorse use of force over de-escalation. While services can benefit by applying an interdisciplinary lens when training officers, the factors that impede this union and collaboration are discussed and explored as police services are given immense discretion in how they train and respond to mental health crises. In conclusion, we examine the government’s role in perpetuating these issues.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (7) ◽  
pp. 95-99
Author(s):  
Moncef Belhadjali ◽  
Sami Abbasi ◽  
Gary Whaley

The implementation of effective cybersecurity by organizations is a prerequisite to privacy protection for personal information collected, used, stored, and shared online. The trend for the potential of online privacy breaches has been moving upward with our daily reliance on the Internet and cloud computing. While online, individuals may choose to use a credit card to complete a transaction, access email, access social media sites, and store pictures through a cloud storage. In some cases, law enforcement agencies may access and use personal information stored online. Do individuals approve of the usage of their personal information by these agencies to solve crimes? Do demographic characteristics such a gender, education, and age provide a reliable set of predictors for the probability of approval? Do females and males differ with respect to the decision to approve information usage to solve crimes?    This study reports on the analysis of data from a 2019 Pew Research Center survey of 1,365 individuals in the USA. Most respondents (63%) approve of personal information usage by law enforcement agencies to solve crimes. The purpose of this study is to determine the trend in the citizens’ approval for personal information usage by law enforcement agencies, especially distinguishing the genders.  The results of a regression analysis showed that the demographic variables -gender, education, and age- provide a statistically significant power to predict the probability for information usage approval. A t-Test revealed that there is a statistically significant difference between genders. Females are more likely to offer the approval.


2002 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Green ◽  
Sean Smith

The growth of mobile digital communication devices has seen a corresponding growth in the data created by users in the course of their mobile communications. The ease with which such data - including sensitive time-dependent location information - can be collected and stored raises clear data protection and concerns. The value such data offers to both law enforcement agencies and the private sector has complicated regulatory responses to such data protection concerns. This has lead to the contradictory situation in which mobile data is used by the law enforcement agencies and the private sector to identify individual users, yet this same information is not considered to be 'personal data'.


Author(s):  
James X. Dempsey ◽  
Fred H. Cate ◽  
Martin Abrams

Companies that collect personal data in the course of their business must be accountable for the safe and fair management of that data. The accountability of companies as data stewards extends to processing by their vendors and partners to whom data is disclosed, in a chain of accountability that can extend through multiple links. However, when a government entity demands that a company disclose data in its possession or control, the chain of accountability can be broken if government itself, shielded by secrecy, is not accountable. This chapter examines what companies can do to remain accountable in the face of government disclosure demands. In addition, it concludes that the principles and practices of accountability developed around the handling of personal information in commercial contexts are applicable within government agencies, including when demanding disclosure of data held by the private sector.


Author(s):  
Giorgio Resta

This chapter focuses on Italian law as it pertains to the variety of legal provisions relevant to data protection and the access to private-sector data by law enforcement. The relevant sources of law can include interpretations of constitutional provisions by the Italian courts, implementation of EU law in Italian law, and statutory provisions, in particular the Italian “Data Protection Code.” Special rules apply to data processing in specific sectors, in particular the judicial sector, law enforcement, and national security. Several statutes make a broad reporting of private-sector data mandatory. Legislation provides individuals with the opportunity to assert their rights either by filing a private lawsuit or by filing a complaint with the Italian Data Protection Authority.


2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clarissa Meerts

Based on qualitative research primarily carried out in the Netherlands, this article describes corporate investigations within the private sector in terms of investigators’ operational autonomy, which, in only a minority of cases, involves contact or cooperation with governmental law enforcement agencies. It is argued that, given this de facto public–private separation, theoretical concepts within the literature that take the nation-state as the imagined historical origin and/or continuing partner of corporate security—concepts such as privatization, responsibilization, or multilateralization—fail to capture the autonomy of corporate investigations. Furthermore, such concepts are politically distracting and potentially dangerous for public policy, since they imply that corporate security is effectively surveilled and supervised by the state within a framework of public–private cooperation. Nothing could be further from the truth; indeed the limited liaisons that do occur are initiated by the private sector.


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