scholarly journals 'A Spy in your Pocket'? The Regulation of Mobile Data in the UK.

2002 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Green ◽  
Sean Smith

The growth of mobile digital communication devices has seen a corresponding growth in the data created by users in the course of their mobile communications. The ease with which such data - including sensitive time-dependent location information - can be collected and stored raises clear data protection and concerns. The value such data offers to both law enforcement agencies and the private sector has complicated regulatory responses to such data protection concerns. This has lead to the contradictory situation in which mobile data is used by the law enforcement agencies and the private sector to identify individual users, yet this same information is not considered to be 'personal data'.

Author(s):  
Sam De Silva

Developments in technology and the global nature of business means that personal information about individuals in the UK may often be processed overseas, frequently without the explicit knowledge or consent of those individuals. This raises issues such as the security of such data, who may have access to it and for what purposes and what rights the individual may have to object. The Data Protection Act 1998 provides a standard of protection for personal data, including in respect of personal data that is being transferred outside of the UK. Chapter 18 focus on how a UK data controller (the organisation that controls how and why personal data is processed and is therefore legally responsible for compliance) can fulfil its business and operational requirements in transferring personal data outside the EEA, whilst ensuring legal compliance.


Legal Studies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 517-532
Author(s):  
Benjamin Wong

AbstractThis paper explains how the concept of personal data should be delimited. Certainty on this matter is crucial, as it determines the material scope of the data protection obligations. The primary boundary delimiting the scope of personal data is the requirement that personal data ‘relate to’ an individual. The courts of the UK and the EU have sought to delineate this boundary, but there are serious difficulties in the present approaches that have emerged thus far. Two possible ways forward are suggested, taking into account the implications of the direct application of the GDPR in the UK.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 139-177
Author(s):  
Niovi Vavoula

Abstract Since the past three decades, an elaborate framework of EU-wide information systems processing the personal data of third-country nationals has emerged. The vast majority of these systems (VIS, Eurodac, EES, ETIAS) are conceptualised as multi-purpose tools, whereby their consultation for crime-related objectives is listed among their ancillary objectives. As a result, immigration records may be accessed by national law enforcement authorities and Europol for the purposes of fighting terrorism and other serious crimes under specified and limited conditions. Drawing from the relevant jurisprudence of the European Court, this article evaluates whether the EU rules on law enforcement access to EU immigration databases comply with the rights to respect for private life and protection of personal data, as enshrined in Article 7 and 8 of the EU Charter respectively. In addition, challenges posed by the forthcoming interoperability between databases are also examined.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 375-389
Author(s):  
Isadora Neroni Rezende

Since 2019, over 600 law enforcement agencies across the United States have started using a groundbreaking facial recognition app designed by Clearview AI, a tech start-up which now plans to market its technology also in Europe. While the Clearview app is an expression of the wider phenomenon of the repurposing of privately held data in the law enforcement context, its use in criminal proceedings is likely to encroach on individuals’ rights in unprecedented ways. Indeed, the Clearview app goes far beyond traditional facial recognition tools. If these have been historically limited to matching government-stored images, Clearview now combines its technology with a database of over three billion images published on the Internet. Against this background, this article will review the use of this new investigative tool in light of the European Union (EU) legal framework on privacy and data protection. The proposed assessment will proceed as follows. Firstly, it will briefly assess the lawfulness of Clearview AI’s data scraping practices under the General Data Protection Regulation. Secondly, it will discuss the transfer of scraped data from the company to EU law enforcement agencies under the regime of the Directive 2016/680/EU (the Directive). Finally, it will analyse the compliance of the Clearview app with art 10 of the Police Directive, which lays down the criteria for lawful processing of biometric data. More specifically, this last analysis will focus on the strict necessity test, as defined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the European Convention on Human Rights. Following this assessment, it will be argued that the Clearview app’s use in criminal proceedings is highly problematic in light of the EU legislation on privacy and data protection.


Author(s):  
Damla Kilic ◽  
Andy Crabtree ◽  
Glenn McGarry ◽  
Murray Goulden

AbstractThe home is a site marked by the increasing collection and use of personal data, whether online or from connected devices. This trend is accompanied by new data protection regulation and the development of privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) that seek to enable individual control over the processing of personal data. However, a great deal of the data generated within the connected home is interpersonal in nature and cannot therefore be attributed to an individual. The cardboard box study adapts the technology probe approach to explore with potential end users the salience of a PET called the Databox and to understand the challenge of collaborative rather than individual data management in the home. The cardboard box study was designed as an ideation card game and conducted with 22 households distributed around the UK, providing us with 38 participants. Demographically, our participants were of varying ages and had a variety of occupational backgrounds and differing household situations. The study makes it perspicuous that privacy is not a ubiquitous concern within the home as a great deal of data is shared by default of people living together; that when privacy is occasioned it performs a distinct social function that is concerned with human security and the safety and integrity of people rather than devices and data; and that current ‘interdependent privacy’ solutions that seek to support collaborative data management are not well aligned with the ways access control is negotiated and managed within the home.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-43
Author(s):  
Paul De Hert ◽  
Vagelis Papakonstantinou

The European Public Prosecutor’s Office (the ‘EPPO’) necessarily processes personal data in order to fulfil its mission; As such, it falls squarely within the European Union (EU) data protection regulatory landscape. However, because the EU data protection regulatory landscape itself is currently found at a crossroads, an analysis of the EPPO data protection model may be twofold: First, placing it within the proper cross-organization dialogue currently taking place on the future regulatory model of personal data processing for law enforcement purposes carried out at EU level. Second, at an EPPO-specific level, whereby the actual data protection regime afforded to it may be assessed. This article purports to elaborate upon the above two data protection dimensions of EPPO personal data processing activities: It presents considerations and policy options during the lawmaking period that resulted in the establishment of the EPPO, it analyses the data protection regime ultimately awarded to it and attempts to, critically, place the EPPO data protection model within its proper operational and legislative environment.


Author(s):  
Jane Bailey ◽  
Sara Shayan

This chapter focuses on Canadian law as it applies to government access to private-sector data. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms implicitly provides constitutional protection of privacy by prohibiting unreasonable search and seizure by the state (s. 8) and by limiting government intrusion on life, liberty and security of the person (s. 7). With some exceptions, the Charter requires law enforcement agencies to seek prior authorization before accessing personal information. However, Canada’s national security intelligence agencies are subject to more relaxed standards. The Privacy Act regulates federal government institutions’ relationship with personal information, whereas the private sector is regulated by the Personal Information and Protection of Electronic Documents Act. However, numerous exceptions in both statutes allow for (and in some cases encourage), information sharing between private-sector and state entities.


2020 ◽  
pp. 11-14
Author(s):  
Г.С. Сабельникова

Расследование преступлений, совершаемых посредством компьютерных технологий, уже не новая задача для правоохранительных органов. С каждым днем количество таких общественно опасных деяний увеличивается, а способы их реали- зации совершенствуются. Вместе с тем отметим, что сами по себе компьютерные технологии стали составной частью финансового механизма государства, в том числе и его банковского сектора. Личные данные клиентов банка, их денежные средства – потенци- альные объекты для посягательства для так называемых киберпреступников. В связи с этим имеется необходимость рассмотрения отдельных аспектов расследования киберпреступленийв банковском секторе. Investigation of the crimes committed with use of computer technologies is not new law enforcement agencies. Every day the number of crimes increases, and ways of their commission are improved. However, computer technologies – became an element of the financial mechanism of the state including its banking sector. Personal data of clients of bank, their money are potential objects for encroachment of cybercriminals. In this regard, there is a need of consideration of the separate moments of investigation of cybercrimes for the banking sector.


2009 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 491-500 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terry Thomas

AbstractA number of countries now use sex offender registers as a policy to improve levels of public protection by ensuring that law enforcement agencies are better informed on the whereabouts of sex offenders in their communities. These policies are designed in part to improve child protection. The paradox is that some people on the register are themselves children and young people who have committed sexual offences. This article examines the development of the UK sex offender register and the registration of children and young people aged 10-17. It looks at attempts to provide alternative forms of registration and implications for the future in terms of children's rights.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 469-478
Author(s):  
Tomasz Safjański ◽  
Adrian James

Abstract Threats to modern nation states from organized crime and terrorism create environments in which intelligence becomes a vital component of policing and security plans but the increasing use of personal data for law enforcement purposes can alter the normative relationships between stakeholders and law enforcement agencies and between agencies and citizens. For that reason, police intelligence practice demands critical examination. This paper presents a narrative inquiry, based on the authors’ experiential knowledge and empirical research, into Europol’s Crime Analysis System (ECAS). The study explains Europol’s efforts to develop data collection and analysis systems that meet the needs of EU Member States (MS). Through ECAS, it has created powerful tools intended to deliver intelligence products that help MS identify, localize, and neutralize transnational threats to a degree not witnessed before in Europe. Nevertheless, Europol’s performance in this context seems sub-optimal. Shortcomings largely are attributed to a lack of trust between Europol and MS leading to failures to share information between themselves and with the institution. The result is that the latter’s strategic intelligence products sometimes are deficient or incomplete. That should be of concern to stakeholders because Europol’s strategic intelligence efforts may be rendered ineffective. Shortcomings in Europol’s intelligence products also are significant for citizens because they may mean that the information-sharing process is less transparent and less accountable than citizens have a right to expect.


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