Introduction

John Rawls ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 163-169

Any egalitarian theory of justice must have some measure by which one can determine whether a system of social cooperation is fair or not. In particular, one must have some metric by which to tell if a system is working to the advantage or disadvantage of a citizen, or as John Rawls puts it, we need “an idea of each participant’s rational advantage, or good.”...

2015 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-64 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wayne Norman

ABSTRACT:Like most egalitarian political philosophers, John Rawls believes that a just society will rely on markets and business firms for much of its economic activity—despite acknowledging that market systems will tend to create very unequal distributions of goods, opportunities, power, and status. Rawls himself remains one of the few contemporary political philosophers to explore at any length the way an egalitarian theory of justice might deal with fundamental options in political economy. This article examines his arguments and conclusions on these topics. It argues that contemporary Rawlsians will reach different conclusions if they take more seriously than Rawls himself did: (1) the implications, for the political culture and the democratic regulatory state, of large firms competing in adversarial markets characterized by the inevitable “fact of market failure,” and (2) the relevance of ownership and governance relationships involving different kinds of business firms. And with respect to the second point, Rawlsians and other egalitarians have much to learn from contemporary economic, legal, and sociological theories of the firm, and the role of these theories in the structure of and rationale for corporate law. This is the kind of social theory that Rawls believes is relevant to the justification and application of theories of justice, but he himself did not appeal to it in his writings on political economy. Contemporary egalitarians can and should appeal to it now, and in doing so correct errors and omissions in Rawls’s analysis. But taking seriously the two points mentioned above will also force egalitarians who support efficient markets to face difficult dilemmas or compromises of their own.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-195

Fairness in income distribution is a factor that both motivates employees and contributes to maintaining social stability. In Vietnam, fair income distribution has been studied from various perspectives. In this article, through the analysis and synthesis of related documents and evidence, and from the perspective of economic philosophy, the author applies John Rawls’s Theory of Justice as Fairness to analyze some issues arising from the implementation of the state’s role in ensuring fair income distribution from 1986 to present. These are unifying the perception of fairness in income distribution; solving the relationship between economic efficiency and social equality; ensuring benefits for the least-privileged people in society; and controlling income. On that basis, the author makes some recommendations to enhance the state’s role in ensuring fair income distribution in Vietnam. Received 11thNovember 2019; Revised 10thApril 2020; Accepted 20th April 2020


1975 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 607-614 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vernon Van Dyke

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls assumes that the principles of justice are for individuals in a society, and in general he assumes that the society is an ethnically homogeneous state. He thus follows the tradition associated with the dominant form of the social contract theory, which focuses on the individual and the state. His assumptions neglect the fact that almost all states are ethnically plural or heterogeneous, and that many of them confer special status and rights on ethnic groups as collective entities; for example, many of them confer special status and rights on indigenous groups, on groups disadvantaged by prior discrimination, and on minorities and other groups conceded a right to survive as distinct cultural entities. Status and rights for groups necessarily mean differentiation among individuals depending on their membership; and this in turn means that a theory of justice that focuses on the individual and neglects the group both fails to account for existing practices and fails to give guidance where the practices are at issue.


2009 ◽  
Vol 71 (3) ◽  
pp. 459-482 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Koppelman

AbstractConstructivist political theory, championed most prominently by John Rawls, builds up a conception of justice from the minimal requirements of political life. It has two powerful attractions. It promises a kind of civic unity in the face of irresolvable differences about the good life. It also offers a foundation for human rights that is secure in the face of those same differences. The very parsimony that is its strength, however, deprives it of the resources to condemn some atrocities. Because it focuses on the political aspect of persons, it has difficulty cognizing violence done to those aspects of the person that are not political, preeminently the body. Constructivism thus can be only a part of an acceptable theory of justice.


Author(s):  
Fernando Aranda Fraga ◽  

In 1993 John Rawls published his main and longest work since 1971, where he had published his reknowned A Theory of Justice, book that made him famous as the greatest political philosopher of the century. We are referring to Political Liberalism, a summary of his writings of the 80’s and the first half of the 90’s, where he attempts to answer the critics of his intellectual partners, communitarian philosophers. One of the key topics in this book is the issue of “public reason”, whose object is nothing else than public good, and on which the principles and proceedings of justice are to be applied. The book was so important for the political philosophy of the time that in 1997 Rawls had to go through the 1993 edition, becoming this new one the last relevant writing published before the death of the Harvard philosopher in November 2002.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 62
Author(s):  
Bede Xavier Harris ◽  
Elizabeth Pearl Harris

The interpretation given by the courts to the word ‘matter’ in sections 75 and 76 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution, and the restrictive approach taken by the courts to what amounts to a sufficient interest in a matter, have led to the consequence that only litigants who can demonstrate a personal interest can bring an action to challenge a breach of the Constitution. This provides insufficient protection for constitutionalism because it means that the enforcement of the Constitution is contingent on there being a self-interested applicant who will bring an action – and, conversely, creates the risk that breaches of the Constitution will be allowed to stand in cases where those who do have standing find it in their political interests to refrain from taking action. With its focus on personal interest, the current approach excludes the altruistic applicant and runs counter to the theory that all citizens have a right to ensure that the Constitution is complied with. This paper examines the way in which the actio popularis of Roman law served the ideal of the engaged citizen by enabling citizens to initiate legal action to enforce public duties, and how modern equivalents of the actio in a number of jurisdictions achieve the same purpose. The paper draws on John Rawls’ theory of justice in arguing for reform of the law on standing in Australia so as to confer open standing in constitutional cases.


2013 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-173
Author(s):  
Milica Trifunovic

The article gives conceptual clarification on a distinction between ideal and nonideal theory by analyzing John Rawls? theory as presented in his books ?A Theory of Justice? and ?The Law of Peoples.? The article tries to show the importance of ideal theory, while at the same time pointing out that the distinction, ideal and nonideal, needs further qualification. Further, the article also introduces the distinction of normative and descriptive into ideal and consequently nonideal theory. Through this four-fold distinction it is easier to establish the function of each theory and the separation of work-fields between philosophers, politicians and lawyers.


1980 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 385-393 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven M. DeLue

John Rawls considers his Theory of Justice to be in the Kantian tradition. Generally there seems to be agreement among Rawls' critics that at least with respect to the procedural formulation of the principles of justice, it is difficult to call Rawls' position Kantian. In this article I will argue that Rawls' Kantianism is best understood as providing a motive source for acting upon known just standards of conduct. In this regard Rawls can be read as synthesizing aspects of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Kant's moral reasoning to provide the rationale to explain why an individual who knows what is morally correct conduct in a given situation, makes such knowledge the source of his action. Demonstrating the Aristotelean roots of Rawls' Kantianism with respect to the problem of motivation for just conduct helps one understand how Kant's moral theory can be viewed in Rawls' words not as a “morality of austere command but … [as] … an ethic of mutual respect and self esteem” (1971, p. 251). Secondly, this view of Kant provides the basis for understanding the anti-corporatist aspect of Rawls' political theory that my reading of Rawls makes necessary.


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