scholarly journals The Police’s Fault?

2019 ◽  
pp. 37-49
Author(s):  
Anne Nassauer

Chapter 3 argues that police strategies and tactics do not cause protest violence directly. The chapter discusses different policing styles in the United States and Germany and shows that police strategies, agents provocateurs, and specific police cultures alone cannot lead to the eruption of violence. It explains how police strategies are often not implemented, and—contrary to common assumptions—if implemented, rigid police strategies alone cannot cause violence. Instead, soft strategies may favor escalation if they coincide with specific situational patterns. Yet situational dynamics, not the strategy, are key for violence to break out. Specific police actions, namely police mismanagement during a protest, can favor violence. Police mismanagement refers to situations in which operational command lacks overview or a course of action or communication among units is severely disrupted or breaks down. Mismanagement can lead to the emergence of violence in combination with other interactions between protesters and police.

2019 ◽  
pp. 197-214
Author(s):  
C. Christine Fair

Given Pakistan's strategic commitments and the risk aversion of policy-makers in the United States and India, what options exist for these states to deal with LeT specifically, or more generally, the problem of Pakistan's reliance upon terrorism as a key foreign policy tool? Admittedly, the options are few and not without risk. In this chapter, I lay out three broad sets of options: maintain the status quo; manage the narrow problem of LeT through enhanced counter-terrorism efforts and leadership decapitation; and develop a new complement of compellent policies to undermine Pakistan's heretofore successful nuclear coercion strategy. India cannot compel Pakistan to cease and desist from using terrorism as a tool of policy on its own; rather, the United States will have to assume the heaviest burden in this effort. However, there is important--if limited--space for Indian action even if the United States, per its historical record, declines to pursue this course of action


2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (10) ◽  
pp. 491-496
Author(s):  
Tracy Perron ◽  
Heather Larovere ◽  
Victoria Guerra ◽  
Kathleen Kilfeather ◽  
Nicole Pare ◽  
...  

As measles cases continue to rise in the United States and elsewhere, public health officials, health care providers and elected officials alike are facing critical questions of how to protect the health of the public from current and future vaccine preventable disease outbreaks while still preserving the religious and personal autonomy of the populations they serve. As measles cases are being examined and carefully managed, public health officials are also tasked with revisiting vaccination policies and agendas to determine the best evidence-based interventions to control this epidemic. To determine the best course of action for the public's interest, research and current literature must be examined to protect and promote the health and wellbeing of those currently affected by the measles outbreak and those yet to be exposed.


Author(s):  
MIYOHEI SHINOHARA

This article examines whether Japan's economic success will last or will be short-lived. The first half analyzes the reasons for the relative decline of the United States from such perspectives as changes in the competitiveness of major industries in the United States and Japan, the mismanagement of macroeconomic policy under the Reagan administration, and the overvaluation of the dollar in the mid-1980s. Therein lie a number of lessons for Japan, a new economic power, in charting its future course of action. The second half discusses Japan's tasks from now on. Its once large current-account surplus has begun to decline, and it is no longer feasible to concentrate only on augmenting domestic demand. First, Japan must be more concerned with the balance between domestic demand and current-account surplus, so as to fulfill its international responsibilities through overseas economic cooperation. Second, the considerable size of Japan's current-account surplus makes all the more necessary some kind of rules or philosophy, acceptable internationally, to serve as a guide in reallocating some of the surplus by region and purpose.


Significance It is as yet unclear whether the police officer in question acted alone, although he apparently once worked for former Interior and Justice Minister Miguel Rodriguez Torres, who, the government claims, is linked to the CIA and whose arrest has reportedly been ordered. The death toll in ongoing anti-government protests continues to rise, now totalling an estimated 75 since April. The failure of the Organization of American States (OAS) to agree a resolution on Venezuela at its General Assembly has emboldened Caracas while demonstrating the inability of the regional body to determine a course of action that can help to resolve the country’s political crisis. Impacts Violence will continue as the opposition relies on protests to weaken the government and erode participation in the assembly elections. Each protest-related death is serving to entrench a paralysing cycle of demonstration and repression. As the OAS flounders, the United States will likely move unilaterally to impose new sanctions on Venezuelan officials. Changes to military figures in the government will deepen political rifts between different elements and factions in the security sector. Yesterday's attack suggests that, in the event of a serious military intervention, this would be violent and bloody.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 216-237
Author(s):  
Terence Roehrig

Abstract The Asia-Pacific region is home to numerous island and maritime disputes but the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute is unique in that it involves two u.s. allies placing Washington in a uncomfortable position. u.s. policy has long been that it takes no position on sovereignty and will abide by any negotiated resolution of the dispute. Yet when tensions have flared between South Korea and Japan over the issue, there have often been calls for the United States to intervene and help solve the problem. However, any u.s. attempt to exert its leverage to reach a solution would be dangerous. Instead, Washington’s best course of action is to quietly remind both sides of their common economic and security interests while helping Seoul and Tokyo to manage the dispute in a careful and judicious manner.


2019 ◽  
pp. 106-128
Author(s):  
Sean J. McLaughlin

This chapter examines how the Kennedy-de Gaulle disagreement over Vietnam was exacerbated by fundamental disagreements over the nature of the Atlantic alliance and tolerance for neutral regimes outside the bloc system. Their dispute over Vietnam began at the spring 1961 summit as a clash of perception, but the Kennedy administration quickly retreated into clichéd views of de Gaulle to dismiss the French position rather than undertake the awkward, difficult task of questioning the assumptions that brought the United States to Vietnam. At the summit, Kennedy made a strong case that there were legitimate strategic concerns that focused his attention on South Vietnam and that a Western defeat there would do great damage to America’s global prestige. De Gaulle emphasized the region’s unsuitability for a military confrontation with the communists and its peripheral importance to the Cold War. What separated the two presidents at this point was de Gaulle’s preference for a low-risk diplomatic course of action that acknowledged the possibility—which he believed to be small—of strategic defeat, while Kennedy was willing to gamble on an idealistic, maximum effort campaign to forestall a communist victory.


1988 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 389-432 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ignacio Klich

With the downfall of the Somoza regime and coming to power of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) in July 1979, Israeli– Nicaraguan relations declined, to be eventually cut off three years later. An important contributing factor to the deterioration and breach of relations was Israel's involvement with Anastasio (Tachito) Somoza Debayle, in particular the military assistance which his faltering regime received from the Likud government until shortly before the end. By no means Tachito's sole armourer,1 the salience of Israel's role was, nonetheless, noted by many, including Somoza Debayle himself.2 This, however, was justified by Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin as the sole honourable course of action in view of earlier favours to the Zionist cause, going back to the pre-state period, by Tachito's father, Anastasio (Tacho) Somoza García.


1993 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 153-174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Haveman ◽  
Barbara Wolfe

This paper offers some facts on trends in children's economic status in the United States as well as an economic perspective for thinking about public policy toward children. Throughout, we will attempt to make clear what is known and what is not known empirically about the relationships that are embodied in our perspective. We consider whether America is “underinvesting in children”; what type of investments in children would be best; to which children investments should be directed; and whether governments should provide the services directly or whether parents should be given the resources and incentives to better nurture their children. We examine the determinants of children's success and propose a course of action for investing in children.


1962 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 45-50
Author(s):  
Hans J. Morgenthau

In order to understand the policy of the United States towards China it is necessary to go back to die Chinese civil war. It is at this point that the confusion over ‘the real issue obscured the thinking and frustrated the policies of the United States. When it became obvious that the Nationalist régime was unable to cope with the revolutionary situation even if supported by American arms and advice, only two courses, which General Wedemeyer's report of 1947 clearly envisaged, were logically open to American policy. One was military intervention on such a scale as to be sufficient not only to crush the Communist armies but also to keep discontent permanently in check. Military intervention of this kind would have entailed military and political commitments of incalculable magnitude. This course of action was rejected by the framers of the United States' foreign policy on the advice, among others, of the then-Secretary of State, George Marshall.


2006 ◽  
Vol 17 (5) ◽  
pp. 414-420 ◽  
Author(s):  
Craig R.M. McKenzie ◽  
Michael J. Liersch ◽  
Stacey R. Finkelstein

Should people be considered organ donors after their death unless they request not to be, or should they not be considered donors unless they request to be? Because people tend to stay with the default in a variety of domains, policymakers' choice of default has large and often important effects. In the United States, where the organ-donation policy default is “not a donor,” about 5,000 people die every year because there are too few donors. Four experiments examined two domains—being an organ donor and saving for retirement—where default effects occur and have important implications. The results indicate that default effects occur in part because policymakers' attitudes can be revealed through their choice of default, and people perceive the default as indicating the recommended course of action. Policymakers need to be aware of the implicit messages conveyed by their choice of default.


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