Russia, the Right to Self-Determination and Annexation

Author(s):  
Johannes Socher

Chapter 4 is the last of three chapters analysing Russia’s post-Soviet state practice with regard to the right to self-determination. It shows how Russia (ab)used the right of peoples to self-determination as a pretext to justify territorial acquisitions by the threat and use of force, in particular in the context of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, but also in its retrospect evaluation of the Soviet Union’s annexation of the Baltic states in 1940. Apart from a ‘referendum’, Russia’s main legal argument for the legality of Crimea’s incorporation into the Russian Federation was based on the reading that the Ukrainian Revolution had created an ‘extreme situation’ in which Crimea’s right to self-determination could not be exercised any longer in the constitutional framework of Ukraine. As in the cases of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the claim of a right of secession had however no sufficient factual basis, although the underlying legal view—that the right of peoples to self-determination may confer a right of secession in ‘extreme situations’—was consistent with earlier state practice. ‘Crimea’ arguably marked a shift away from legal argumentation towards recourse to eclectic historical claims and restoration of hegemonic power, in which the right of peoples to self-determination continues to function as a central legal argument, but legal reasoning more generally loses its dominant position in the official justification of Russia’s state practice in the post-Soviet space.

Author(s):  
Johannes Socher

As a concept of international law, the right to self-determination is widely renowned for its lack of clarity. Broadly speaking, one can differentiate between a liberal and a nationalist tradition. In modern international law, the balance between these two opposing traditions is sought in an attempt to contain or ‘domesticate’ the nationalist conception by limiting it to ‘abnormal’ situations, that is to colonialism in the sense of ‘alien subjugation, domination and exploitation’. Essentially, this distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ situations has since, the distinction was made, been the heart of the matter in the legal discourse on the right to self-determination, with the important qualification regarding the need to preserve existing borders. This book situates Russia’s approach to the right to self-determination in that discourse by way of a regional comparison vis-à-vis a ‘Western’ or European perspective, and a temporal comparison with the former Soviet doctrine of international law. Against the background of the Soviet Union’s role in the evolution of the right to self-determination, the bulk of the book analyses Russia’s relevant state practice in the post-Soviet space through the prisms of sovereignty, secession, and annexation, illustrated by a total of seven case studies on the conflicts over Abkhazia, Chechnya, Crimea, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Tatarstan, and Transnistria. Complemented by a review of the Russian scholarship on the right to self-determination, it is suggested that Russia’s approach may be best understood not only in terms of power politics disguised as legal rhetoric, but can be seen as evidence of traits of a regional (re-)fragmentation of international law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-26
Author(s):  
Johannes Socher

As a concept of international law, the right to self-determination is widely renowned for its unclarity. Broadly speaking, one can differentiate between a liberal and a nationalist tradition. In modern international law, the balance between these two opposing traditions is sought in an attempt to contain or ‘domesticate’ the nationalist conception by limiting it to ‘abnormal’ situations, i.e. to colonialism in the sense of ‘alien subjugation, domination and exploitation’. Essentially, this distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ situations has since been the heart of the matter in the legal discourse on the right to self-determination, with the important qualification regarding the need to preserve existing borders. This study situates Russia’s approach to the right to self- determination in that discourse by way of a regional comparison vis-à-vis a ‘western’ or European perspective, and a temporal comparison with the former Soviet doctrine of international law. Against the background of the Soviet Union’s role in the evolution of the right to self-determination, the bulk of the study analyses Russia’s relevant state practice in the post-Soviet space through the prisms of sovereignty, secession, and annexation. Complemented by a review of the Russian scholarship on the topic, it is suggested that Russia’s approach to the right to self-determination may be best understood not only in terms of power politics disguised as legal rhetoric, but can be seen as evidence of traits of a regional (re-)fragmentation of international law.


Author(s):  
Johannes Socher

The book provides a detailed assessment of Russia’s state practice in the post-Soviet space with the aim to ascertain a distinct Russian approach to the right of peoples to self-determination, illustrated by seven case studies on the secessionist conflicts over Abkhazia, Chechnya, Crimea, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Tatarstan, and Transnistria. As such, it may serve as a detailed documentation of the raw material necessary to form and identify rules of customary international law, produced by one particular state. Beyond that, it seeks to test the accuracy of and give substance to Lauri Mälksoo’s general assessment in Russian Approaches to International Law that the ‘evolution of Moscow’s legal argumentation and views in these complex cases … has not followed some overarching legal principle but reflected changing power politics. Until 2014, Russia claimed that sovereignty trumped self-determination but in 2014 partly destroyed its own earlier argumentation by its own actions in Ukraine.’ Finally, this book is a contribution to what Mälksoo calls the ‘debatable nexus’ between legal scholarship and state practice of international law in Russia, that is the open question of to what extent international law as an academic discipline continues to be subjugated to the raison d’état in Russia.


Author(s):  
Johannes Socher

Chapter 3 is the second of three chapters analysing Russia’s post-Soviet state practice with regard to the right to self-determination. It argues that prior to Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008, Russia’s state practice in the four major secessionist conflicts outside the Russian Federation’s territory (Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, and Transnistria in Moldova) was relatively consistent, notwithstanding valid critique of hypocrisy. With the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states shortly after Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Russia’s approach arguably changed, although the underlying legal view was consistent with its position in the Kosovo case in front of the International Court of Justice, where Russia did not deny Kosovo recognition because of a different view on self-determination and secession but because it refused to accept the logic of some states which viewed Kosovo as a ‘special’ or ‘unique’ case that cannot be compared with other secessionist conflicts. The case studies furthermore show that Russia started to construct its own legal framework to justify its actions.


2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 567-583 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kieran O'Reilly ◽  
Noelle Higgins

AbstractThe 2008 conflict in South Ossetia, involving both Georgian and Russian armed forces, attracted much international attention and debate. This article seeks to analyse the international legal framework regarding the use of force which should have applied to this conflict. It will first look at the history of, and circumstances surrounding, the South Ossetian conflict, and then examine the jus ad bellum regarding wars of national liberation and aggression. The concept of intervention to protect nationals abroad will also be discussed. These legal paradigms will then be applied to the events of August 2008 in the region of South Ossetia to analyse the legality of the use of force in this conflict.


2012 ◽  
Vol 39 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 237-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaarel Piirimäe

The objective of this article is to challenge the widespread interpretation of interwar East Central Europe as a hotbed of excessive nationalism, by establishing a longue durée of federalist thinking in Estonia in the first half of the twentieth century. By focusing on personal continuities from the founding years of the Estonian Republic into the 1940s, it is possible to detect a remarkable persistence of ‘idealist’ visions about intra and interstate federalism that had been internalized by Estonian statesmen before and during the First World War and earlier. Apart from establishing the continuity of federalist thought the article analyzes the political discourse in which the concept of national self-determination was picked up. The primary framework for Estonian thinkers on nationality was the debate that developed within the all-Russian socialist movement in the context of the nationality problems of the multinational Western provinces and Congress Poland. The discourse on territorial and cultural autonomy within a federative Russia, demands that came to the fore in 1905, developed only after the idea of self-determination entered the thinking of Estonian radicals. Until late 1917, asserting the right to self-determination by no means meant separation from Russia. Even after 1917 Estonian politicians imagined the future republic as part of a regional league or union relinquishing part of its sovereignty to a supranational authority, plans that foundered on the incompatibility of national interests by 1920. Although the experience had not been encouraging, Baltic politicians resuscitated federalist concepts in the early period of the Second World War, as they tried to envisage a new structure for a cooperative and autonomous East Central Europe, within a restored Europe.


Author(s):  
Beata Gałek

Russia defines relations with The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the category of strategic competition and struggle for influence. It realizes its goals through various methods and tools, choosing the right combination of them, depending on the entities to which they are dedicated. This article is an attempt to synthetically discuss the activity of the Russian Federation in the information environment of the Baltic States, oriented to the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), determining its conditions, mechanisms and key narratives. The author considers the fact that the attitude towards NATO is part of Russia‘s global strategy, which aims to revise the international order in a direction that would guarantee a return to its rightful position in the emerging new order.


2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 267 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dr.Sc. Elvina Jusufaj

Crimea’s secession from Ukraine and its annexation to the Russian Federation invoked Kosovo precedent, in its declaration of independence, as an argument for secession. The territorial referendum in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, only five days after the declaration of independence, was an attempt to justify the secession based on the right to selfdetermination of the people of Crimea. It is overwhelmingly considered illegal and its outcome has not been accepted and recognized by states, regional and international organizations. The comparative elements of statehood and secession between Kosovo and Crimea are reflected through analyzing the declarations of independence, international recognition and Russia’s role as a third-state factor in external selfdetermination. Essential distinctions are highlighted. Kosovo is widely acknowledged and accepted a sui generis case. Its declaration of independence came as result of a long monitored comprehensive process; not to legitimize the right for self-determination but as the final option for stability and peace in the region. Crimea seceded in violation of international law through the use of force. While Kosovo is a democratic, multi-ethnic new state and recognized by 107 states, the secession of Crimea and its annexation to the Russian Federation is considered illegal and endangers the existing international order.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document