Russia, the Right to Self-Determination and Annexation
Chapter 4 is the last of three chapters analysing Russia’s post-Soviet state practice with regard to the right to self-determination. It shows how Russia (ab)used the right of peoples to self-determination as a pretext to justify territorial acquisitions by the threat and use of force, in particular in the context of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, but also in its retrospect evaluation of the Soviet Union’s annexation of the Baltic states in 1940. Apart from a ‘referendum’, Russia’s main legal argument for the legality of Crimea’s incorporation into the Russian Federation was based on the reading that the Ukrainian Revolution had created an ‘extreme situation’ in which Crimea’s right to self-determination could not be exercised any longer in the constitutional framework of Ukraine. As in the cases of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the claim of a right of secession had however no sufficient factual basis, although the underlying legal view—that the right of peoples to self-determination may confer a right of secession in ‘extreme situations’—was consistent with earlier state practice. ‘Crimea’ arguably marked a shift away from legal argumentation towards recourse to eclectic historical claims and restoration of hegemonic power, in which the right of peoples to self-determination continues to function as a central legal argument, but legal reasoning more generally loses its dominant position in the official justification of Russia’s state practice in the post-Soviet space.