Epilogue

2020 ◽  
pp. 359-370
Author(s):  
Wendell Bird
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Freedom Of Speech ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Broad Definition ◽  
Freedom Of Press ◽  
New States ◽  
Narrow Definition ◽  
Fundamental Law ◽  
Definition Of

A number of conundrums are explained by the fact that an expansive understanding of freedom of press and freedom of speech prevailed and became dominant in Britain and America after the mid-1760s, and are unsolved by those who claim that the narrow Blackstone-Mansfield definition of freedoms of press and speech was universally or generally accepted during the late eighteenth century. Those conundrums include why those freedoms would be defined as mere protection from licensing that ended nearly a century before, why there was a steady stream of essays championing a broad definition and opposing a narrow definition, why American colonists and English radical Whigs threatened with prosecution would advocate narrow instead of broad freedoms, why there was such a wide chasm between restrictive law and permissive practices of speech and press, why nine of the eleven new states that adopted new fundamental law found it necessary to protect freedom of press, why every one of those declarations of rights gave the broadest protection without express exceptions rather than using Blackstone’s language, why the federal Bill of Rights similarly used the broadest language and rejected common law limitations, as well as why Fox’s Libel Act was able to attract majority support in Parliament.

Introduction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Wendell Bird
Keyword(s):  
First Amendment ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Freedom Of The Press ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
James Madison ◽  
Broad Definition ◽  
The Press ◽  
Narrow Definition ◽  
The Common ◽  
Definition Of

The “father of the Bill of Rights,” James Madison, described the unqualified words protecting freedoms of speech and press as embodying a broad definition rather than a narrow definition of those liberties. Upon offering those provisions, he said that “freedom of the press and rights of conscience . . . are unguarded in the British constitution,” including the common law, and that “every government should be disarmed of powers which trench upon those particular rights.” In Madison’s draft and in the final First Amendment, each clause was worded to modify or to reject the English common law on point in order to provide for far greater protection of individual liberties; no clause was worded with the restrictions that the common law imposed. Was Madison right? Are freedoms of press and speech in the First Amendment broad or narrow protections?

The Dominant American View of Freedoms of Press and Speech, in the Decade Leading Up to Ratification of the Federal Bill of Rights

2020 ◽  
pp. 303-336
Author(s):  
Wendell Bird
Keyword(s):  
First Amendment ◽  
Freedom Of Speech ◽  
Source Material ◽  
Freedom Of The Press ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Original Source ◽  
Narrow View ◽  
The Press ◽  
Freedom Of Press ◽  
The World

In the 1780s in America, the advocates of broad understandings of freedom of press and freedom of speech continued to argue, as “Junius Wilkes” did in 1782, that “[i]f a printer is liable to prosecution and restraint, for publishing pieces on public measures, conceived libellous, the liberty of the press is annihilated and ruined. . . . The danger is precisely the same to liberty, in punishing a person after the performance appears to the world, as in preventing its publication in the first instance. The doctrine of libels, is of pernicious consequence to the freedom of the press.” Many other essays in the 1780s showed the dominance of an expansive understanding of freedoms of press and speech, as did the declarations of rights of nine states. That was the context in which the First Amendment was adopted and ratified in 1789–1791. These conclusions about the prevalent and dominant understanding after the mid-1760s are flatly contrary to the narrow view of freedoms of press and speech stated by Blackstone and Mansfield, and restated by the neo-Blackstonians, who claim that the narrow understanding was not only predominant but exclusive through the ratification of the First Amendment and onward until 1798. This book’s conclusions are based on far more original source material than the neo-Blackstonians’ conclusions.

The Revolution in Freedoms of Press and Speech

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wendell Bird
Keyword(s):  
First Amendment ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Quarter Century ◽  
Conventional View ◽  
The Press ◽  
History Of ◽  
Narrow Definition ◽  
The Common ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
First Time

This book discusses the revolutionary broadening of concepts of freedoms of press and speech in Great Britain and in America during the quarter century before the First Amendment and Fox’s Libel Act. The conventional view of the history of freedoms of press and speech is that the common law since antiquity defined those freedoms narrowly. In that view, Sir William Blackstone in 1769, and Lord Chief Justice Mansfield in 1770, faithfully summarized that common law in giving very narrow definitions of those freedoms as mere liberty from prior restraint and not as liberty from punishment after printing or speaking (the political crimes of seditious libel and seditious speech). Today, that view continues to be held by neo-Blackstonians, and remains dominant or at least very influential among historians. Neo-Blackstonians claim that the Framers used freedom of press “in a Blackstonian sense to mean a guarantee against previous restraints” with no protection against “subsequent restraints” (punishment) of seditious expression. Neo-Blackstonians further claim that “[n]o other definition of freedom of the press by anyone anywhere in America before 1798” existed. This book, by contrast, concludes that a broad definition and understanding of freedoms of press and speech was the dominant context of the First Amendment and of Fox’s Libel Act. Its basis is hundreds of examples of a broad understanding of freedoms of press and speech, in both Britain and America, in the late eighteenth century. For example, a book published in London in 1760 by a Scottish lawyer, George Wallace, stated that it is tyranny “to restrain the freedom of speculative disquisitions,” and because “men have a right to think for themselves, and to publish their thoughts,” it is “monstrous … under the pretext of the authority of laws, which ought never to have been enacted … attempting to restrain the liberty of the press” (seditious libel law). This book also challenges the conventional view of Blackstone and the neo-Blackstonians. Blackstone and Mansfield did not find any definition in the common law, but instead selected the narrowest definition in popular essays from the prior seventy years. Blackstone misdescribed it as an accepted common law definition, which in fact did not exist, and a year later Mansfield inserted a similar definition into the common law for the first time. Both misdescribed that narrow definition and the unique rules for prosecuting sedition as ancient. They were leading a counter-revolution, cloaked as a summary of a narrow and ancient common law doctrine that was neither.

The primacy of mania: A reconsideration of mood disorders

2009 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
Athanasios Koukopoulos ◽  
S. Nassir Ghaemi
Keyword(s):  
Bipolar Disorder ◽  
Clinical Evidence ◽  
Unipolar Depression ◽  
Current Treatment ◽  
Depressive Illness ◽  
Broad Definition ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Narrow Definition ◽  
Empirical Tests ◽  
Definition Of

AbstractIn contemporary psychiatry, depression and mania are conceived as different entities. They may occur together, as in bipolar disorder, or they may occur separately, as in unipolar depression. This view is partly based on a narrow definition of mania and a rather broad definition of depression. Generally, depression is seen as more prominent, common, and problematic; while mania appears uncommon and treatment-responsive. We suggest a reversal: mania viewed broadly, not as simply episodic euphoria plus hyperactivity, but a wide range of excitatory behaviors; and depression seen more narrowly. Further, using pharmacological and clinical evidence, and in contrast to previous theories of mania interpreted as a flight from depression, we propose the primacy of mania hypothesis (PM): depression is a consequence of the excitatory processes of mania. If correct, current treatment of depressive illness needs revision. Rather than directly lifting mood with antidepressants, the aim would be to suppress manic-like excitation, with depression being secondarily prevented. Potential objections to, and empirical tests of, the PM hypothesis are discussed.

Water services and why a broad definition under the WFD is needed to ensure the polluter pays principle

elni Review ◽  
2012 ◽  
pp. 59-62
Author(s):  
Sarolta Tripolszky
Keyword(s):  
Water Status ◽  
Water Services ◽  
Economic Policies ◽  
Economic Activities ◽  
Member States ◽  
Broad Definition ◽  
Water Users ◽  
European Court ◽  
Narrow Definition ◽  
Definition Of

'Water services' is a term under the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) that describes economic activities which make use of water infrastructure that changes the physical characteristic of a water body. Economic actors who make use of water in this way are asked to come up for all or part of the costs and thus contribute to the achievement of good water status - the objective of the WFD. However many European member states have applied a narrow definition of the term in their national legislation and restricted water services to the traditional water service sectors: wastewater treatment and municipal drinking water supply, leaving agriculture, mining, hydropower or navigation aside. Because of the narrow definition of this legal term the wrong economic policies are applied to water users resulting in a poor allocation of natural and financial resources. This goes against the very essence of the WFD which was adopted to start a new area in which all human pressures on water are dealt within a single framework and in which the polluter has to pay. The involvement of all relevant sectors and application of wise economics is crucial for the timely implementation of the WFD. In turn, this is essential for the European society and economy in view of the predicted increase in pressure on water in the future. EEB and WWF started a collective complaint against 11 member states in 2006 to enforce the correct implementation of the Directive. A decision by the European court of Justice is expected in the fall of 2012. In this article the author explains the concept of the term 'water services' and outlines the economic and legal consequences of a narrow and broad definition. The development of the collective (or strategic) complaint from 2006 till today is also described.

The Need for a Constitution in the United Kingdom

1979 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 269-285
Author(s):  
Wilberforce
Keyword(s):  
United Kingdom ◽  
New Zealand ◽  
Legal System ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Flexible Instrument ◽  
The Common ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Right

I was not surprised when, from several alternative subjects, you chose, as the title of my Lecture, the need for a Constitution in Britain. Those of us without a written constitution are indeed, a select club—New Zealand, Israel, the United Kingdom.I will start with a quotation from Lord Salmon. In a recent lecture, he said: In this country [U.K.] we have an unwritten constitution. I have always regarded this as a blessing and never agreed with the theoretical objections to it. It is superbly flexible and above all it has stood the test of time. It works—and works admirably. But I am beginning to wonder whether it might not be wise to evolve, not an elaborate written constitution but perhaps the equivalent of a modern Bill of Rights. A statute which should lay down our basic freedoms, provide for their preservation and enact that it could not be repealed save by, say, a 75% majority of both Houses of Parliament.One can recognize in this passage the views of an eminent common lawyer, believing in the strength and potentialities of the common law as a flexible instrument, in, of course, the right hands: of one who believes deeply in human freedom, and who is concerned about the threat to it: who desires an explicit definition of the basic liberties and who believes that these can be protected by a sufficiently strong, entrenched, legal system. In this he undoubtedly reflects the views of many people, probably of the majority of ordinary men.

faculty. Follow-up univariate F tests revealed 14 items that differed significantly at the 0.05 level using the Scheffé test. For a number of the items, it appears that there is statistical significance and not necessarily meaningful differences. For ex-ample, the item concerning taking a test for another student was rated 3.97 and 3.84 by students and faculty, respectively, yet was different in statistical signifi-cance. Of the items that are significantly different, 3 stand out as being meaning-ful. Items pertaining to studying from old versions of exams and having the instructors manual that contains test items were rated more severe by students (Ms = 2.75 and 3.53, respectively) than faculty (Ms = 1.64 and 2.91, respectively), whereas faculty rated collaborating on work that was supposed to be done individ-ually as more severe (M = 3.05) than did students (M = 2.70). A broad definition of perceived prevalence of cheating was established by ask-ing faculty and students to rate the percentage of students they believed cheat using a Likert scale with 1 being 0% and 10 being 90% to 100%. Faculty perceived that between 0% to 10% of students cheat (M = 1.89), whereas students perceived be-tween 10% to 20% of students cheat (M = 2.32), a difference that is significant, i(271) = 4.27, p<. 001. Table 1 presents the perceived prevalence results using a narrow definition of the term based on the 40 academically dishonest items. As can be seen from Table 1, both faculty and students perceive that the prevalence of cheating is quite low, with most item ratings having means below 2.00, indicating that 1 % to 10% of stu-dents are perceived as engaging in the behaviors. The behaviors perceived to be most prevalent by faculty were students using old tests without permission, whereas students perceived changing words slightly from an original source as the most prevalent. Although the perception of these behaviors is relatively low, there is greater variance (standard deviations typically above 1.0) in the ratings of per-ceived prevalence when compared to the severity ratings. In general, students have greater variance than faculty in their perceived prevalence ratings. A MANO VA was computed to determine whether significant differences ex-isted between student and faculty ratings of perceived prevalence. Results re-vealed a significant MANO VA, Wilks's A = .70, F(40, 247) = 2.69, p < .001. Follow-up univariate F tests revealed 23 items that differed significantly at the .05 level. Students had higher perceived prevalence ratings on 22 of the 23 items, with faculty rating the use of old tests without permission as more prevalent than stu-dents. Similar to the results regarding severity ratings, many of the significant dif-ferences obtained on perceived prevalence ratings, although statistically significant, do not appear to be meaningful differences. For example, although the item concerning using unauthorized materials such as crib notes is statistically sig-nificant with a student mean of 1.55 and a faculty mean of 1.34, this difference is not a meaningful one.

2003 ◽  
pp. 81-85
Keyword(s):  
Statistical Significance ◽  
Original Source ◽  
Broad Definition ◽  
Test Items ◽  
Scheffe Test ◽  
Faculty Ratings ◽  
Narrow Definition ◽  
Faculty Rating ◽  
Definition Of

scholarly journals Information interventions as a new dimension of Ukraine's cyber-vulnerability

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (S2) ◽  
pp. 152-166
Author(s):  
Ihor V. Diorditsa ◽  
Armenui A. Telestakova ◽  
Olga M. Koval ◽  
Olha A. Nazarenko ◽  
Andrii A. Nastiuk
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Public Opinion ◽  
Cyber Security ◽  
Computer Systems ◽  
Separate Group ◽  
Broad Definition ◽  
Narrow Definition ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Concept Of Information

In the article, the author analyzes information interventions as threats to the cybernetic security of Ukraine. The relevance of this study is due to the fact that large number of socially dangerous acts aimed at harming state interests can now be used both in the information space and in purely cyberspace. Since such actions are performed using computer systems and performed in cyberspace, we propose to define this type of intervention as “cybernetic intervention”, describing it as a separate group of socially dangerous acts aimed at damaging the information infrastructure of States, vital areas of society's existence. The main aim of this study is to analyze information intervention as a threat to cyber security of Ukraine. The interpretation of terms that make up the conceptual and categorical apparatus of the subject of research is carried out. A narrow definition of the concept of “information intervention” is proposed as the violent intervention of one or more subjects of information relations in the activities of another or others, and a broad definition – a certain set of aggressive actions that are aimed at influencing public opinion and decision-making within one or another country and achieving clearly defined results.

Holism, Chinese Medicine and Systems Ideologies: Rewriting the Past to Imagine the Future

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Volker Scheid
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Chinese Medicine ◽  
Medical Humanities ◽  
Science And Technology Studies ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
The Past ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Us ◽  
Shared Objective ◽  
Definition Of

This chapter explores the articulations that have emerged over the last half century between various types of holism, Chinese medicine and systems biology. Given the discipline’s historical attachments to a definition of ‘medicine’ that rather narrowly refers to biomedicine as developed in Europe and the US from the eighteenth century onwards, the medical humanities are not the most obvious starting point for such an inquiry. At the same time, they do offer one advantage over neighbouring disciplines like medical history, anthropology or science and technology studies for someone like myself, a clinician as well as a historian and anthropologist: their strong commitment to the objective of facilitating better medical practice. This promise furthermore links to the wider project of critique, which, in Max Horkheimer’s definition of the term, aims at change and emancipation in order ‘to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them’. If we take the critical medical humanities as explicitly affirming this shared objective and responsibility, extending the discipline’s traditional gaze is not a burden but becomes, in fact, an obligation.

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