Perception and Perceptual Contents

2021 ◽  
pp. 104-157
Author(s):  
Marc Gasser-Wingate
Keyword(s):  
Sense Perception ◽  
Role Perception ◽  
Cognitive Penetration ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Perceptual Objects ◽  
Broad Interpretation

I examine Aristotle’s views on the contents of perception, and how they bear on the role perception plays in our learning. I defend a broad interpretation of perceptual objects and contents, on which we perceive not just colors, sounds, and so on, but Callias, lyres, loaves of bread, and whether Callias is near, and the lyre well-tuned, and the loaf baked. I consider how this broad perception relates to the characterization of sense-perception in De Anima, and whether it depends on some sort of “cognitive penetration” from the intellect. I then consider Aristotle’s claim that our perceptions are “of universals” even though we perceive particulars, and his description of our pretheoretical apprehension of “compound” universals. I argue that Aristotle thought we could be perceptually responsive to universals we do not yet recognize as such, and that this thought informs his generous take on the knowledge possessed by those with experience.

The Lever, or How to Act at a Distance: A Backdrop to Theophrastus’ De sensibus

Rhizomata ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 168-187
Author(s):  
André Laks
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Sense Organ ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Extreme Caution ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias ◽  
Physiological Alteration ◽  
Material Process ◽  
Theoretical Frame

AbstractIt is well known that when it comes to perception in the De anima, Aristotle uses affection-related vocabulary with extreme caution. This has given rise to a debate between interpreters who hold that in Aristotle’s account, the act of sense-perception nevertheless involves the physiological alteration of the sense organ (Richard Sorabji), and those think, with Myles Burnyeat, that for Aristotle, perception does not involve any material process, so that an Aristotelian physics of sense-perception is a “physics of forms alone”. The present article suggests that the dematerialisation of Aristotle’s theory of perception, which has a long story from Alexander of Aphrodisias to Brentano, may be in fact traced back to Theophrastus’ exegesis of Aristotle’s relevant passages in the De anima in his Physics, as we can reconstruct it on the basis of Priscian’s Metaphrasis in Theophrastum and Simplicius’ commentary of Aristotle’s De Anima. The reconstruction also provides a scholastic-theoretical frame to Theophrastus’ critical exposition of ancient theories about sense perception in his De sensibus, whether or not the discussion originally belonged to Theophrastus’ Physics.

The Emotions

2021 ◽  
pp. 18-41
Author(s):  
David Charles
Keyword(s):  
Pure Form ◽  
The Other ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Body And Soul ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Physical Features ◽  
Distinct Features ◽  
Physical Type

In De Anima A.1, Aristotle developed an account of certain ‘affections of the soul’ such as anger which is his model for other ‘affections and actions common to body and soul’ such as desire and sense perception. His remarks about anger can be understood in two different ways. According to one account, which I call ‘the Pure Form Interpretation’, anger is essentially a compound made up of two definitionally distinct features, one purely psychological (a desire for revenge: its form) and the other physical (the boiling of the blood: its matter), where the latter in some way ‘underlies’ the former. In the other, described as ‘the Impure Form Interpretation’, the type of desire for revenge referred to in the definition of anger (its form) is inseparable in definition from (and not abstractable from) physical features such as, for example, the boiling blood. The type of desire which defines anger is itself defined as a boiling-of-the-blood-(or hot-) desire for revenge. Aristotle’s comments in De Anima A.1 are, it is argued, best understood in line with the Impure Form Interpretation, as defining anger as an inextricably psycho-physical type of desire for revenge, not decomposable into two definitionally separate features, one purely psychological, one purely physical.

scholarly journals Algorithm and Parameters: Solving the Generality Problem for Reliabilism

2019 ◽  
Vol 128 (4) ◽  
pp. 463-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack C. Lyons
Keyword(s):  
Case Studies ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Folk Psychology ◽  
Important Case ◽  
Cognitive Penetration ◽  
Generality Problem ◽  
Psychological Variables ◽  
Affect Processing

The paper offers a solution to the generality problem for a reliabilist epistemology, by developing an “algorithm and parameters” scheme for type-individuating cognitive processes. Algorithms are detailed procedures for mapping inputs to outputs. Parameters are psychological variables that systematically affect processing. The relevant process type for a given token is given by the complete algorithmic characterization of the token, along with the values of all the causally relevant parameters. The typing that results is far removed from the typings of folk psychology, and from much of the epistemology literature. But it is principled and empirically grounded, and shows good prospects for yielding the desired epistemological verdicts. The paper articulates and elaborates the theory, drawing out some of its consequences. Toward the end, the fleshed-out theory is applied to two important case studies: hallucination and cognitive penetration of perception.

Sense Organs and the Activity of Sensation in Aristotle

Phronesis ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 306-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Magee
Keyword(s):  
Detailed Examination ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
Transparent Medium ◽  
Living Animal ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Sense Organs ◽  
Physical Processes ◽  
Ongoing Debate ◽  
Proper Interpretation ◽  
Qualitative Changes

AbstractAmid the ongoing debate over the proper interpretation of Aristotle's theory of sense perception in the De Anima, Steven Everson has recently presented a well-documented and ambitious treatment of the issue, arguing in favor of Richard Sorabji's controversial position that sense organs literally take on the qualities of their proper objects. Against the interpretation of M. F. Burnyeat, Everson and others make a compelling case the Aristotelian account of sensation requires some physical process to occur in sense organs. A detailed examination of the interpretation by Everson and Sorabji of Aristotle's theory, however, shows that their reading cannot be the correct one, since it involves many textual and philosophical difficulties. Their interpretation, for instance, would require abandoning Aristotle's requirement that only a transparent substance is suitable matter for an eye. Likewise, their understanding of the Aristotle's doctrine of sensation as the reception of form without matter in DA 2.12 cannot be reconciled with other texts of his from On Generation and Corruption. An analysis of these texts, as well as DA 2.7 and De Sensu 6 on the roles of light and the transparent medium in vision, show that, for Aristotle, the physical processes which sense organs undergo are not standard qualitative changes (i.e. alterations), but activities or the actualizations of potencies in the material constituents of living animal bodies.

Être en vie sans vraiment l’être ? Autour du « corps naturel ayant la vie en puissance » (De Anima 412a20).

2019 ◽  
Vol 101 (4) ◽  
pp. 477-507
Author(s):  
Jorge Mittelmann
Keyword(s):  
De Anima ◽  
Standard Solution ◽  
Alternative Proposal

Abstract John Ackrill argued that Aristotelian bodies are conceptually promiscuous, since they fail to exemplify the modal relations that are expected to hold between their matter and their form. Although “potentially alive”, organic bodies are bound to be ensouled, on pain of lacking the required potential; but to the extent that they are ensouled, they are already actually alive. It seems odd to claim that a body may lack (qua “potential”) what it cannot help having (as necessarily enjoying life). This paper claims that the standard solution (which distinguishes an essentially ensouled body from its underlying inanimate substrate) falls short of the strong unity living beings display, given that nothing in them can be accidentally alive (De Anima 415b13). An alternative proposal is advanced, based on two distinctions Aristotle draws in his philosophical lexicon: (i) both matter and form have a claim to being called “nature”; (ii) formal nature may be found in its subject either (ii.a) in actuality or (ii.b) in potentiality (Met. 1015a18). It is argued that the characterization of organic bodies as “potentially alive” conforms to (ii.b), a pattern that helps explain the specific way in which bodies share in the organisms’ life. Two possible instances of (ii.b) are finally considered by way of illustration.

Medical Topics in the De anima Commentary of Coimbra (1598) and the Jesuits’ Attitude towards Medicine in Education and Natural Philosophy

2014 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-101 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Sander
Keyword(s):  
Sixteenth Century ◽  
Early Modern ◽  
Natural Philosophy ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Universities And Colleges ◽  
Jesuit Universities ◽  
Modern Learning ◽  
Jesuit College

Early-modern Jesuit universities did not offer studies in medicine, and from 1586 onwards, the Jesuit Ratio studiorum prohibited digressions on medical topics in the Aristotelian curriculum. However, some sixteenth-century Jesuit text books used in philosophy classes provided detailed accounts on physiological issues such as sense perception and its organic location as discussed in Aristotle’s De anima II, 7–11. This seeming contradiction needs to be explained. In this paper, I focus on the interst in medical topics manifested in a commentary by the Jesuits of Coimbra. Admittedly, the Coimbra commentary constituted an exception, as the Jesuit college that produced it was integrated in a royal university which had a strong interest in educating physicians. It will be claimed that the exclusion of medicine at Jesuit universities and colleges had its origin in rather incidental events in the course of the foundation of the first Jesuit university in Sicily. There, the lay professors of law and medicine intended to avoid subordination to the Jesuits and thereby provoked a conflict which finally led the Jesuit administration to refrain from including faculties of medicine and law in Jesuit universities. Towards the end of the sixteenth century, a veritable Jesuit animosity towards medicine emerged for philosophical and pedagogical reasons. This development reflects educational concerns within the Society as well as the role of commentaries on Aristotle for early-modern learning.


scholarly journals Body and Soul in Aristotle

Philosophy ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 49 (187) ◽  
pp. 63-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Sorabji
Keyword(s):  
Sense Organ ◽  
Mental Activity ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Sense Organs ◽  
Physiological Aspect ◽  
Body And Soul ◽  
Corporeal Nature ◽  
Physical Components ◽  
Opposite Extreme

Interpretations of Aristotle's account of the relation between body and soul have been widely divergent. At one extreme, Thomas Slakey has said that in the De Anima ‘Aristotle tries to explain perception simply as an event in the sense-organs’. Wallace Matson has generalized the point. Of the Greeks in general he says, ‘Mind–body identity was taken for granted.… Indeed, in the whole classical corpus there exists no denial of the view that sensing is a bodily process throughout’. At the opposite extreme, Friedrich Solmsen has said of Aristotle's theory, ‘it is doubtful whether the movement or the actualization occurring when the eye sees or the ear hears has any physical or physiological aspect.’ Similarly, Jonathan Barnes has described Aristotle as leaning hesitantly towards the view that desire and thought are wholly non-physical. But on the emotions and sense-perception, Barnes takes an intermediate position. Aristotle treats these, he says, as including physical and non-physical components. Other writers too have sought a position somewhere in the middle. Thus G. R. T. Ross concedes that we find in Aristotle ‘what looks like the crudest materialism’. It appears that objects produce changes in an organism, ‘and the reception of these changes in the sense organ is perception’. But, he maintains, this gives us only half the picture. The complete theory ‘may in a way be designated as a doctrine of psychophysical parallelism’. W. D. Ross also seeks a middle position. He thinks that Aristotle sometimes brings out ‘the distinctively mental, non-corporeal nature of the act [of sensation].… But Aristotle cannot be said to hold successfully to the notion of sensation as a purely mental activity having nothing in common with anything physical. He is still under the influence of earlier materialism’.

Aristotle on Various Types of Alteration in De Anima II 5

Phronesis ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 138-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Bowin
Keyword(s):  
De Anima ◽  
Types Of Change

AbstractIn De Anima II 5, 417a21-b16, Aristotle makes a number of distinctions between types of transitions, affections, and alterations. The objective of this paper is to sort out the relationships between these distinctions by means of determining which of the distinguished types of change can be coextensive and which cannot, and which can overlap and which cannot. From the results of this analysis, an interpretation of 417a21-b16 is then constructed that differs from previous interpretations in certain important respects, chief among which is its characterization of transitions from first potentiality to first actuality, e.g., learning, not as ‘ordinary’, but rather as acquisitions of natural dispositions or faculties.

scholarly journals Aristotle’s criticism of the “like is known by like” principle (Commentary on De anima II 5, 416b 32 – 417a 20)

2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 307-325
Author(s):  
Svetlana Mesyats
Keyword(s):  
Sense Perception ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Being Moved

One of the principles underlying Aristotle’s theory of sense perception is that the sense faculty is potentially such as the sensible object is actually. On closer examination, this statement turns out to be a modernization of the ancient rule "like is known by like", shared by most of the early Greek philosophers, including Empedocles and Plato. The paper shows that though Aristotle criticizes this principle in his treatise On the Soul, he doesn’t really abandon it. On the contrary, he retains it for his own theory of sense perception while using the notions of the possible and the actual. The paper is written in the form of a line-by-line commentary to De anima II 5 416b 32–417a 20, where Aristotle reproaches his predecessors for the inconsistency and contradictions of their theories; shows that the “like is known by like” principle entails certain difficulties, and solves these difficulties by introducing his own theory of being moved and acted upon, according to which the patient is in a sense unlike the agent and in a sense like it.

Natural theology

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott MacDonald
Keyword(s):  
Inductive Inference ◽  
Natural Theology ◽  
Biblical Theology ◽  
Religious Language ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
Cognitive Resources ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Deductive Argument ◽  
Knowledge Of God

Natural theology aims at establishing truths or acquiring knowledge about God (or divine matters generally) using only our natural cognitive resources. The phrase ‘our natural cognitive resources’ identifies both the methods and data for natural theology: it relies on standard techniques of reasoning and facts or truths in principle available to all human beings just in virtue of their possessing reason and sense perception. As traditionally conceived, natural theology begins by establishing the existence of God, and then proceeds by establishing truths about God’s nature (for example, that God is eternal, immutable and omniscient) and about God’s relation to the world. A precise characterization of natural theology depends on further specification of its methods and data. One strict conception of natural theology – the traditional conception sometimes associated with Thomas Aquinas – allows only certain kinds of deductive argument, the starting points of which are propositions that are either self-evident or evident to sense perception. A broader conception might allow not just deductive but also inductive inference and admit as starting points propositions that fall short of being wholly evident. Natural theology contrasts with investigations into divine matters that rely at least in part on data not naturally available to us as human beings. This sort of enterprise might be characterized as revelation-based theology, in so far as the supernatural element on which it relies is something supernaturally revealed to us by God. Revelation-based theology can make use of what is ascertainable by us only because of special divine aid. Dogmatic and biblical theology would be enterprises of this sort. Critics of natural theology fall generally into three groups. The first group, the majority, argue that some or all of the particular arguments of natural theology are, as a matter of fact, unsuccessful. Critics in the second group argue that, in principle, natural theology cannot succeed, either because of essential limitations on human knowledge that make it impossible for us to attain knowledge of God or because religious language is such as to make an investigation into its truth inappropriate. The third group of critics holds that natural theology is in some way irrelevant or inimical to true religion. They argue in various ways that the objectifying, abstract and impersonal methods of natural theology cannot capture what is fundamentally important about the divine and our relation to it.

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