scholarly journals Body and Soul in Aristotle

Philosophy ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 49 (187) ◽  
pp. 63-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Sorabji
Keyword(s):  
Sense Organ ◽  
Mental Activity ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Sense Organs ◽  
Physiological Aspect ◽  
Body And Soul ◽  
Corporeal Nature ◽  
Physical Components ◽  
Opposite Extreme

Interpretations of Aristotle's account of the relation between body and soul have been widely divergent. At one extreme, Thomas Slakey has said that in the De Anima ‘Aristotle tries to explain perception simply as an event in the sense-organs’. Wallace Matson has generalized the point. Of the Greeks in general he says, ‘Mind–body identity was taken for granted.… Indeed, in the whole classical corpus there exists no denial of the view that sensing is a bodily process throughout’. At the opposite extreme, Friedrich Solmsen has said of Aristotle's theory, ‘it is doubtful whether the movement or the actualization occurring when the eye sees or the ear hears has any physical or physiological aspect.’ Similarly, Jonathan Barnes has described Aristotle as leaning hesitantly towards the view that desire and thought are wholly non-physical. But on the emotions and sense-perception, Barnes takes an intermediate position. Aristotle treats these, he says, as including physical and non-physical components. Other writers too have sought a position somewhere in the middle. Thus G. R. T. Ross concedes that we find in Aristotle ‘what looks like the crudest materialism’. It appears that objects produce changes in an organism, ‘and the reception of these changes in the sense organ is perception’. But, he maintains, this gives us only half the picture. The complete theory ‘may in a way be designated as a doctrine of psychophysical parallelism’. W. D. Ross also seeks a middle position. He thinks that Aristotle sometimes brings out ‘the distinctively mental, non-corporeal nature of the act [of sensation].… But Aristotle cannot be said to hold successfully to the notion of sensation as a purely mental activity having nothing in common with anything physical. He is still under the influence of earlier materialism’.

The Lever, or How to Act at a Distance: A Backdrop to Theophrastus’ De sensibus

Rhizomata ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 168-187
Author(s):  
André Laks
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Sense Organ ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Extreme Caution ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias ◽  
Physiological Alteration ◽  
Material Process ◽  
Theoretical Frame

AbstractIt is well known that when it comes to perception in the De anima, Aristotle uses affection-related vocabulary with extreme caution. This has given rise to a debate between interpreters who hold that in Aristotle’s account, the act of sense-perception nevertheless involves the physiological alteration of the sense organ (Richard Sorabji), and those think, with Myles Burnyeat, that for Aristotle, perception does not involve any material process, so that an Aristotelian physics of sense-perception is a “physics of forms alone”. The present article suggests that the dematerialisation of Aristotle’s theory of perception, which has a long story from Alexander of Aphrodisias to Brentano, may be in fact traced back to Theophrastus’ exegesis of Aristotle’s relevant passages in the De anima in his Physics, as we can reconstruct it on the basis of Priscian’s Metaphrasis in Theophrastum and Simplicius’ commentary of Aristotle’s De Anima. The reconstruction also provides a scholastic-theoretical frame to Theophrastus’ critical exposition of ancient theories about sense perception in his De sensibus, whether or not the discussion originally belonged to Theophrastus’ Physics.

The Emotions

2021 ◽  
pp. 18-41
Author(s):  
David Charles
Keyword(s):  
Pure Form ◽  
The Other ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Body And Soul ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Physical Features ◽  
Distinct Features ◽  
Physical Type

In De Anima A.1, Aristotle developed an account of certain ‘affections of the soul’ such as anger which is his model for other ‘affections and actions common to body and soul’ such as desire and sense perception. His remarks about anger can be understood in two different ways. According to one account, which I call ‘the Pure Form Interpretation’, anger is essentially a compound made up of two definitionally distinct features, one purely psychological (a desire for revenge: its form) and the other physical (the boiling of the blood: its matter), where the latter in some way ‘underlies’ the former. In the other, described as ‘the Impure Form Interpretation’, the type of desire for revenge referred to in the definition of anger (its form) is inseparable in definition from (and not abstractable from) physical features such as, for example, the boiling blood. The type of desire which defines anger is itself defined as a boiling-of-the-blood-(or hot-) desire for revenge. Aristotle’s comments in De Anima A.1 are, it is argued, best understood in line with the Impure Form Interpretation, as defining anger as an inextricably psycho-physical type of desire for revenge, not decomposable into two definitionally separate features, one purely psychological, one purely physical.

Sense Organs and the Activity of Sensation in Aristotle

Phronesis ◽  
2000 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 306-330 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Magee
Keyword(s):  
Detailed Examination ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
Transparent Medium ◽  
Living Animal ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Sense Organs ◽  
Physical Processes ◽  
Ongoing Debate ◽  
Proper Interpretation ◽  
Qualitative Changes

AbstractAmid the ongoing debate over the proper interpretation of Aristotle's theory of sense perception in the De Anima, Steven Everson has recently presented a well-documented and ambitious treatment of the issue, arguing in favor of Richard Sorabji's controversial position that sense organs literally take on the qualities of their proper objects. Against the interpretation of M. F. Burnyeat, Everson and others make a compelling case the Aristotelian account of sensation requires some physical process to occur in sense organs. A detailed examination of the interpretation by Everson and Sorabji of Aristotle's theory, however, shows that their reading cannot be the correct one, since it involves many textual and philosophical difficulties. Their interpretation, for instance, would require abandoning Aristotle's requirement that only a transparent substance is suitable matter for an eye. Likewise, their understanding of the Aristotle's doctrine of sensation as the reception of form without matter in DA 2.12 cannot be reconciled with other texts of his from On Generation and Corruption. An analysis of these texts, as well as DA 2.7 and De Sensu 6 on the roles of light and the transparent medium in vision, show that, for Aristotle, the physical processes which sense organs undergo are not standard qualitative changes (i.e. alterations), but activities or the actualizations of potencies in the material constituents of living animal bodies.

Γνωστικῶς and / or ὑλικῶς: Philoponus’ Account of the Material Aspects of Sense-Perception

Phronesis ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 378-400 ◽  
Author(s):  
Péter Lautner
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Sense Organ ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
Sense Organs ◽  
Physiological Processes ◽  
Three Stages ◽  
The Common ◽  
Physical Changes ◽  
Specific Sense ◽  
Sensory Process

Abstract The paper aims to show that Philoponus’ theory of sense-perception does not fit in with the spiritualist claim that the sensory process does not involve an extra material change in the sense-organ. Both the specific sense-organs (like the vitreous liquid and choroid or corneal membrane in the eyes) and the primary sense-organ (like the optic pneuma) contract or expand in the perceptual process. On the other hand, the literalist claim needs to be modified as well since only the tactile sense-organ (flesh) takes on the relevant qualities. Contraction or expansion in the sense-organ is triggered, not by physical changes in the medium, but by the formal activities arising from the perceptible objects: colours make the visual sense-organ contract or expand. At the level of sense-organs, the physiological process underlying sense-perception has three stages. The change in specific sense-organ will be transmitted to the primary sense-organ of the particular sense (optic/acoustic pneuma), and then reaches the common sense-organ, the pneuma. The primary sense-organs are spatially distinguishable parts of the common sense-organ which is otherwise homogeneous, not allowing for qualitative differences. The homogeneity of the pneuma establishes the unity of sense-perception at the level of physiological processes.

Aristotle on the Organ and Medium of Touch

Méthexis ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-121
Author(s):  
David Redmond
Keyword(s):  
Sense Organ ◽  
De Anima ◽  
The Senses ◽  
Sense Of Touch

Aristotle identifies the eye as the organ of sight, the ear as the organ of hearing, and the nose as the organ of smell. However, rather than identify the flesh as the organ of touch and that particular bit of flesh, the tongue, as the organ of taste, Aristotle makes what he admits to be the surprising claim that the organ of both touch and taste is located further inward (near the heart). The flesh is merely the medium that comes between the sense organ and their respective sense objects. Focusing on the sense of touch in particular, I consider what reasons Aristotle offers in support of this claim. After carefully wading through De Anima 2.11, I argue that the only argument that Aristotle offers there relies on an assumption about the unity of the senses that provides as much support for alternative views about the organ and medium of touch as it does for the view that Aristotle endorses.

The fine morphology of the osphradial sense organs of the mollusca. III. Placophora and bivalvia

1987 ◽  
Vol 315 (1169) ◽  
pp. 37-61 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Fine Structure ◽  
Sense Organ ◽  
Mantle Cavity ◽  
Sense Organs ◽  
Physiological Evidence ◽  
Anal Papillae ◽  
Fine Morphology

The fine morphology of the osphradia of six placophorans and eight bivalves, representing all major subgroups of both classes, is described. In addition the branchial and lateral sense organs of Lepidopleurus cajetanus (Placophora) have been investigated ultrastrucurally. Whereas osphradial fine structure is very uniform within the Bivalvia there are differences between Ischnochitonina and Acanthochitonina, supporting the separation of both groups. Major differences in the conditions of the mantle cavity divide Recent Placophora into the orders Lepidopleurida and Chitonida. The homology of the molluscan osphradium throughout the phylum is discussed in detail. It is concluded that the terminal sense organ (Caudofoveata, Solenogastres), the adanal sensory stripes (Placophora—Chitonida), the interbranchial and post-anal papillae of Nautilus (Cephalopoda), and the organ of Lacaze (Gastropoda-Basommatophora) are homologous with the organs of Spengel (Prosobranchia, Opisthobranchia, Bivalvia), all to be called osphradial sense organs (or osphradia). After discussion it is concluded that the osphradium is a chemoreceptor and not a mechanoreceptor as suggested by many authors. This is shown by the physiological evidence so far reported but mainly by the existence of paddle cilia in the osphradial epithelia throughout the Mollusca, which are typical of molluscan chemoreceptors. It is suggested that the osphradium is primarily used in sexual biology (coordination of spawning, search for a mate), a role altered within the Gastropoda (search for food, osmoreceptor, p O2 -receptor).

Genetic determinants of sense organ identity in Drosophila: regulatory interactions between cut and poxn

Development ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 121 (9) ◽  
pp. 3111-3120 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Vervoort ◽  
D. Zink ◽  
N. Pujol ◽  
K. Victoir ◽  
N. Dumont ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Regulatory Region ◽  
Sense Organ ◽  
Sense Organs ◽  
Genetic Determinants ◽  
Regulatory Interactions ◽  
Organ Identity ◽  
Small Domain

Two genes involved in defining the type of sense organ have been identified in Drosophila. The gene cut differentiates the external sense organs (where it is expressed) from the chordotonal organs (where it is not); among the external sense organs poxn differentiates the poly-innervated organs (where it is expressed) from the mono-innervated organs (where it is not). Here we show that the expression of poxn in normal embryos does not depend on cut, and that poxn is capable of inducing the expression of cut. We have identified a small domain of the very large cut regulatory region as a likely target for activation by poxn.

The determination of sense organs in Drosophila: effect of the neurogenic mutations in the embryo

Development ◽  
1991 ◽  
Vol 113 (4) ◽  
pp. 1395-1404 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Goriely ◽  
N. Dumont ◽  
C. Dambly-Chaudiere ◽  
A. Ghysen
Keyword(s):  
Progenitor Cell ◽  
Sense Organ ◽  
The Other ◽  
Sense Organs ◽  
Mutual Inhibition ◽  
Competent Cells ◽  
Mother Cells

We have examined the early pattern of sensory mother cells in embryos mutant for six different neurogenic loci. Our results show that the neurogenic loci are required to restrict the number of competent cells that will become sensory mother cells, but are not involved in controlling the localization or the position-dependent specification of competent cells. We conclude that these loci are involved in setting up a system of mutual inhibition, which transforms graded differences within the proneural clusters into an all-or-none difference between one cell, which becomes the sense organ progenitor cell, and the other cells, which remain epidermal.

Prospero distinguishes sibling cell fate without asymmetric localization in the Drosophila adult external sense organ lineage

Development ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 126 (10) ◽  
pp. 2063-2071 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Manning ◽  
C.Q. Doe
Keyword(s):  
Cell Fate ◽  
Asymmetric Cell Division ◽  
Protein Localization ◽  
Sense Organ ◽  
Cell Loss ◽  
Sense Organs ◽  
Cell Fates ◽  
Dendrite Morphology ◽  
And Function ◽  
Sheath Cells

The adult external sense organ precursor (SOP) lineage is a model system for studying asymmetric cell division. Adult SOPs divide asymmetrically to produce IIa and IIb daughter cells; IIa generates the external socket (tormogen) and hair (trichogen) cells, while IIb generates the internal neuron and sheath (thecogen) cells. Here we investigate the expression and function of prospero in the adult SOP lineage. Although Prospero is asymmetrically localized in embryonic SOP lineage, this is not observed in the adult SOP lineage: Prospero is first detected in the IIb nucleus and, during IIb division, it is cytoplasmic and inherited by both neuron and sheath cells. Subsequently, Prospero is downregulated in the neuron but maintained in the sheath cell. Loss of prospero function leads to ‘double bristle’ sense organs (reflecting a IIb-to-IIa transformation) or ‘single bristle’ sense organs with abnormal neuronal differentiation (reflecting defective IIb development). Conversely, ectopic prospero expression results in duplicate neurons and sheath cells and a complete absence of hair/socket cells (reflecting a IIa-to-IIb transformation). We conclude that (1) despite the absence of asymmetric protein localization, prospero expression is restricted to the IIb cell but not its IIa sibling, (2) prospero promotes IIb cell fate and inhibits IIa cell fate, and (3) prospero is required for proper axon and dendrite morphology of the neuron derived from the IIb cell. Thus, prospero plays a fundamental role in establishing binary IIa/IIb sibling cell fates without being asymmetrically localized during SOP division. Finally, in contrast to previous studies, we find that the IIb cell divides prior to the IIa cell in the SOP lineage.

Therapy workshop: Experience of the senses

2017 ◽  
Vol 41 (S1) ◽  
pp. s869-s869
Author(s):  
E.M.B. Lira ◽  
S.C. Vasconcelos ◽  
C.S.L.D. Piagge ◽  
S.O. Luna ◽  
V. Silva Nascimento ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Substance Dependence ◽  
Sense Organ ◽  
Interdisciplinary Approach ◽  
Sense Perception ◽  
Psychoactive Substances ◽  
Eastern Brazil ◽  
North Eastern ◽  
The Senses ◽  
Competing Interest ◽  
Alcohol And Other Drugs

IntroductionThe psychoactive substances consumption modifies the users’ sense-perception.ObjectivesDiscuss the therapeutic workshop as a stimulation strategy of the sense organs.MethodologyThe activities were developed at a Center of Psycho-Social Attention for alcohol and other drugs – CPSAad, located in north-eastern Brazil. The therapeutic workshop was divided into six sessions; being worked a sense organ in each meeting. Initially, the sessions were explained and they entered the room in silence. At first, vision and lastly, taste. The taste dynamic session was initiated by the pool where users experienced different flavours and made distinctions between them, including a food without flavour, experiencing feelings of pleasure and displeasure. This dynamic was finalized in the institute's kitchen with different ice cream flavours. The participants freely served themselves, being led to reflections on their choices of pleasure. The sixth session was constituted by listening about all Therapy Workshop Experience of the Senses, on which participants reported emotions and feelings experienced during the sessions, such as: fear, anxiety, craving, denial, pleasure and displeasure.ResultsIt was identified a universe of sensations that can be translated into a sense-perception reframing about themselves and their surroundings.ConclusionThe participants presented a sensory dullness, relating the experienced stimuli to the consumption of psychoactive substances, demonstrating a strong equivalence between the proposed activity and substance dependence. This activity enabled an interdisciplinary approach, through knowledge and interventions exchange.Disclosure of interestThe authors have not supplied their declaration of competing interest.

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