Two More Principles of Epistemic Rationality
In Chapter 6, the author focuses on two main topics: the essential role of partial or full necessitation hypotheses in scenarios that generate expectations for experience and the social dimension of epistemic rationality. He contrasts partial or full necessitation hypotheses with neo-Humean regularity hypotheses. He argues that memory is a causal notion and contrasts it with non-causal apparent memories. He contrasts the causal physical object framework with a non-causal phenomenalist framework. And he explains why there is no syntactic solution to Goodman’s New Riddle of induction. He explains why Goodman’s own solution to the puzzle is an example of a parasitic hypothesis. He discusses parasitic hypotheses more fully and explains why most conspiracy theories are parasitic. He proposes a Third and Fourth Principle of Epistemic Rationality. Finally, he credits feminist epistemologists with drawing attention to the social dimension of epistemic rationality in contrast to the usual individualist approach in Western epistemology. He ends the chapter with a deep challenge for his own theory.