Cavendish’s Anti-Hobbesian Materialism
This chapter examines the distinctive materialist philosophy of Margaret Cavendish. Cavendish gave a materialist account of the natural world, but departed in several ways from Hobbes’s materialism. Her view was a panpsychist one, on which some matter was fundamentally and irreducibly sensitive, and other matter was fundamentally and irreducibly rational. The chapter argues that Cavendish’s view lies in some ways between Hobbes’s view and Henry More’s. Cavendish’s view also reverses the mechanist model of explanation used by Hobbes and others: rather than explaining thought in terms of motion, Cavendish explains motion in terms of thought. The chapter also notes Cavendish’s sometime view that human beings have a divine, immaterial, supernatural soul, and examines her views about how, and to what extent, material beings can conceive of immaterial ones.