Crisis in Machinery Building: The Roots of Germany’s Economic Malaise?

Author(s):  
Meric S. Gertler

The health and state of the German economy has been the dominant topic in the European business press since at least 1994, when the post-unification boom came to an end, and with good reason. Home to 82 million people, it is Europe’s largest economy. But it has also been the slowest-growing economy within the European Union since 1994, averaging just 1.6 per cent annually, a period in which it has also lagged behind the United States in every year except 2001. The DAX index of Germany’s top companies has experienced a sharper and more sustained downturn than the stock markets in the United States, United Kingdom, and France, indicative of a growing malaise amongst the country’s largest industrial and financial firms (Smiley 2002: 4). Inward foreign direct investment has slowed to a trickle, and a large proportion of its biggest companies are diverting their own investments to production sites abroad. The country’s share of global exports has declined from 11.8 per cent to 9.7 per cent over the decade between 1992 and 2002 (The Economist 2002a: S8). Meanwhile, the national unemployment rate has climbed to nearly 10 per cent over the same period, according to German statistics (or 8.3 per cent using European Union statistics) (The Economist 2002b: S13). There is no shortage of diagnoses for what allegedly ails the German economy these days. For many in the same business press, the answer is seductively simple: Germany is ‘stifled by a hugely restrictive and intrusive web of regulations, and weighed down by one of the most expensive, inflexible and protected labour forces in the world’ (Smiley 2002: S4). While there is undoubtedly some truth to this assessment, it is also simple-minded in the extreme. This chapter provides an alternative interpretation of the roots of Germany’s economic problems by focusing on one of its bedrock industries: mechanical engineering (in particular, its machinery and machine tool industry). Tracing the evolution of this key industry from a point early in the 1990s when it first encountered a serious competitive setback.

Author(s):  
Attarid Awadh Abdulhameed

Ukrainia Remains of huge importance to Russian Strategy because of its Strategic importance. For being a privileged Postion in new Eurasia, without its existence there would be no logical resons for eastward Expansion by European Powers.  As well as in Connection with the progress of Ukrainian is no less important for the USA (VSD, NDI, CIA, or pentagon) and the European Union with all organs, and this is announced by John Kerry. There has always ben Russian Fear and Fear of any move by NATO or USA in the area that it poses a threat to  Russians national Security and its independent role and in funence  on its forces especially the Navy Forces. There for, the Crisis manyement was not Zero sum game, there are gains and offset losses, but Russia does not accept this and want a Zero Sun game because the USA. And European exteance is a Foot hold in Regin Which Russian sees as a threat to its national security and want to monopolize control in the strategic Qirim.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-79
Author(s):  
Nargiza Sodikova ◽  
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Important aspects of French foreign policy and national interests in the modern time,France's position in international security and the specifics of foreign affairs with the United States and the European Union are revealed in this article


2016 ◽  
pp. 26-46
Author(s):  
Marcin Jan Flotyński

The global financial crisis in 2007–2009 began a period of high volatility on the financial markets. Specifically, it caused an increased amplitude of fluctuations of the level of gross domestic products, the level of investment and consumption and exchange rates in particular countries. To address the adverse market circumstances, governments and central banks took actions in order to bolster the weakening global economy. The aim of this article is to present the anti-crisis actions in the United States and selected member states of the European Union, including Poland, and an assessment of their efficiency. The analysis conducted indicates that generally the actions taken in the United States in response to the crisis were faster and more adequate to the existing circumstances than in the European Union.


Author(s):  
Francesco Giumelli ◽  
Michal Onderco

Abstract While the current practice of the United Nations Security Council, the European Union, and the United States leans towards imposing only targeted sanctions in most of the cases, private actors often complain about inability to process financial transactions, ship goods, or deliver services in countries where sanctions targets are located. The impact of sanctions often ends up being widespread and indiscriminate because sanctions are implemented by for-profit actors. This article investigates how for-profit actors relate to the imposition of sanctions, how they reflect them in their decisions, and how they interact with the public authorities. The findings of our research show that for-profit actors, with the possible exception of the largest multinationals, do not engage with public authorities before the imposition of sanctions. The behaviour of for-profit actors in the implementation phase is in line with the assumption of firms and business as profit-maximisers. Weighting the profits from business against the costs of (non-)compliance and make the decisions that in their view maximise their profit. Indeed, de-risking seems to be the most common approach by the companies due to the uncertainties produced by the multiple and overlapping sanctions regimes imposed by the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States.


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