Are there Non-Propositional Intentional States?

Author(s):  
John R. Searle

Intentionality is that feature of the mind by which it is directed at or about objects and states of affairs in the world. Intentionality is simply aboutness or directedness. “Proposition” is more difficult, but the essential idea is this: every intentional state has a content. Sometimes it seems that the content just enables a state to refer to an object. So if John loves Sally, then it appears that the content of his love is simply “Sally”. But if John believes that it is raining, then the specification of the content requires an entire “that” clause. “Are there non-propositional intentional states?” amounts to the question, “Are there intentional states whose content does not require specification with a ‘that’ clause?” This chapter explores whether there are any non-propositional states, and suggest that a very limited class, such as boredom, is in fact non-propositional.

Author(s):  
Robert Francescotti

Consider those aspects of the world that are the way they are in virtue of how we think about them, or the way we feel about them, or how we view them. Those are the subjective aspects of the world. What makes them subjective can be understood via the notion of an intentional state. The label ‘intentional state’ is often used to refer to mental states that have intentionality. These mental states (including but not limited to thoughts, beliefs, desires and perceptual images) are representational; they represent the world as being a certain way. They are mental states with ‘aboutness’; they are about objects, features and/or states of affairs. Using ‘intentional state’ to refer to mental states with intentionality, a subjective fact about some item x may be defined as a fact that obtains in virtue of someone’s intentional states regarding x. Objective facts are those that are not subjective. So an objective fact about x may be defined as one that does not obtain by virtue of anyone’s intentional state regarding x. Subjectivity is often mentioned in the philosophy of mind because so much of mentality is subjective, with a special brand of subjectivity present in the case of conscious experience. Whenever one has an intentional state, consciously or non-consciously, there is a subjective fact. Suppose an individual s has an intentional state directed toward some item x. Then the fact that s is representing x is, obviously, a function of s’s intentional state regarding x, which makes the fact that s is representing x a subjective fact. Assuming, also, that the intentional state is conscious, there is an additional element of subjectivity involved. Suppose you are visually perceiving a tree and your visual perception is a conscious mental state. Then not only are you representing the tree to yourself; it also seems that you are in some way aware of your representation of the tree. That this extra element of subjectivity seems to be present in the case of conscious experience is part of the reason ‘higher-order’ accounts of consciousness are so attractive. Higher-order accounts capture the intuition that if a mental state is conscious, then its host is aware of the mental state in some suitable way (while adding that the right sort of higher-order awareness is also sufficient for the target state’s being conscious). A higher-order account arguably does capture the unique way in which conscious experience is subjective. There is the subjective, perspectival element characteristic of intentional states in general, including those that are non-conscious. And there is the special brand of subjectivity found in conscious experience, where one’s intentionality is directed toward one’s own mental states. Now suppose that mental representation can be understood purely physically; suppose there is a true and complete account in purely physical terms of what it is for a mental state to have the content it has. Then, one might think, with a higher-order theory we can close the infamous explanatory gap between the physical and the phenomenal components of consciousness. Some have noted, however, that within the realm of the phenomenal we should distinguish between the subjective character of a conscious state and its qualitative character, where the latter is the way the mental state feels and the former is its feeling a certain way for-a-subject. There is reason to doubt that any higher-order account can explain why a mental state has the qualitative character it has, or any qualitative character at all. Yet, even if higher-order accounts fail to solve the hard problem of consciousness, by failing to close the explanatory gap between the physical and the qualitative aspects of consciousness, it is tempting to think that with a higher-order account we might be able to close the explanatory gap between its physical and its subjective character.


Author(s):  
Mark Sainsbury

Thinking about Obama and thinking about Pegasus seem to be the same fundamental kind of thing, yet one is relational and the other not. I address this puzzle by distinguishing various different kinds of relationality. The Obama-thought and the Pegasus-thought are both metaphysically relational in that both thinkers are in states that relate them to representations. The relationality is covert: it is not overtly expressed in attitude attribution, and the second term of the relation is not what the intentional state is about. Are representations relational? It is natural to think so, because representation is often analyzed by tracking relations that connect the concepts to entities in the world. I argue that we can understand representation in a non-relational way. The upshot is that all intentional states are relational in that a subject is related to a representation, and some intentional states have a further dimension of relationality if the relevant representation is a relational one.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 121-124
Author(s):  
John Gabriel Mendie ◽  
Stephen N Udofia

There is a widespread belief that language is a veritable instrumentum laborat (working tool) for the communication of thoughts and the conception of reality. There is equally a lingering belief that language pictures or mirrors reality. Nevertheless, to what extent can we authenticate this existing opinion? Is it the case that the conglomerate of reality can be represented linguistically without any iota of defect/fallibilism? Can language mirror reality perfectly as it is, in itself? What really is the ontological status of language? What is language anyway? How does it relate to the world? How does it relate to the mind? Should our view of language influence our view of the world? Even more seriously, what is the limit of language in the herculean task of conceiving and revealing reality? Armed with the concerns highlighted above, this paper, attempts to grapple with these questions, by first seeking insights into the meaning, nature and use of language; the nature of reality; and the role of language within the context of effective representation and a veridical a fortiori conception of different ‘forms of life and states of affairs’ of reality.


2020 ◽  
Vol 63 (10) ◽  
pp. 74-87
Author(s):  
Irina N. Sidorenko

 The author analyzes the conceptions of ontological nihilism in the works of S. Kierkegaard, F. Nietzsche, M. Heidegger, E. Jünger. On the basis of this analysis, violence is defined as a manifestation of nihilism, of the “will to nothingness” and hypertrophy of the self-will of man. The article demonstrates the importance of the problem of nihilism. The nihilistic thinking of modern man is expressed in the attitude toward a radical transformation of the world from the position of his “absolute” righteousness. The paradox of the current situation is that there is the reverse side of this transformative activity, when there is only the appearance of action and the dilution of responsibility. Confidence in the rightness of own views and beliefs increases the risk of the violent imposition of own vision of reality. Historical and philosophical reconstruction of the conceptions of nihilism allowed to reveal the following projects of its comprehension and resolution: (1) the project of “positing of values,” which consists in the transformation of the evaluation, which is understood as another perspective of positing values, leading to the affirmation of being; (2) the project of overcoming nihilism from the space of temporality, carried out through the resoluteness to accept the historicity of own existence; (3) the project of overcoming nihilism as the oblivion of being from the spatial perspective of the “line,” allowing to realize the “glimpse” of being. The author concludes that it is impossible to solve the problem of violence and its various forms of its manifestation without overcoming “ontological nihilism.” Significant role in solving the problem of ontological violence is assigned to philosophy as a critical and responsible form of thinking, which is capable to help a person to bear the burden of the world, to provide meanings and affirm being, as well as to unite people and resist the fundamentalist claims of exclusivity and rightness.


Author(s):  
Sergey Nickolsky

The question of the Russian man – his past, present and future – is the central one in the philosophy of history. Unfortunately, at present this area of philosophy is not suffciently developed in Russia. Partly the reason for this situation is the lack of understanding by researchers of the role played by Russian classical literature and its philosophizing writers in historiosophy. The Hunting Sketches, a collection of short stories by I.S. Turgenev, is a work still undervalued, not fully considered not only in details but also in general meanings. And this is understandable because it is the frst systematic encyclopedia of Russian worldview, which is not envisaged by the literary genre. To a certain extent, Turgenev’s line is continued by I. Goncharov (the theme of the mind and heart), L. Tolstoy (the theme of the living and the dead, nature and society, the people and the lords), F. Dostoevsky (natural and rational rights), A. Chekhov (worthy and vulgar life). This article examines the philosophical nature of The Hunting Sketches, its structure and content. According to author’s opinion, stories can be divided into ten groups according to their dominant meanings. Thus, in The Hunting Sketches the main Russian types are depicted: “natural man,” rational, submissive, cunning, honest, sensitive, passionate, poetic, homeless, suffering, calmly accepting death, imbued with the immensity of the world. In the image and the comments of the wandering protagonist, Ivan Turgenev reveals his own philosophical credo, which he defnes as a moderate liberalism – freedom of thought and action, without prejudice to others.


Author(s):  
Kolarkar Rajesh Shivajirao ◽  
Kolarkar Rajashree Rajesh

The perfect balance of Mind and body is considered as complete health in Pāli literature as well as in Ayurveda. Pāli literature and Ayurveda have their own identity as most ancient and traditional system of medicine in India.The universal teachings of the Buddha are the most precious legacy ancient India gave to the world. The teachings are a practical code of conduct, a way of purity and of gracious living. There is a scientific study of the truth pertaining to mind and matter, and the ultimate truth beyond. In fact, the Buddha should be more appropriately known as a super-scientist who studied the entire laws of nature governing the Universe, by direct personal experience. The Buddha's rational teachings are clearly explained in the Eight-fold Noble Path, divided in three divisions of Sīla (morality), Samādhi (mastery over the mind), Paññā i.e. ‘Pragya' (purification of the mind, by developing insight). In Ayurveda Psychotherapy can be done by Satvavajaya Chikitsa and good conduct. Aim is to augment the Satva Guna in order to correct the imbalance in state of Rajas (Passion) and Tamas (Inertia). Sattvavajaya as psychotherapy, is the mental restraint, or a "mind control" as referred by Caraka, as well as Vagbhata is achieved Dnyan (education), Vidnyan (training in developing skill), Dhairya (development of coping mechanism), Smruti (memory enhancement), Samadhi (concentration of mind). According to WHO, Mental disorders are the common problem. The burden of mental disorders continues to grow with significant impacts on health and major social, human rights and economic consequences in all countries of the world.


Author(s):  
Samuel Lebens

Hassidic idealism is the view that the world and everything in it (even you and I) exist only in the mind of God. To be is to be part of God’s dream, or the story that God is telling. This chapter argues that Hassidic idealism, coupled with an understanding of the philosophy and semantics of fiction, allows us to generate a distinctive solution to ‘the problem with sefirot.’ The sefirot are the attributes of God, as the Kabbalistic tradition understands them. The problem with the sefirot is that, as they are classically understood, belief in them seems to collapse into polytheism. The problem is analogous to certain problems facing the Christian belief in the Trinity. This chapter proposes an original Hassidic solution to this problem that relies upon various insights about fictions within fictions, and fictions that include their authors as a character.


Author(s):  
Jelinčić Ivana ◽  
Degmečić Dunja

Background: Hallucinations involve sensing things such as visions, sounds, or smells that seem real but are not. These things are created by the mind. However, little is known about the distribution of incident hallucinations in the community. This paper aims to examine manifestation and frequency of the hallucinatory experiences within the general Croatian population. Methods: The instrument of the survey is Chicago Hallucination Assessment Tool (CHAT). The study included 521 examinees; 284 females (54.5%) and males 237 (45.5%). Results: There was a manifestation of all types of hallucinatory experiences determined. Out of all of the participants 17% listed that they experienced acoustic hallucinations during their lifetime, 15% said that they have experienced visual hallucinations, 12% olfactory hallucinations, 10% gustatory and 12% tactile/cenesthetic hallucinations. Conclusion: The results of this research have indicated that simple hallucinations were mostly represented among the general Croatian population and those more complex were represented less which is a positive thing because of its prominent clinical significance. The contribution of this study is the possibility of comparisons with studies from different regions of Europe and the world. This is another component in a better understanding of the incidence of hallucinations in the general population. The data we have obtained puts us on the map of countries trying to raise awareness of a topic that needs to acquire more attention.


2014 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
SAMUEL LEBENS

AbstractWhat happens when you assume that the world is a dream in the mind of God, or that the world's history is a story that God is spinning? Focusing on the role that this assumption plays in the thought of Rabbi Mordechai Yosef Leiner (1801–1854), at least as it is understood by Rabbi Herzl Hefter, I argue that this assumption generates interesting solutions to old riddles in the philosophy of religion and interesting insights into the nature of religious language.


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