Stalinism and De-Stalinization

Author(s):  
Balázs Trencsényi ◽  
Michal Kopeček ◽  
Luka Lisjak Gabrijelčič ◽  
Maria Falina ◽  
Mónika Baár ◽  
...  

By 1948, a full-fledged Stalinist dictatorship was introduced all over the region. Socialist realism became an official aesthetic ideology; in historiography, in most cases it was the national Romantic vision that was extolled as “progressive,” but there were also attempts to claim the progressive character of a strong central state power. Independent reflection on Stalinism was only possible either in exile or in the private sphere. After Stalin’s death, however, criticism started to appear, digging more and more into hitherto banned cultural, economic, and historical topics. In 1956 the dramatic events in Hungary and Poland triggered a wave of reflections on the limits of resistance. Yugoslavia, breaking with the Soviet bloc in 1948, followed a different trajectory; however, this did not lead to a lack of repressions towards dissidents, such as Milovan Đilas, whose theory of the “new class” was to have an enormous impact in the region and beyond.

2003 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 497-529 ◽  
Author(s):  
Freek Colombijn

The communis opinio of historians is that early modern, or precolonial, states in Southeast Asia tended to lead precarious existences. The states were volatile in the sense that the size of individual states changed quickly, a ruler forced by circumstances moved his state capital, the death of a ruler was followed by a dynastic struggle, or a local subordinate head either ignored or took over the central state power; in short, states went through short cycles of rise and decline. Perhaps nobody has helped establish this opinion more than Clifford Geertz (1980) with his powerful metaphor of the “theatre state.” Many scholars have preceded and followed him in their assessment of the shakiness of the state (see, for example, Andaya 1992, 419; Bentley 1986, 292; Bronson 1977, 51; Hagesteijn 1986, 106; Milner 1982, 7; Nagtegaal 1996, 35, 51; Reid 1993, 202; Ricklefs 1991, 17; Schulte Nordholt 1996, 143–48). The instability itself was an enduring phenomenon. Most polities existed in a state of flux, oscillating between integration and disintegration, a phenomenon which was first analyzed for mainland Southeast Asia by Edmund Leach (1954) in his seminal work on the Kachin chiefdoms. This alternation of state formation and the breaking up of kingdoms has been called the “ebb and flow of power” and the “rhythm” of Malay history (Andaya and Andaya 1982, 35). In this article, I will probe into the causes of the volatility of the Southeast Asian states, using material from Sumatra to make my case.


1992 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 420-444 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clyde W. Barrow

The origins of the American university system are generally traced to a reform cycle that began in the late 1890s and culminated in the 1920s when most colleges and universities adopted institutional structures, faculty routines, and financial systems that approximated those of a modern corporation. As contemporary educational historians have rewritten the saga of higher education reform, the institutional changes that swept through colleges during this formative period have come to be viewed as a virtually inevitable functional response to the demands of political and economic modernization. The underlying historiographic theme of modernization theory is that as higher institutions expanded in size, internal diversity, and organizational complexity, university presidents responded with the only feasible administrative alternative that could restore effective control and economic efficiency to educational institutions. Indeed, Laurence Veysey's classic rendition of this scenario concludes that a corporate type of bureaucratic administration became “essential” if higher institutions were to avoid educational confusion and fiscal insolvency, while adjusting to the cultural, economic, and political demands placed on them by industrial society.


Thesis Eleven ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 152 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-51
Author(s):  
Yanli He

This paper’s core concern is Boris Groys’ theory of the total art of Stalinism, which is devoted to rewriting Soviet art history and reinterpreting Socialist Realism from the perspective of the equal rights between political and artistic Art Power. The aim of this article is to decode Groys and the total art of Stalinism, based on answering the following three questions: 1) why did Groys want to rewrite Soviet art history? 2) How did Groys re-narrate Soviet art history? 3) What are the pros and cons of his reordering of the total art of Stalinism? Groys offers an effective paradigm that could rethink two theoretical genres: a) other Socialist Realisms inside or outside the Soviet bloc, during or after the Soviet era; b) the aesthetical rights of political artworks before, during and after the Cold War, and the historical debates about art, especially about art for art’s sake, or art for political propaganda. However, Groys’ total art of Stalinism and its core theory of the Socialist Realism frame hides some dangers of aestheticizing Stalin and Stalinism.


2009 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lars-Erik Cederman ◽  
Andreas Wimmer ◽  
Brian Min

Much of the quantitative literature on civil wars and ethnic conflict ignores the role of the state or treats it as a mere arena for political competition among ethnic groups. Other studies analyze how the state grants or withholds minority rights and faces ethnic protest and rebellion accordingly, while largely overlooking the ethnic power configurations at the state's center. Drawing on a new data set on Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) that identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to central state power around the world from 1946 through 2005, the authors analyze outbreaks of armed conflict as the result of competing ethnonationalist claims to state power. The findings indicate that representatives of ethnic groups are more likely to initiate conflict with the government (1) the more excluded from state power they are, especially if they have recently lost power, (2) the higher their mobilizational capacity, and (3) the more they have experienced conflict in the past.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Jordan Anderson

<p><b>Throughout the main Anglo-American democracies, state power has been tested in recent decades by the presentation of the risks posed by sexual offenders. The capacity of the state to take decisive action in these jurisdictions has been significantly challenged by neoliberal restructuring from the 1980s onwards, and criminal justice has been one of many policy areas affected by the shrinking of central state power. The development of intolerance for risk of sexual harm posed specifically by offenders released from prison has provided an opportunity for the state to take unique action to maintain an impression of control. As governments have sought extraordinary legislative and policy measures to control or remove these specific risks of sexual harm from the community, communities and individuals have responded to their place in the ecosystem of the risk society.</b></p> <p>The release of a high-risk sex offender into a community is a microcosm of the modus operandi of the modern state, providing a context through which the operation of the modern risk society can be examined. This thesis explores the reactions of three New Zealand communities to instances of de facto community notification of sex offender release, and explains the differences in their reactions through the lens of Zygmunt Bauman’s (2000a) Liquid Modernity. In each of the three case studies of Whanganui, Napier, and Ōtāhuhu I examine the processes around an instance of community release, the reactions of the community, and the impact of the incident within the community and the implications of this for our understanding of risk society.</p>


2021 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 113-131
Author(s):  
Kacper Wańczyk

The aim of this article is to analyse the privatisation process in the Republic of Belarus. This analysis will help to answer two questions. Firstly, is Belarusian privatisation strategic in nature? Secondly, what theoretical framework explains Belarusian privatisation policy?Juxtaposing the process of transferring state property to the private sphere in Belarus with traditional theoretical frameworks explaining the causes and course of privatisation in the former Soviet bloc countries does not fully explain the actions of the Belarusian authorities. Privatisation transactions were not part of a broader plan to restructure the economy. They were carried out ad hoc, usually as a result of a combination of two factors – pressure from external actors and the need to raise budget funds.To explain the actions of President Alexander Lukashenko, it seems appropriate to use an approach derived from the concept of power-ownership developed by Russian researchers Yuri Latov and Rustem Nureev. This assumes the formation of property rights from above and directly links political power with property control. In this view, giving up control over property is tantamount to giving up political power.


Pirate Lands ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 19-46
Author(s):  
Ursula Daxecker ◽  
Brandon Prins

This chapter offers comparisons of historical and contemporary maritime piracy. It examines the conditions that have driven commerce raiding in the past and the present, which include political violence, privation, geographic opportunity, and governance. The chapter notes that imperial competition, legitimacy gaps, and capacity limits drove privateering and piracy up through the nineteenth century. But while legitimacy gaps and capacity limits continue to incentivize piracy today, weak capacity and lack of legitimacy originate within states rather than states being unable to control and regulate the world’s oceans. Contemporary pirates collude with corruptible local elites rather than with far-off imperial powers. The chapter concludes that historical piracy was often an extension of regime capability, while modern pirates stand in opposition to central state power even as they partner with local governance actors to plunder transiting ships.


2021 ◽  
pp. 300-317
Author(s):  
Andrei B. Edemsky ◽  

The chapter presents the results of an examination of the attitude of Milovan Djilas (1911- 1995), the world's most famous opponent of Communist power and the Communist system during the Cold War, who was removed from the ranks of the political elite in the early 1950s for his critique which predicted the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the monopoly of Communist power. Djilas was convinced of the inevitability of such a finale from the second half of the 1950s, describing in his article “Storm in Eastern Europe” the theoretical beginning of the disintegration of the Soviet bloc. The validity of the three stages and the protective reaction of the USSR he predicted was confirmed in 1968 in Czechoslovakia. His hypotheses about the process of changes in Eastern Europe, the mutual influence of processes in the USSR and Eastern Europe, Stalinism as a logical continuation of Leninism, the futility of returning to Lenin's practice, and the idea of the rotting and decomposition of the governing stratum of the Communist bureaucracy (the “New Class”) as a natural result of its evolution formed the basis for his assessments of processes in the Soviet camp in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when Djilas focused in his writing mainly on the activities and personality of the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. The complex nature of Djilas's ideas and their evolution from Marxism to critical positivism are also confirmed in the third book of his trilogy Managers and the Collapse of Communism, written in the early 1990s, about the “new class” as the losing stratum of Communists.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Jordan Anderson

<p><b>Throughout the main Anglo-American democracies, state power has been tested in recent decades by the presentation of the risks posed by sexual offenders. The capacity of the state to take decisive action in these jurisdictions has been significantly challenged by neoliberal restructuring from the 1980s onwards, and criminal justice has been one of many policy areas affected by the shrinking of central state power. The development of intolerance for risk of sexual harm posed specifically by offenders released from prison has provided an opportunity for the state to take unique action to maintain an impression of control. As governments have sought extraordinary legislative and policy measures to control or remove these specific risks of sexual harm from the community, communities and individuals have responded to their place in the ecosystem of the risk society.</b></p> <p>The release of a high-risk sex offender into a community is a microcosm of the modus operandi of the modern state, providing a context through which the operation of the modern risk society can be examined. This thesis explores the reactions of three New Zealand communities to instances of de facto community notification of sex offender release, and explains the differences in their reactions through the lens of Zygmunt Bauman’s (2000a) Liquid Modernity. In each of the three case studies of Whanganui, Napier, and Ōtāhuhu I examine the processes around an instance of community release, the reactions of the community, and the impact of the incident within the community and the implications of this for our understanding of risk society.</p>


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