The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Author(s):  
Andrew Futter

Since the end of the cold war, the global landscape of weapons of mass destruction has changed considerably. Three additional states have openly acquired a nuclear capability—India, Pakistan, and North Korea—and a fourth, Iran, may be trying to do the same. Meanwhile, other states were forced to give up or agreed to abandon their nuclear capabilities or ambitions. At the same time, the threat of ‘loose nukes’ and the associated challenge of nuclear security have acquired existential significance given the possibility of nuclear terrorism, the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the damage caused by the A. Q. Khan network. Europe remains a key ‘nuclear theatre’ with UK, French, Russian, and NATO nuclear forces deployed in the region, and this seems unlikely to change anytime soon. The aim of this chapter is to explore the nature and implications of a second nuclear age for European military thinking and strategy.

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-339
Author(s):  
Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus

O objetivo deste artigo é examinar as perspectivas para a dissuasão nuclear para as duas principais potências nuclearmente armadas - EUA e Rússia - durante os cinco primeiros anos da década de 2000. O argumento central aponta que as duas potências preocuparam-se com a dissuasão de ameaças advindas das principais potências, mas se mostraram mais preocupadas com as ameaças de potências regionais com armas de destruição em massa. Elas reduziram suas forças nucleares desde o fim da Guerra Fria, manifestaram um maior interesse em capacidades não-nucleares para a dissuasão e tentaram definir opções para o uso limitado de armas nucleares.     The aim of this paper is to examine the approaches for nuclear deterrence for the two greatest nuclear-weapon states - the U.S. and Russia - in the first half of the 2000s. The central argument shows that the two powers were concerned with deterrence of threats stemming from major powers, but were more concerned about the threats from regional powers with weapons of mass destruction. They have reduced their nuclear forces since the end of the Cold War, showed a greater interest in non-nuclear capabilities for deterrence and tried to define options for the limited use of nuclear weapons.      


2016 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 147-161
Author(s):  
Hans Blix

International institutions given the task to maintain collective security and to seek disarmament need to build on cooperation between major powers. The authors of the un Charter vested great powers in the Security Council but a consensus between the five permanent great powers was required for use of the powers. This inevitably paralyzed the Council during the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, the permanent members have remained unable jointly to pursue disarmament, but they have succeeded in several remarkable cases to reach consensus, notably on measures to prevent the further spread of weapons of mass destruction. The quick action to eliminate chemical weapons in Syria was a win-win case led by us-Russian diplomacy, while the comprehensive deal settling the controversy over Iran’s nuclear program was a victory for patient diplomacy involving all permanent members and the eu. These actions show the potentials of the Council.


Author(s):  
Keir A. Lieber ◽  
Daryl G. Press

This chapter analyzes how much nuclear retaliatory capability must countries build to reliably deter nuclear attack and how easy is it to establish nuclear stalemate. It discusses competing views and explains why the outcome of the debate is crucial for understanding the central puzzle of the nuclear age. One view holds that even minimal nuclear arsenals are “enough” to create stalemate, while another contends that stalemate requires far more robust nuclear forces and the virtual certainty of retaliation. However, the chapter also shows that minimal arsenals have not been enough. It looks into the intense rivalry of the Cold War, in which the threshold of nuclear capability required to generate deterrence was higher than the capability to create the mere possibility of retaliation.


Author(s):  
Joseph M. Siracusa

Does the spread of nuclear weapons make the world safer or more dangerous? ‘Reflections on the Atomic Age’ considers this debate's relevance now and in the future. The clarity of the Cold War world has given way to the ambiguities and uncertainties of a world where global security is threatened by regime collapse, nuclear terrorism, new nuclear weapons states, regional conflict, and pre-existing nuclear arsenals. The prediction of mass destruction has so far proved false, but is that because of effective efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, or is it just luck?


Author(s):  
John Baylis

This chapter explores a variety of questions on how to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). It begins with a discussion of the shift that took place during the cold war from disarmament to arms control, as well as the shift in relative importance that occurred in the early post-cold war era from arms control to more forcible means to tackle nuclear proliferation. It then considers the emergence of new ideas, first in the Clinton administration, and then in the Bush administration, that focused less on arms control and more on counterproliferation. It also examines a host of problems and dilemmas associated with counterproliferation, the Obama administration's policy of engagement and ‘tough but direct diplomacy’, and the challenges presented by new geopolitical tensions. Finally, it reflects on future prospects for strategic nuclear arms control.


Author(s):  
John Baylis

This chapter examines issues regarding the control of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and its implications for international security. It begins with a discussion of the shift that took place during the cold war from disarmament to arms control, and the shift in relative importance that occurred in the early post-cold war period from arms control to more forcible means to tackle proliferation. It then considers concerns that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s about the continuing utility of arms control as an effective means of dealing with WMDs. It also analyses new ideas that began to take shape, first during the presidency of Bill Clinton, and then under George W. Bush, about more militarily driven approaches, associated with counterproliferation. The chapter concludes with an assessment of ‘the return to arms control’ by the administration of Barack Obama and the challenges presented by new geopolitical tensions.


Author(s):  
Peter Viggo Jakobsen

This chapter examines how coercive diplomacy has emerged as a strategy for states in dealing with the opponent without resorting to full-scale war. Coercive diplomacy involves the use of military threats and/or limited force (sticks) coupled with inducements and assurances (carrots) in order to influence the opponent to do something it would prefer not to. This chapter first explains what coercive diplomacy is and considers its requirements for success. It then shows how states have employed coercive diplomacy to manage crises and conflicts during the three strategic eras that followed the end of the Cold War. It also discusses the importance of the strategic context in shaping the use of coercive diplomacy by presenting two case studies, one relating to the United States’s conflict with Libya due to the latter’s weapons of mass destruction, and the other relating to Russia’s military involvement in Ukraine.


2006 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 113-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashley J. Tellis

The shift in Indian positions on missile defense in the context of the growing transformation of U.S.-Indian relations since the end of the Cold War, and particularly since the advent of the George W. Bush administration, has been remarkable. New Delhi's traditional opposition to strategic defenses gave way to its current consideration of missile defense for a variety of reasons. These included structural factors related to the dissolution of U.S.-Indian antagonism associated with the bipolar configuration of the Cold War; the growing recognition in Washington and New Delhi of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and their associated delivery systems in the hands of hostile states intent on nuclear coercion; and the Indian and American desire to forge a new partnership grounded in democratic values but ultimately oriented toward promoting geopolitical equilibrium in Asia in the face of rising challengers such as China and problem states such as Pakistan. All of these factors combined to produce a dramatic new acceptance of strategic defenses as conducive to stability on the part of New Delhi. What is fascinating about this evolution is the manner in which missile defenses have come to reflect both an example of, and a means toward, the steady improvement in U.S.-Indian ties occurring in recent years. This, in turn, implies that a deepening bilateral relationship has become part of New Delhi's larger solution to increasing India's capacity to defeat those threats requiring active defenses in the future.


Author(s):  
Sarah Blodgett Bermeo

This chapter places the concept of targeted development in historical context, starting with an overview of the time immediately following the end of World War II. Interestingly, the logic for targeted development today has much in common with the decision to target development resources to Europe, rather than the developing world, in the second half of the 1940s. As the Cold War unfolded and the strategy of containment took hold, the chapter demonstrates how development promotion was sidelined in favor of a more direct approach to pursuing geopolitical goals in developing countries. The chapter then traces the rise of interconnections between industrialized and developing countries since the end of the Cold War and the impact of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks for focusing attention on spillovers associated with underdevelopment.


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