Organized Armed Groups in Contemporary International Practice

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tilman Rodenhäuser
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Final Part ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Variety Of Groups ◽  
State Group

Chapter 3 suggests that IHL requires non-state entities to fulfil three criteria to form a party to a non-international armed conflict: a group needs to be (1) a collective entity with (2) the ability to ensure respect for basic humanitarian norms, and (3) the capacity to engage in sufficiently intense violence. This chapter discusses how these broad criteria have been interpreted and also develops new ways of how they should be understood in light of the variety of groups engaged in contemporary armed conflicts and the increasing fragmentation of groups. Instead of simply recounting factors established in international jurisprudence, this chapter reconsiders these factors’ actual relevance and shows how they can be helpful in proving the three identified criteria. In its final part, Chapter 3 applies the identified criteria to two specific cases: transnational armed groups such as the Islamic State Group, and cyber groups such as Anonymous.

The Definition of Civilians in Non-International Armed Conflicts

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-155 ◽  
Author(s):  
Camille Marquis Bissonnette
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Codes Of Conduct ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Direct Participation ◽  
State Actors ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Shed Light

This article analyzes the perceptions of armed groups regarding the concept of civilians in non-international armed conflicts, through their codes of conduct and other commitments. It intends to shed light on the implementation by these non-state actors of the very critical principle of distinction, the exact articulation of is hotly debated in non-international armed conflict. It thus presents the different approaches to the principle of distinction in non-international armed conflict: the specific-act approach, the membership approach, the functional non-privileged combatancy approach, and the direct participation in hostilities with extended temporal scope in light of the commitments and undertakings of various armed groups. It concludes with the findings made on the basis of the study of the commitments made by armed groups, underlying in particular the issues that remain problematic regarding the principle of distinction in non-international armed conflict, as well as the issues on which a consensus in conceivable.

Exploring the “continuous combat function” concept in armed conflicts: Time for an extended application?

2018 ◽  
Vol 100 (907-909) ◽  
pp. 267-285
Author(s):  
Sabrina Henry
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Function Concept ◽  
Extended Application

AbstractThis paper focuses on the “continuous combat function” concept and proposes to extend its application. First, the article will demonstrate that the continuous combat function concept should be extended to certain members of organized armed groups in cases where those groups do not belong to any of the parties to an international armed conflict and whose actions do not reach the level of intensity required for a separate non-international armed conflict (NIAC) to exist. Secondly, the paper will look at the extension of this concept in order to determine individual membership in State armed forces in the context of a NIAC, while arguing that the notion of “armed forces” should be interpreted differently depending of the nature of the conflict, be it international or non-international.

scholarly journals Lessons for the law of armed conflict from commitments of armed groups: identification of legitimate targets and prisoners of war

2011 ◽  
Vol 93 (882) ◽  
pp. 463-482 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandesh Sivakumaran
Keyword(s):  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Ad Hoc ◽  
Prisoners Of War ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Law Of Armed Conflict ◽  
The Law ◽  
Rules Set

AbstractArmed groups frequently issue ad hoc commitments that contain a law of armed conflict component. These commitments detail the obligation of the relevant armed group to abide by international humanitarian law, the Geneva Conventions, or particular rules set out in the commitment. They commit the group to abide by international standards, sometimes exceed international standards, or in certain respects violate international standards. Although these commitments are often overlooked, they offer certain lessons for the law of armed conflict. This article considers the commitments of armed groups with respect to two specific areas of the law that are either of contested interpretation or seemingly inapplicable to non-international armed conflicts, namely the identification of legitimate targets and the prisoners of war regime.

The Obama Administration and Targeting “War-Sustaining” Objects in Noninternational Armed Conflict

2016 ◽  
Vol 110 (4) ◽  
pp. 663-679 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Goodman
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
President Obama ◽  
Law Of Armed Conflict ◽  
Economic Infrastructure ◽  
Significant Attention

Since September 11, 2001, legal experts have focused significant attention on the lethal targeting of individuals by both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations. An equally significant legacy of the post-9/11 administrations, however, may be the decisions to target specific kinds of objects. Those decisions greatly affect the success of U.S. efforts to win ongoing conflicts, such as the conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). These decisions may also become precedents for military attacks that states consider lawful, whether carried out by cyber or kinetic means, in future armed conflicts.To achieve the goal of destroying ISIL, President Obama embraced what many in the international law community long regarded as off-limits: targeting war-sustaining capabilities, such as the economic infrastructure used to generate revenue for an enemy's armed forces. Although the weight of scholarly opinion has for years maintained that such objects are not legitimate military targets, the existing literature on this topic is highly deficient. Academic discussion has yet to grapple with some of the strongest and clearest evidence in support of the U.S. view on the legality of such targeting decisions. Indeed, intellectual resources may be better spent not on the question of whether such objects are legitimate military targets under the law of armed conflict, but on second-order questions, such as how to apply proportionality analysis and how to identify limiting principles to guard against unintentional slippery slopes. In this article, I discuss the legal pedigree for war-sustaining targeting. I then turn to identify some of the most significant second-order questions and how we might begin to address them.

Detention by armed groups: overcoming challenges to humanitarian action

2011 ◽  
Vol 93 (883) ◽  
pp. 759-782 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Tuck
Keyword(s):  
Perceived Risk ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
International Committee ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Red Cross ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Unique Role ◽  
Humanitarian Action ◽  
International Character

AbstractArmed conflict and deprivation of liberty are inexorably linked. Deprivation of liberty by non-state armed groups is a consequence of the predominantly non-international character of contemporary armed conflicts. Regardless of the nature of the detaining authority or the overarching legality of its detention operations, deprivation of liberty may nonetheless have serious humanitarian implications for the individuals detained. Despite a need for humanitarian action, effective engagement is hampered by certain threshold obstacles, such as the perceived risk of the group's legitimization. Since the formative work of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)'s founder, Henry Dunant, the ICRC has sought to overcome these obstacles. In doing so it draws upon its experience of humanitarian action in state detention, adapting it to the exigencies of armed groups and the peculiarities of their detention practice. Although not without setbacks, the ICRC retains a unique role in this regard and strives to ameliorate the treatment and conditions of detention of persons deprived of liberty by armed groups.

Part IV The Right to Reparation/Guarantees of Non-Recurrence, B Guarantees of Non-Recurrence of Violations, Principle 37 Disbandment of Parastatal Armed Forces/Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Children

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Duthie Roger ◽  
Mayer-Rieckh Alexander
Keyword(s):  
Transitional Justice ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Historical Background ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Social Reintegration ◽  
Criminal Violence ◽  
The Right

Principle 37 focuses on the disbandment of parastatal armed forces and the demobilization and social reintegration of children involved in armed conflicts. It articulates measures designed to prevent the transformation of conflict violence to criminal violence through the dismantling and reintegration of all armed groups engaged in abuses, and outlines comprehensive responses to the injustices experienced by children during armed conflict. This chapter first provides a contextual and historical background on Principle 37 before discussing its theoretical framework and practice. It then examines the importance of reintegration processes and how they can be affected by transitional justice measures, along with their implications for former child combatants. It also highlights the relevance of measures for dealing with unofficial armed groups from an impunity standpoint, as well as the efforts of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs to address them.

Terrorist offences and international humanitarian law: The armed conflict exclusion clause

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-30
Author(s):  
Thomas Van Poecke ◽  
Frank Verbruggen ◽  
Ward Yperman
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
National Level ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Armed Groups

Abstract While armed conflicts are principally governed by international humanitarian law (IHL), activities of members of non-State armed groups and their affiliates may also qualify as terrorist offences. After explaining why the concurrent application of IHL and criminal law instruments on terrorism causes friction, this article analyzes the chief mechanism for dissipating this friction: a clause excluding activities governed by IHL from the scope of criminal law instruments on terrorism. Such armed conflict exclusion clauses exist at the international, regional and national level. This article explains how an exclusion clause can best avoid friction between IHL and criminal law instruments on terrorism.

Personal Self-Defense and the Standing Rules of Engagement

2018 ◽  
pp. 109-124
Author(s):  
Christopher M. Ford
Keyword(s):  
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Use Of Force ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Aerial Vehicle ◽  
The Law ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. military Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) restrict the use of force in armed conflict to either self-defense or “mission-specific” rules of engagement, which refer to the use of force against members of enemy armed forces or organized armed groups that have been “declared hostile.” This bifurcation of authority works well in an international armed conflict, where the enemy force is uniformed and easily distinguished. In these circumstances, the overwhelming number of engagements are against identified hostile forces. In many non-international armed conflicts, however, combatants actively attempt to camouflage their status, and U.S. forces find themselves engaging enemy forces under a self-defense framework. This creates problems. Consider, for example, a situation where three individuals of unknown affiliation launch an attack against a U.S. military convoy in Afghanistan. After a short engagement, the attackers get in a van and speed away from the attack site. The U.S. convoy is disabled, but an unmanned aerial vehicle tracks the van as it retreats into the desert. Thirty minutes later an AH-64 Apache attack helicopter arrives on scene above the still-retreating van. Can the Apache attack the vehicle? The van is retreating and poses no threat, thus self-defense principles would not allow for the use of force, despite the fact that the occupants are clearly directly participating in hostilities. This chapter addresses three questions: Why are the SROE drafted in this manner? What is the basis in the law for the SROE’s approach to self-defense? What are the problems presented by this approach?

Examining the Use of Amnesties and Pardons as a Response to Internal Armed Conflict

2014 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew G Reiter
Keyword(s):  
Transitional Justice ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Internal Armed Conflict ◽  
The Past ◽  
Peace And Security ◽  
Lasting Peace ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Internal Armed Conflicts

The use of amnesty for human rights violations has been heavily criticised on legal, ethical and political grounds. Yet amnesties have been the most popular transitional justice mechanisms over the past four decades, particularly in the context of internal armed conflict. States justify these amnesties by claiming they are important tools to secure peace. But how successful is amnesty in accomplishing these goals? This article seeks to answer this question by analysing the use and effectiveness of 236 amnesties used in internal armed conflicts worldwide since 1970. The article first creates a typology of the use of amnesty in the context of internal armed conflict. It then qualitatively examines the impact on peace of each type of amnesty. The article finds that most amnesties granted in the context of internal armed conflict have no demonstrable impact on peace and security. Yet amnesties granted as carrots to entice the surrender of armed actors occasionally succeed in bringing about the demobilisation of individual combatants or even entire armed groups. More importantly, amnesties extended as part of a peace process are effective in initiating negotiations, securing agreements, and building the foundation for long-lasting peace.

Special agreements as a means of enhancing compliance with IHL in non-international armed conflicts: An inquiry into the governing legal regime

2014 ◽  
Vol 96 (895-896) ◽  
pp. 1195-1224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ezequiel Heffes ◽  
Marcos D. Kotlik
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
Armed Conflicts ◽  
International Humanitarian Law ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Armed Groups ◽  
Legal Regime ◽  
Geneva Conventions ◽  
Domestic Law

AbstractCommon Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions encourages the parties to a non-international armed conflict to bring into force international humanitarian law provisions through the conclusion of special agreements. Since armed groups are ever more frequent participants in contemporary armed conflicts, the relevance of those agreements as means to enhance compliance with IHL has grown as well. The decision-making process of special agreements recognizes that all the parties to the conflict participate in the clarification and expansion of the applicable rights and obligations in a way that is consistent with the principle of equality of belligerents. This provides incentives for armed groups to respect the IHL rules they have themselves negotiated. However, even upon the conclusion of such agreements, it remains unclear which legal regime governs them. This paper will argue that special agreements are governed by international law instead of domestic law or asui generislegal regime.

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