Article 18 Right to restriction of processing

Author(s):  
Gloria González Fuster

Article 4(3) (Definition of ‘restriction of processing’); Article 5(1)(d) (Principle of accuracy); Article 16 (Right to rectification); Article 5(1)(a) (Principle of lawfulness); Article 17(1)(d) (Right to erasure based on unlawful processing); Article 5(1)(c) (Principle of data minimisation); Article 17(3)(e) (Limitations to the right to erasure); Article 19 (Notification obligation); Article 21 (Right to object); Article 89 (Derogations relating to processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes); Article 58(1)(g) (Powers of supervisory authorities).

Author(s):  
Lee A. Bygrave

Article 4(5) (Definition of ‘pseudonymisation’) (see too recital 28); Article 5(2) (Accountability) (see too recital 11); Article 6(4)(e) (Compatibility); Article 22 (Automated individual decision-making, including profiling) (see too recital 71); Article 24 (Responsibility of controllers); Article 28 (Processors) (see too recital 81); Article 32 (Security of processing) (see too recital 83); Article 34(3)(a) (Communication of personal data breach to data subject) (see too recitals 87–88); Article 35 (Data protection impact assessment) (see too recital 84); Article 40 (Codes of conduct); Article 83(2)(d) and 83(4) (Fines); Article 89(1) (Safeguards relating to processing of personal data for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes).


Author(s):  
Cécile de Terwangne

Article 6(1) (Lawfulness of processing) (see too recitals 40–49); Article 6(4) (Exceptions to the requirement of compatible purposes for further processing and criteria to ascertain whether a purpose of further processing is compatible with the purpose for which the personal data are initially collected) (see too recital 50); Article 12 (Transparent information) (see too recitals 58–59); Articles 13–15 (Information and access to personal data) (see also recitals 60–64); Article 24 (Responsibility of the controller) (see too recitals 74–78) ; Article 32 (Security of processing) (see too recital 83); Article 89(1) (Safeguards and derogations relating to processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes) (see too recitals 158–163).


Author(s):  
Jef Ausloos

This chapter zooms in on Article 17 GDPR, on the right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’). It meticulously dissects the three paragraphs of this provision. The first paragraph lists six rights-to-erasure triggers which can be summarized as: (a) purpose expiration; (b) withdrawal of consent; (c) right to object; (d) unlawful processing; (e) legal obligation; and (f) withdrawal of consent by minors in the online environment. The second paragraph comprises an odd extension of the right to erasure, enabling data subjects to request that controllers who have made the personal data public, communicate potential erasure to anyone else processing that same personal data. The third paragraph lists five exemptions to the right to erasure, summarized as: (a) freedom of expression and information; (b) legal obligation or task carried out in the public interest or official authority; (c) public interest in the area of public health; (d) public interest archiving, scientific and historical research, or statistical purposes; and (e) legal claims. What becomes clear right away is how both the right-to-erasure’s triggers and exemptions all refer to other legal provisions in and outside the GDPR. As such, the right to erasure can be seen as a central hub in the GDPR, bringing together key data protection principles from the perspective of data subject empowerment.


Author(s):  
Gloria González Fuster

Article 4(9) (Definition of ‘recipient’); Article 12 (Transparent information, communication and modalities for the exercise of the rights of the data subject); Article 16 (Right to rectification), Article 17(1) (Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’)); Article 18 (Right to restriction of processing); Article 58(2)(g) (Powers of supervisory authorities); Article 89(3) (Safeguards and derogations relating to processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes).


Author(s):  
Cécile de Terwangne

Article 5(d) (Principles relating to processing of personal data—accuracy) (see too recital 39); Article 12 (Transparent information, communication and modalities for the exercise of the rights of the data subject) (see too recital 59); Article 19 (Notification obligation regarding rectification or erasure of personal data or restriction of processing); Article 23 (Restrictions) (see too recital 73); Article 89 (Safeguards and derogations relating to processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes) (see too recital 156).


Author(s):  
Christian Wiese Svanberg

Article 4 (Definitions) (see too recital 26); Article 5 (Principles relating to processing of personal data); Article 6 (Lawfulness of processing) (see too recital 50); Article 9 (Processing of special categories of personal data) (see too recitals 52–53).


2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gagah Yaumiyya Riyoprakoso ◽  
AM Hasan Ali ◽  
Fitriyani Zein

This study is based on the legal responsibility of the assessment of public appraisal reports they make in land procurement activities for development in the public interest. Public assessment is obliged to always be accountable for their assessment. The type of research found in this thesis is a type of normative legal research with the right-hand of the statue approach and case approach. Normative legal research is a study that provides systematic explanation of rules governing a certain legal category, analyzing the relationship between regulations explaining areas of difficulty and possibly predicting future development. . After conducting research, researchers found that one of the causes that made the dispute was a lack of communication conducted between the Government and the landlord. In deliberation which should be the place where the parties find the meeting point between the parties on the magnitude of the damages that will be given, in the field is often used only for the delivery of the assessment of the compensation that has been done.


Author(s):  
Olga Mykhailоvna Ivanitskaya

The article is devoted to issues of ensuring transparency and ac- countability of authorities in the conditions of participatory democracy (democ- racy of participation). It is argued that the public should be guaranteed not only the right for access to information but also the prerequisites for expanding its par- ticipation in state governance. These prerequisites include: the adoption of clearly measurable macroeconomic and social goals and the provision of control of the processes of their compliance with the government by citizens of the country; ex- tension of the circle of subjects of legislative initiative due to realization of such rights by citizens and their groups; legislative definition of the forms of citizens’ participation in making publicly significant decisions, design of relevant orders and procedures, in particular participation in local referendum; outlining methods and procedures for taking into account social thought when making socially im- portant decisions. The need to disclose information about resources that are used by authorities to realize the goals is proved as well as key performance indicators that can be monitored by every citizen; the efforts made by governments of coun- tries to achieve these goals. It was noted that transparency in the conditions of representative democracy in its worst forms in a society where ignorance of the thought of society and its individual members is ignored does not in fact fulfill its main task — to establish an effective dialogue between the authorities and so- ciety. There is a distortion of the essence of transparency: instead of being heard, society is being asked to be informed — and passively accept the facts presented as due. In fact, transparency and accountability in this case are not instruments for the achievement of democracy in public administration, but by the form of a tacit agreement between the subjects of power and people, where the latter passes the participation of an “informed observer”.


Author(s):  
Dirk Voorhoof

The normative perspective of this chapter is how to guarantee respect for the fundamental values of freedom of expression and journalistic reporting on matters of public interest in cases where a (public) person claims protection of his or her right to reputation. First it explains why there is an increasing number and expanding potential of conflicts between the right to freedom of expression and media freedom (Article 10 ECHR), on the one hand, and the right of privacy and the right to protection of reputation (Article 8 ECHR), on the other. In addressing and analysing the European Court’s balancing approach in this domain, the characteristics and the impact of the seminal 2012 Grand Chamber judgment in Axel Springer AG v. Germany (no. 1) are identified and explained. On the basis of the analysis of the Court’s subsequent jurisprudence in defamation cases it evaluates whether this case law preserves the public watchdog-function of media, investigative journalism and NGOs reporting on matters of public interest, but tarnishing the reputation of public figures.


Legal Studies ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 615-643 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eoin Daly ◽  
Tom Hickey

In law and discourse, it has typically been assumed that the religious freedom of state-funded religious schools must trump any competing right to non-discrimination on grounds of belief. For example, the Irish Constitution has been interpreted as requiring the broad exemption of denominational schools from the statutory prohibition on religious discrimination in school admissions. This stance is mirrored in the UK Equality Act 2010. Thus, religious discrimination in the public education context has been rationalised with reference to a ‘liberty-equality dichotomy’, which prioritises the integrity of faith schools' ‘ethos’, as an imperative of religious freedom. We argue that this familiar conceptual dichotomy generates a novel set of absurdities in this peculiar context. We suggest that the construction of religious freedom and non-discrimination as separate and antagonistic values rests on a conceptually flawed definition of religious freedom itself, which overlooks the necessary dependence of religious freedom on non-discrimination. Furthermore, it overstates the necessity, to religious freedom, of religious schools' ‘right to discriminate’. We argue for an alternative ordering of the values of religious freedom and non-discrimination – which we locate within the neo-republican theory of freedom as non-domination.


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