Resisting the Push for Tougher Regulation: Hedge Funds

2020 ◽  
pp. 111-128
Author(s):  
Scott James ◽  
Lucia Quaglia
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
International Standards ◽  
International Level ◽  
Light Touch ◽  
Financial Industry ◽  
Domestic Constraints ◽  
The Us ◽  
Regulatory Capacity ◽  
The Uk

In the wake of the crisis, regulators at the Financial Services Authority (FSA) sought to develop a tougher approach to overseeing hedge funds. But this push for trading-up regulation was opposed by elected officials, together with the financial industry, on the grounds that this would damage the competitiveness of the sector. The FSA’s capacity to resist this pushback was also severely constrained by growing speculation over whether it would be abolished, limiting its regulatory capacity and diminishing its institutional resources. At the international level, the UK allied with the US to act as foot-draggers to ensure that new international standards were broadly compatible with their relatively light-touch regime. However, the UK’s ability to resist the trading-up of EU rules was more limited because it lacked political allies and domestic constraints to exploit as bargaining leverage.

International Standards for Bank Capital Exposures to CCPs and Derivatives

2020 ◽  
pp. 126-151
Author(s):  
Lucia Quaglia
Keyword(s):  
Capital Requirements ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Basel Iii ◽  
Real Economy ◽  
Bank Capital ◽  
Financial Industry ◽  
Leverage Ratio ◽  
The Us ◽  
Credit Valuation Adjustment ◽  
The Uk

The elemental regime on bank capital for derivatives encompassed the credit valuation adjustment (CVA), the leverage ratio, and bank exposures to CCPs. Like for other parts of Basel III, the US and the UK were pace-setters internationally, promoting relatively precise, stringent, and consistent rules. The EU agreed on the need for higher capital requirements, but worried about negative implications for the provision of credit to the real economy. Networks of regulators were instrumental in furthering agreement amongst and within jurisdictions. They also fostered rules consistency through formal and informal coordination tools amongst international standard-setting bodies. The financial industry mobilized in order to reduce the precision and stringency of capital requirements, pointing out the need to consider capital reforms in conjunction with other post-crisis standards, notably, margins.

scholarly journals Trends in educational mobility: How does China compare to Europe and the United States?

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-240
Author(s):  
Rob J Gruijters ◽  
Tak Wing Chan ◽  
John Ermisch
Keyword(s):  
Educational Opportunity ◽  
The United States ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Educational Mobility ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Economic Boom ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Large Decline ◽  
Inequality Of Educational Opportunity

Despite an impressive rise in school enrolment rates over the past few decades, there are concerns about growing inequality of educational opportunity in China. In this article, we examine the level and trend of educational mobility in China, and compare them to the situation in Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the USA. Educational mobility is defined as the association between parents’ and children’s educational attainment. We show that China’s economic boom has been accompanied by a large decline in relative educational mobility chances, as measured by odds ratios. To elaborate, relative rates of educational mobility in China were, by international standards, quite high for those who grew up under state socialism. For the most recent cohorts, however, educational mobility rates have dropped to levels that are comparable to those of European countries, although they are still higher than the US level.

Taking the Lead: Bank Recovery and Resolution Rules

2020 ◽  
pp. 71-90
Author(s):  
Scott James ◽  
Lucia Quaglia
Keyword(s):  
Significant Influence ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Bank Failures ◽  
Bank Capital ◽  
Response Regulators ◽  
Financial Industry ◽  
First Mover Advantage ◽  
The Us ◽  
Alliance Building ◽  
First Mover

As in the case of bank capital, elected officials were quick to respond to voter concerns by substantially expanding regulators’ powers over bank recovery and resolution. In response, regulators developed stringent new rules on loss-absorbing capacity (LAC) and ‘living wills’ for banks. However, the financial industry on the whole did not seek to resist the changes. Nonetheless, UK regulators sought to act as pace-setters in this area at the international and EU levels to manage the cross-border externalities generated by bank failures. They were therefore able to exert significant influence in the formulation of new international standards on resolution and LAC, and over the EU’s new Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive. This was achieved by leveraging their substantial regulatory expertise, alliance-building (with the US), and ‘first-mover advantage’.

In Search of Stability: Bank Capital and Liquidity Requirements

2020 ◽  
pp. 52-70
Author(s):  
Scott James ◽  
Lucia Quaglia
Keyword(s):  
Banking Regulation ◽  
Capital Requirements ◽  
Political Support ◽  
Basel Iii ◽  
Bank Capital ◽  
Financial Industry ◽  
Domestic Constraints ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Institutional Architecture ◽  
Crd Iv

Following the financial crisis, UK preferences shifted decisively in favour of trading up bank capital and liquidity requirements. To reassure voters, elected officials intervened in the regulatory process by strengthening the domestic institutional architecture for banking regulation. Financial regulators leveraged this political support to overcome resistance from the financial industry, but also pushed for international/EU harmonization of capital requirements to avoid damaging the UK’s competitiveness. Internationally, UK regulators therefore acted as pace-setters and exerted significant influence over the design of the Basel III Accord. However, at the EU level, the UK was forced to act as a foot-dragger by prolonging negotiations over the Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) in an attempt to resist Franco-German efforts to water down the rules. But UK negotiators were more successful in leveraging domestic constraints to oppose the Commission’s attempt to impose the ‘maximum’ harmonization of bank capital.

Unstable politics may make trade deals uncertain

2019 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Financial Services ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
National Elections ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Us ◽  
Ideological Divergence ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Trade Deals ◽  
Trade Partners ◽  
The Eu

Subject Politics and trade talks. Significance Understanding the factors that determine how long trade negotiations take will help businesses navigate the uncertainty, as the UK government prepares to negotiate trade agreements once it leaves the EU. The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the EU took seven years to finalise. Less comprehensive renegotiations of international agreements can be shorter, including the US-Mexico-Canada agreement, which took less than two years. Impacts UK sectors highly exposed to the EU or United States, including automotive and financial services, face prolonged investment uncertainty. Timing of national elections, lobbying and the ideological divergence between trade partners will determine post-Brexit trade deal talks. Continued polarisation of major economies' electorates will delay or stop other global deals, including on foreign aid and climate change.

scholarly journals The UK and Digital Trade: Which way forward?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily Jones ◽  
Beatriz Kira ◽  
Anna Sands ◽  
Danilo B. Garrido Alves
Keyword(s):  
Global Economy ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Digital Economy ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Cross Border ◽  
Data Flows ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Uk

The internet and digital technologies are upending global trade. Industries and supply chains are being transformed, and the movement of data across borders is now central to the operation of the global economy. Provisions in trade agreements address many aspects of the digital economy – from cross-border data flows, to the protection of citizens’ personal data, and the regulation of the internet and new technologies like artificial intelligence and algorithmic decision-making. The UK government has identified digital trade as a priority in its Global Britain strategy and one of the main sources of economic growth to recover from the pandemic. It wants the UK to play a leading role in setting the international standards and regulations that govern the global digital economy. The regulation of digital trade is a fast-evolving and contentious issue, and the US, European Union (EU), and China have adopted different approaches. Now that the UK has left the EU, it will need to navigate across multiple and often conflicting digital realms. The UK needs to decide which policy objectives it will prioritise, how to regulate the digital economy domestically, and how best to achieve its priorities when negotiating international trade agreements. There is an urgent need to develop a robust, evidence-based approach to the UK’s digital trade strategy that takes into account the perspectives of businesses, workers, and citizens, as well as the approaches of other countries in the global economy. This working paper aims to inform UK policy debates by assessing the state of play in digital trade globally. The authors present a detailed analysis of five policy areas that are central to discussions on digital trade for the UK: cross-border data flows and privacy; internet access and content regulation; intellectual property and innovation; e-commerce (including trade facilitation and consumer protection); and taxation (customs duties on e-commerce and digital services taxes). In each of these areas the authors compare and contrast the approaches taken by the US, EU and China, discuss the public policy implications, and examine the choices facing the UK.

London

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Roberts
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Financial Regulation ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Services Sector ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis ◽  
The Uk ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Eu

At the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in 2007 London was one of the two foremost global financial centres, along with New York. London experienced a 12 per cent fall in wholesale financial services jobs in 2008–9, but a recovery got underway in 2010 and London’s wholesale financial services sector staged a wavering advance. But now there were new challenges, in particular the avalanche of financial regulation coming from the UK, the EU, the US and the G20. Fintech engendered new uncertainties. The impact of Brexit was uncertain, but mostly expected to be negative, at least in the short-term. Furthermore, there was growing competition from Asian and other financial centres. Nevertheless, London remained pre-eminent as one of the two largest global concentrations of wholesale financial services activity and at the top of the Global Financial Centres Index.

Controversies Over Clearing: Regulation of Derivatives

2020 ◽  
pp. 129-149
Author(s):  
Scott James ◽  
Lucia Quaglia
Keyword(s):  
Euro Area ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
International Level ◽  
Over The Counter ◽  
Legal Challenges ◽  
Central Counterparties ◽  
Regulatory Capacity ◽  
The Uk ◽  
European Markets ◽  
Minimal Resistance

UK regulators supported more stringent rules regarding the clearing of over-the-counter derivatives through Central Counterparties (CCPs) on financial stability grounds. Minimal resistance to this came either from elected officials, who paid little attention to the issue, or from the derivatives industry, as many viewed reform as desirable. UK regulators were therefore able to pursue the trading-up of OTCD rules and greater harmonization to manage the cross-border externalities generated by derivatives clearing. At the international level, UK regulators acted as pace-setters to secure more prescriptive standards, leveraging their significant market power and regulatory capacity, based on London’s prominent position. But at the EU level, UK negotiators pursued a strategy of foot-dragging in opposition to European Markets Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) provisions on the scope, access, and location of CCPs. The UK also used legal challenges to block attempts to relocate the clearing of euro-denominated derivatives to the euro area.

scholarly journals Corporate culture and frauds: a behavioral finance analysis of the Barclays-LIBOR case

2013 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 447-463 ◽  
Author(s):  
Enrico Maria Cervellati ◽  
Luca Piras ◽  
Matteo Scialanga
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Culture ◽  
Behavioral Finance ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Financial Industry ◽  
Department Of Justice ◽  
Dominant Culture ◽  
Futures Trading ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
The Us ◽  
Commodity Futures Trading Commission

The aim of this paper is to use behavioral finance to explain the factors that brought Barclays Plc. to face a £290 million fine (about $440 million), having deliberately tried to manipulate the LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate). This sums to the £59.5 million fined by the British Financial Services Authority (FSA) – the highest fine ever imposed by this organization – and respectively £102 million and £128 million by the US Department of Justice and by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). We analyze the reports issued by the U.S. and the British regulatory agencies, and those of financial analysts. Even though the focus of analysis are Barclays’ actions, we compare them with what other market participants did at the time of the analyzed events, to offer a comprehensive look at the financial industry and its dominant culture. In particular, after describing LIBOR rate determination methodology and the behavior of Barclays personnel when violations occurred, we present Barclays’ failures in organizing its own control systems and establishing a proper corporate culture. Finally, we analyze the behavior of market participants and supervisory authority in evaluating Barclays’ financial and ethical performance.

Coordinated fiscal stimulus in the Euro Area

2009 ◽  
Vol 207 ◽  
pp. 27-38 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Euro Area ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
Growth Path ◽  
Medium Term ◽  
European Monetary ◽  
Potential Growth ◽  
Fiscal Stimulus ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Us ◽  
The Uk

The Euro Area will experience a deep and relatively protracted recession. In the third quarter of 2008 Euro Area GDP fell by 0.2 per cent on a quarterly basis and we estimate that in the fourth quarter it dropped by a further 1 per cent. In 2009, the European Monetary Union is expected to suffer the sharpest downturn it has ever experienced, and it is expected to be sharper than the downturns experienced by member countries in the early 1990s and 1980s as well as the mid 1970s — see figure 17. The economy is expected to contract by 2 per cent year-on-year. In 2010 the Euro Area economy is expected to show no growth at all in annual terms, before it slowly returns to its potential growth path in the medium term. In the longer term there may be scarring from the crisis on the level of output, but we suggest that it will be noticeably less than in the UK and the US as they economies have been more dependent on financial services.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document