Macroeconomic Stabilization

2019 ◽  
pp. 552-557
Author(s):  
Marek Dabrowski
Keyword(s):  
Public Debt ◽  
Current Account Deficit ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
Macroeconomic Stabilization ◽  
Macroeconomic Policies ◽  
Fiscal Institutions ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
High Inflation ◽  
The International Monetary Fund

The aim of macroeconomic stabilization is restoring price stability and reducing monetary, fiscal, and balance-of-payment imbalances. Macroeconomic stabilization is particularly needed when a country suffers from high inflation or hyperinflation. To stop such an inflation one can choose between three types of anti-inflationary programmes: orthodox money-based, orthodox exchange rate-based, and heterodox. Other cases of macrostabilization policy include reducing excessive fiscal deficit and public debt before they become monetized, dealing with the deflationary consequences of the systemic banking crisis, reducing the excessive current account deficit, dealing with the consequences of a sudden stop in capital flows, and fighting chronic moderate inflation. Fiscal rules, and the independence of monetary and fiscal institutions such as central banks, play an important role in preventing macroeconomic instability. National macroeconomic policies are also monitored from outside, for example by the International Monetary Fund and European Commission (in the case of EU member states).

Public debt limit of the EU Member States and its impact on polish legal system – considerations in the context of public finance stability

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 239-255
Author(s):  
Wojciech Bożek
Keyword(s):  
Public Debt ◽  
Comparative Method ◽  
Reference Value ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Constitutional Tribunal ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Eu

The author’s goal is to determine the consequences of implementing treaty solutions concerning public debt to the Polish Constitution and to define the differences between the methodology of counting public debt in the European Community and Polish legal order. The raised issues concern important problems from the substantive and practical point of view, therefore the study’s content is important for science and practice. The research methodology was based on the analysis of the EU and Poland’s normative solutions, opinions expressed in the international and national literature on the subject, and the case law of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. The paper applies mostly the dogmatic-analytic and legal-comparative method with reference to available statistical data on Poland’s public debt. The study allowed the author to gain an understanding of the significance of fiscal rules implemented at the EU level to ensure stability. Article 216(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland indicates that the treaty solutions regarding the reference value (public debt-to-GDP ratio) were reenacted. However, until this day, the EU and Poland’s debt measurement methods do not fully correspond. In order to counteract excessive debt incursion, a state is required to take not only efficient actions but also ones that are adequate and, to some extent, flexible. This is an expression of acceptance of the EU’s preventive assumptions. However, there is still no full correlation in the methodology of calculating public debt in the EU and the Republic of Poland.

scholarly journals Fiscal Constraints In The European Union – When More Is Less?

2015 ◽  
Vol 62 (s1) ◽  
pp. 19-28
Author(s):  
Florin-Alexandru Macsim ◽  
Florin Oprea
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
European Union ◽  
Public Debt ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
Fiscal Policies ◽  
Budget Deficits ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Fiscal Institutions ◽  
Fiscal Constraints ◽  
Key Aspects

Abstract This paper examines the implications of fiscal rules measured through the Fiscal Rules Index and fiscal institutions that supervise fiscal policies on key aspects of fiscal policies such as public debt and budget deficits. Our goal was to identify the specific links between fiscal rules, institutions and fiscal policies, to support any rethinking of public policy matters. Our results confirm that the government’s consolidated debt is influenced by both fiscal rules and institutions. Through this research we have showed that an increased number of institutions and fiscal rules is closely related to an increase in public debt levels. We explained this influence by stating that cause may consist in not having one strong and independent institution, but more institutions more or less independent that divide key responsibilities. Also our results indicate that budget deficits aren’t influenced either by supervising institutions or fiscal rules.

scholarly journals The Influence of Fiscal Rules on the Fiscal Stability in the EU Member States

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 212
Author(s):  
Ryta Iwona Dziemianowicz ◽  
Aneta Kargol-Wasiluk
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Public Debt ◽  
Budget Deficit ◽  
National Level ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Fiscal Discipline ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
The Eu

Due to the rapid increase of the budget deficit and public debt in many the EU countries after 2008, fiscal policy has faced a significant challenge for developing an appropriate tools to strengthen fiscal discipline and thereby improve the quality of public finance. Institutional mechanisms such as among others numerical fiscal rules play an important role in maintaining the fiscal discipline and support fiscal credibility of the state. Fiscal rules are most often defined as permanent constraints on fiscal policy, expressed by indicators introducing a limit for a particular fiscal aggregate, such as a budget deficit (real or structural), public debt, public expenditure or public revenue. The theoretical objective of the article is to analyze the institutional dimension of numerical fiscal rules (their type, legal basis, transparency, complexity, flexibility, adequacy and coherence). The empirical purpose, on the other hand, is to conduct a statistical analysis and to examine the relationship between the value of the fiscal rules index and the level of budget deficit and public debt in 28 Member States of the European Union. Examining the effectiveness of applied fiscal rules, at both European and national level seems to be the most valuable part of the analysis.

scholarly journals Measuring the fiscal governance instruments: a synthetic index for EU countries

2021 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 117-136
Author(s):  
SLAWOMIR FRANEK ◽  
MARTA POSTULA
Keyword(s):  
Data Model ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
Medium Term ◽  
Fiscal Institutions ◽  
Eu Countries ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Synthetic Index ◽  
General Government ◽  
Governance Instruments

ABSTRACT The aim of the paper is to examine the collective effect of fiscal governance instruments (i.e., fiscal rules, medium-term budgetary frameworks, independent fiscal institutions) on the fiscal outcomes of EU member states. The results of panel data model estimation for 28 EU countries for the period 2004-2016 confirm a statistically significant and positive impact of synthentic index for those instruments on the general government balance to GDP ratio. Additionally, an adjustment of the synthetic index was proposed, taking into account the degree of autonomy of independent fiscal institutions, and the link between medium-term budgetary frameworks and the annual budget.

scholarly journals Fiscal and Other Rules in EU Economic Governance: Helpful, Largely Irrelevant or Unenforceable?

2017 ◽  
Vol 239 ◽  
pp. R3-R13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain Begg
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
The Political ◽  
Stability And Growth Pact ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
Growth Pact ◽  
Macroeconomic Imbalances ◽  
Eu Economic Governance ◽  
The Eu

EU Member States, particularly in the Euro Area, have been pushed to adopt more extensive and intrusive fiscal rules, but what is the evidence that the rules are succeeding? The EU level Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has been – and remains – the most visible rule-book, but it has been complemented by a profusion of national rules and by new provisions on other sources of macroeconomic imbalance. Much of the analysis of rules has concentrated on their technical merits, but tends to neglect the political economy of compliance. This paper examines the latter, looking at compliance with fiscal rules at EU and Member State levels and at the rules-based mechanisms for curbing other macroeconomic imbalances. It concludes that politically driven implementation and enforcement shortcomings have been given too little attention, putting at risk the integrity and effectiveness of the rules.

Fiscal Institutions and Macroeconomic Management in the United Arab Emirates

2019 ◽  
pp. 356-426
Author(s):  
Raimundo Soto
Keyword(s):  
United Arab Emirates ◽  
Resource Curse ◽  
Political Stability ◽  
Institutional Development ◽  
Business Environment ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
Fiscal Institutions ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Oil Wealth ◽  
Macroeconomic Management

The UAE has seemingly escaped “the natural resource curse”: it is one of the richest countries in the world and ranks comparatively highly on business environment, infrastructure, and institutional development. Symptoms of the curse can nevertheless be found in the very low growth in labor productivity, massive public sector overemployment, and the inability to counteract instability induced by oil price cycles. This chapter shows that fiscal policy is highly ineffective as a countercyclical tool due to the absence of income and ad-valorem taxes. Stabilizing instruments—such as open-budgeting procedures or fiscal rules—are notoriously absent. Why would a country design its fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies so that they allow for high levels of pro-cyclicality, thereby hampering efficiency and long-run growth? A political economy explanation is developed whereby weak fiscal institutions are an agreed-upon mechanism to secure political stability and transfer oil wealth among emiratis and to future generations.

The Motive to Borrow

2019 ◽  
pp. 102-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Fatás ◽  
Atish R. Ghosh ◽  
Ugo Panizza ◽  
Andrea F. Presbitero
Keyword(s):  
Asset Management ◽  
Public Debt ◽  
Causal Link ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
Output Volatility ◽  
Lower Growth ◽  
Fiscal Stimulus ◽  
Debt Accumulation ◽  
Strategic Manipulation ◽  
Tax Smoothing

Governments issue debt for good and bad reasons. While the good reasons—intertemporal tax smoothing, fiscal stimulus, and asset management—can explain some of the increases in public debt observed in recent years, they cannot account for all of the observed changes. Bad reasons for borrowing are driven by political failures associated with intergenerational transfers, strategic manipulation, and common pool problems. These political failures are a major cause of overborrowing and budgetary institutions and fiscal rules can play a role in mitigating the tendency to overborrow. While it is difficult to establish a clear causal link from high public debt to low growth, it is likely that some countries might be paying a price in terms of lower growth and greater output volatility because of excessive debt accumulation.

Financial Assistance to Non-Euro Area Member States

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Thiele
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Public Debt ◽  
European Central Bank ◽  
Financial Assistance ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Money Markets ◽  
Complete Breakdown ◽  
The International Monetary Fund ◽  
Bail Out

The historic financial crisis that began on the American housing market in 2007 and from there spread all over the globe had tremendous consequences for more or less every country worldwide, especially for their respective public finances. The overall public debt level skyrocketed due to the substantial economic downfall and the necessity to bail out hundreds of financial institutions that had suffered severe losses when the American subprime market collapsed and the money markets froze. Though the States were (with tremendous help by the European Central Bank) finally successful in preventing a complete breakdown of the major financial markets, their intervention left the national budgets and the balance of payments (BOP) of several of them in a devastating condition with insolvencies only being averted by massive external and mainly financial assistance by other States and institutions (especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF)). Some of these states facing such a financial calamity were Member States of the European Union (EU)—a fact having an important normative implication: Other Member States wanting to help financially were bound by the normative framework of the European Union Treaties. And the same was obviously true for the European Union itself where it wanted to initiate any form of (financial) assistance.

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