The Politics of Regulatory Convergence and Divergence
This chapter sets out an analytical framework that explains why regulators in peripheral developing countries respond in different ways to international banking standards. It identifies four factors that generate incentives for convergence on international standards: politicians seeking to integrate their countries into global finance and expand financial services sectors; domestic banks looking to enhance their reputation as they expand into international markets; regulators with strong connections to peer regulators and transnational policy networks; and sustained engagement with the IMF and World Bank. It also identifies four factors that generate incentives for divergence: politicians pursuing interventionist financial policies; politicians and business oligarchs using banks to direct credit to political allies; regulators who are sceptical about the applicability of Basel standards for their local context; and banks with business models focused on the domestic market for whom there are high costs and few benefits. The chapter identifies specific pathways to regulatory convergence and divergence, and salient features of each.