Israel

2021 ◽  
pp. 484-504
Author(s):  
Or Tuttnauer ◽  
Chen Friedberg
Keyword(s):  
Strong Evidence ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Parliamentary Democracy ◽  
Party Leadership ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
National Parliament ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Speech Time ◽  
Rules Of Procedure

This chapter investigates the factors affecting floor access in the Israeli national parliament—the Knesset. Although Israel is a parliamentary democracy with a proportional, closed-list electoral system, the Knesset’s rules of procedure give little control to parties over floor access. Analyzing over 46,000 speeches over three terms between 2009 and 2019, even in debates where party leadership does have control over who takes the floor, we find no strong evidence that such control is used to give more speech time to highly ranked representatives. This is at odds with predictions made by others in two ways: First, in that the parliamentary rules do not reflect the electoral incentives of party leadership; Second, in that parties do not appear to utilize whatever ability they possess to control their representatives’ speechmaking.

scholarly journals Electoral Incentives and the Allocation of Public Funds

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederico Finan ◽  
Maurizio Mazzocco
Keyword(s):  
Electoral System ◽  
Policy Reforms ◽  
Public Funds ◽  
Term Limit ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Projects ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The One ◽  
The Cost

Abstract Politicians allocate public resources in ways that maximize political gains, and potentially at the cost of lower welfare. In this paper, we quantify these welfare costs in the context of Brazil’s federal legislature, which grants its members a budget to fund public projects within their states. Using data from the state of Roraima, we estimate a model of politicians’ allocation decisions and find that 26.8% of the public funds allocated by legislators are distorted relative to a social planner’s allocation. We then use the model to simulate three potential policy reforms to the electoral system: the adoption of approval voting, imposing a one-term limit, and redistricting. We find that a one-term limit and redistricting are both effective at reducing distortions. The one-term limit policy, however, increases corruption, which makes it a welfare-reducing policy.

Minimalinvasiv oder wirksam? Debattenbeitrag zur Novellierung des Bundeswahlrechts vom Oktober 2020

2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 675-684
Author(s):  
Johannes Krause
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Vote System ◽  
The Political ◽  
Local Elections ◽  
Standard Size ◽  
National Parliament ◽  
System P ◽  
Voting System ◽  
The Way

Despite the 2020 reform of Germany’s national parliament voting law, the debate about a robust voting system has not ended . Träger and Jacobs have convincingly shown that Naun­dorf’s suggestion to introduce a parallel voting system creates more problems than it solves, and thus more far-reaching approaches have to be considered . One way to stop the Bunde­stag from growing is to reject the two vote-system . Comparable to the system of Thuringia’s local elections, with open lists and three votes per voter, both the standard size of the Bun­destag can be safely adhered to and at the same time a personalized proportional represen­tation can be maintained . Among other advantages, the voters would have greater influence on the personalized composition of the Bundestag . In particular, reservations on the part of the political parties could stand in the way of such a sustainable solution to the ongoing problems with the German electoral system .

Polarization and Electoral Incentives: The End of the Chilean Consensus Democracy, 1990–2014

2018 ◽  
Vol 60 (4) ◽  
pp. 49-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Fábrega ◽  
Jorge González ◽  
Jaime Lindh
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Political Support ◽  
The Political ◽  
Parliamentary Elections ◽  
Consensus Democracy ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Spatial Voting ◽  
Political Forces ◽  
Political Center

AbstractConsensus democracy among the main Chilean political forces ended abruptly after the 2013 presidential and parliamentary elections, the most polarized elections since the return to democracy in 1990. Relying on spatial voting theory to uncover latent ideological dimensions from survey data between 1990 and 2014, this study finds patterns of gradual polarization starting at least ten years before the collapse of consensus, based on an increasing demobilization of the political center that misaligned politicians from their political platforms (particularly in the center-left parties). That phenomenon changed the political support for the two main political coalitions and the intracoalition bargaining power of their various factions. The pattern also helps to explain the process behind the 2015 reform of the electoral system.

Candidate Selection in Ireland: The Impact of Localism and the Electoral System

1980 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 489-503 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Gallagher
Keyword(s):  
Political Process ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
The Political ◽  
National Parliament ◽  
Republic Of Ireland ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Selection Of ◽  
The Way

Although the selection of candidates for elections to the national parliament is an important part of the political process, there is little writing on the way in which this is carried out in the Republic of Ireland. This no doubt springs largely from parties' reluctance to reveal details of this essentially internal matter. In Duverger's words, ‘parties do not like the odours of the electoral kitchen to spread to the outside world’.

Government Formation and Endogenous Parties

1993 ◽  
Vol 87 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
David P. Baron
Keyword(s):  
Formal Theory ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Collective Responsibility ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
System A ◽  
Parliamentary Systems ◽  
The Government

I provide a formal theory of government for a political system characterized by a proportional representation electoral system, a parliamentary government that exercises collective responsibility, and a government formation process. Political parties are assumed to be policy-oriented and to serve the interests of those who vote for them. Parties choose policy platforms that determine their representation in parliament; and given that representation, the parties bargain over the government to be formed and the policies that government will implement. The model yields equilibria with the property that parties choose dispersed policy positions. Thus, electoral incentives in proportional representation parliamentary systems need not lead to policy convergence. The theory provides predictions of party locations such as those developed in the manifesto project.

scholarly journals Careerism, Committee Assignments, and the Electoral Connection

1996 ◽  
Vol 90 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan N. Katz ◽  
Brian R. Sala
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Connection ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Committee Assignment ◽  
Committee Assignments

Most scholars agree that members of Congress are strongly motivated by their desire for reelection. This assumption implies that members of Congress adopt institutions, rules, and norms of behavior in part to serve their electoral interests. Direct tests of the electoral connection are rare, however, because significant, exogenous changes in the electoral environment are difficult to identify. We develop and test an electoral rationale for the norm of committee assignment “property rights.” We examine committee tenure patterns before and after a major, exogenous change in the electoral system—the states' rapid adoption of Australian ballot laws in the early 1890s. The ballot changes, we argue, induced new “personal vote” electoral incentives, which contributed to the adoption of “modern” congressional institutions such as property rights to committee assignments. We demonstrate a marked increase in assignment stability after 1892, by which time a majority of states had put the new ballot laws into force, and earlier than previous studies have suggested.

Limits of Electoral Equality and Political Representation

2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kostas Chryssogonos ◽  
Costas Stratilatis
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Free Expression ◽  
Parliamentary Democracy ◽  
Equal Opportunities ◽  
Political Equality ◽  
Normative Standards ◽  
Tyranny Of The Majority

Constitutional limits to the discretion of the legislature in forming the electoral system — Political equality — Equal suffrage — Equal opportunities for political parties — Free expression of popular will — Functionality of the parliament — Concrete normative standards for assessing the constitutionality of an electoral system — Conception of parliamentary democracy emphasising representation of political minorities and protection from ‘tyranny of the majority’

scholarly journals Aiming higher: the consequences of progressive ambition among MPs in European parliaments

2015 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich Sieberer ◽  
Wolfgang C. Müller
Keyword(s):  
Electoral System ◽  
Party Leadership ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Electoral Campaigns ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Party Ideology ◽  
Progressive Ambition ◽  
Local Party

How ambitious are MPs in European parliaments and how does progressive ambition affect their strategies? We argue that progressively ambitious members of parliament try to generate individual visibility and seek the support of party leaders who decide on promotion while at the same time ensuring reelection by adjusting to electoral system incentives. Using novel data from a 15-country MP survey we show that progressive ambition is widespread in Europe and Israel. As hypothesized, progressively ambitious MPs are more likely to favor personal rather than party-centered electoral campaigns and to address the national or regional party leadership instead of their local party. Electoral system features and party ideology also have the theoretically expected effects.

scholarly journals Electoral incentives, policy compromise, and coalition durability: Japan's LDP–Komeito Government in a mixed electoral system

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam P. Liff ◽  
Ko Maeda
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Japanese Politics ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Coalition Politics ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Mixed Electoral System

AbstractPolitical parties’ behavior in coalition formation is commonly explained by their policy-, vote-, and office-seeking incentives. From these perspectives, the 20-year partnership of Japan's ruling conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its pacifistic Komeito junior coalition partner is an anomalous case. The longevity, closeness, and nature of their unlikely partnership challenges core assumptions in existing theories of coalition politics. LDP–Komeito cooperation has sustained for two decades despite vastly different support bases and ideological differences on fundamental policy issues. LDP leaders also show no signs of abandoning the much smaller Komeito despite enjoying a single-party majority. We argue that the remarkable durability of this puzzling partnership results primarily from the two parties’ electoral incentives and what has effectively become codependence under Japan's mixed electoral system. Our analysis also demonstrates that being in a coalition can induce significant policy compromises, even from a much larger senior partner. Beyond theoretical implications, these phenomena yield important real-world consequences for Japanese politics: especially, a far less dominant LDP than the party's Diet seat total suggests, and Komeito's remarkable ability to punch significantly above its weight and constrain its far larger senior partner, even on the latter's major national security policy priorities.

Electoral Incentives in Mixed-Member Systems: Party, Posts, and Zombie Politicians in Japan

2006 ◽  
Vol 100 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROBERT PEKKANEN ◽  
BENJAMIN NYBLADE ◽  
ELLIS S. KRAUSS
Keyword(s):  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Parallel System ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Legislative Organization ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Different Types ◽  
The Individual

How do electoral incentives affect legislative organization? Through an analysis of Japan's mixed-member electoral system, we demonstrate that legislative organization is strongly influenced not only by the individual legislators reelection incentives but also by their interest in their party gaining power and maintaining a strong party label. Electorally vulnerable legislators are given choice legislative positions to enhance their prospects at the polls, whereas (potential) party leaders disproportionately receive posts with greater influence on the party's overall reputation. Members of Parliament elected from proportional representation (PR) lists and in single member districts also receive different types of posts, reflecting their distinct electoral incentives. Even small variations in electoral rules can have important consequences for legislative organization. In contrast to Germany's compensatory mixed-member system, Japan's parallel system (combined with a “best loser” or “zombie” provision) generates incentives for the party to allocate posts relating to the distribution of particularistic goods to those elected in PR.

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