Introduction
This chapter introduces the book’s central argument, and discusses the contribution that it makes to the literature. This contribution is twofold. First, Rural Democracy acknowledges that in addition to strategies of electoral fraud, clientelism, and ethnic politics, African rulers have also attempted to compete for votes by providing public goods and services to their citizens. A discussion of the range of strategies that governments use to secure rural votes, the distinctions and interactions between them, and their relative significance, serves to frame the book’s argument, and sets scope conditions to bound its generalizability. The book’s second major contribution relates to the impact of democracy on development more broadly. By theorizing the effects of electoral institutions within the specific contexts in which they are embedded, Rural Democracy suggests a way forward for future research on the impact of democracy on development in Africa, and elsewhere also. In discussing these contributions, Chapter 1 clarifies the minimalist understanding of democracy adopted in Rural Democracy. Although the argument in Rural Democracy is that even minimally competitive elections generate incentives for incumbents to consider voters’ preferences when making policy, the extent to which elections create incentives for the costlier strategy of pro-rural development likely diminishes below some level of democratic quality, or fairness. Chapter 1 also introduces and justifies the book’s threefold empirical strategy. This includes a discussion of case selection, and a consideration of how the results might generalize beyond the particular cases that are included in the analyses.