scholarly journals Body models in humans, animals, and robots: mechanisms and plasticity

2021 ◽  
pp. 152-180
Author(s):  
Matej Hoffmann

Humans and animals excel in combining information from multiple sensory modalities, controlling their complex bodies, adapting to growth or failures, or using tools. The key foundation is an internal representation of the body that the agent—human, animal, or robot—has developed. In the biological realm, evidence has been accumulating in diverse disciplines, giving rise to the concepts of body image, body schema, and others. In robotics, a model of the robot is an indispensable component that enables to control the machine. This chapter compares the character of body representations in biology with their robotic counterparts and relates that to the differences in performance observed. Conclusions are drawn about how robots can inform the biological sciences dealing with body representations and which of the features of the ‘body in the brain’ should be transferred to robots, giving rise to more adaptive and resilient self-calibrating machines.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Gadsby

The distinction between body image and body schema has been incredibly influential in cognitive neuroscience. Recently, researchers have begun to speculate about the relationship between these representations (Gadsby, 2017; 2018; Pitron & de Vignemont, 2017; Pitron et al., 2018). Within this emerging literature, Pitron and colleagues (2018) proposed that the long-term body image and long-term body schema co-construct one another, through a process of reciprocal interaction. In proposing this model, they make two assumptions: that the long-term body image incorporates the spatial characteristics of tools, and that it is distorted in the case of Alice in wonderland syndrome. Here, I challenge these assumptions, with a closer examination of what the term “long-term body image” refers to. In doing so, I draw out some important taxonomic principles for research into body representation.


Author(s):  
Frédérique de Vignemont

This chapter considers the relationship between body representations, action, and bodily experiences. It first clarifies the conceptual landscape of body representations and stresses the conceptual and empirical difficulties that the current body schema/body image taxonomy faces, difficulties that can be explained by their constant interaction but not only. There is indeed a lack of precise understanding of the functional role of the body schema as opposed to the body image. Instead of these unclear notions, the chapter proposes distinguishing different types of body representations on the basis of their direction of fit and of their spatial organization. On the one hand, there is a purely descriptive body map that represents well-segmented categorical body parts, in which one can localize one’s sensations. On the other hand, there is a body map that is both descriptive and directive (i.e. pushmi-pullyu representation), and that encodes structural bodily affordances for action planning and control.


2021 ◽  
pp. 52-68
Author(s):  
Helena De Preester

The role of sensations for body experience and body representations such as body image and body schema seems indisputable. This chapter discusses the link between sensory input, the experience of one’s own body, and body representations such as body image and body schema. That happens on the basis of Michel Henry’s radical phenomenology of the body, which unites body and subjectivity and reconsiders the role of sensory input for the experience of the body and related representations. Without supporting, but inspired by, Henry’s ontological dualism between subjective and objective body, it is argued that the traditional view that considers sensory signals as all-important for bodily experience misses out a bodily dimension crucial for subjectivity—the body’s subjective dimension, not reigned by current sensory input. Cognitive science seems willing to accept representations that are over and above sensory input but still experiential in nature. The exact status of these ‘offline’ representations is, however, unclear. If it is true that these offline representations are responsible for crucial aspects of bodily subjective life (e.g., unity, ownership, presence), then it is unclear how these representations bring this experience about. Whereas online bodily representations are based on sensory input, offline bodily representations seem to be based on bodily experience over and above sensory life. In other words, they seem to represent or mediate what they are supposed to explain—the subjective body.


Perception ◽  
10.1068/p5853 ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 36 (10) ◽  
pp. 1547-1554 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Pavani ◽  
Massimiliano Zampini

When a hand (either real or fake) is stimulated in synchrony with our own hand concealed from view, the felt position of our own hand can be biased toward the location of the seen hand. This intriguing phenomenon relies on the brain's ability to detect statistical correlations in the multisensory inputs (ie visual, tactile, and proprioceptive), but it is also modulated by the pre-existing representation of one's own body. Nonetheless, researchers appear to have accepted the assumption that the size of the seen hand does not matter for this illusion to occur. Here we used a real-time video image of the participant's own hand to elicit the illusion, but we varied the hand size in the video image so that the seen hand was either reduced, veridical, or enlarged in comparison to the participant's own hand. The results showed that visible-hand size modulated the illusion, which was present for veridical and enlarged images of the hand, but absent when the visible hand was reduced. These findings indicate that very specific aspects of our own body image (ie hand size) can constrain the multisensory modulation of the body schema highlighted by the fake-hand illusion paradigm. In addition, they suggest an asymmetric tendency to acknowledge enlarged (but not reduced) images of body parts within our body representation.


Body schema refers to the system of sensory-motor functions that enables control of the position of body parts in space, without conscious awareness of those parts. Body image refers to a conscious representation of the way the body appears—a set of conscious perceptions, affective attitudes, and beliefs pertaining to one’s own bodily image. In 2005, Shaun Gallagher published an influential book entitled ‘How the Body Shapes the Mind’. This book not only defined both body schema (BS) and body image (BI), but also explored the complicated relationship between the two. The book also established the idea that there is a double dissociation, whereby body schema and body image refer to two different, but closely related, systems. Given that many kinds of pathological cases can be described in terms of body schema and body image (phantom limbs, asomatognosia, apraxia, schizophrenia, anorexia, depersonalization, and body dysmorphic disorder, among others), we might expect to find a growing consensus about these concepts and the relevant neural activities connected to these systems. Instead, an examination of the scientific literature reveals continued ambiguity and disagreement. This volume brings together leading experts from the fields of philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and psychiatry in a lively and productive dialogue. It explores fundamental questions about the relationship between body schema and body image, and addresses ongoing debates about the role of the brain and the role of social and cultural factors in our understanding of embodiment.


2021 ◽  
pp. 229-243
Author(s):  
Jonathan Cole

In neurological illnesses, the body may present itself to perception in ways which allows insights into the concepts of body image and body schema. Three such conditions are explored. From those who live with spinal cord injury, paralysed and insentient from the neck down, aspects of the importance of the body in one’s sense of self are revealed. Some also describe a coming to terms with their altered bodies. When considering the body image, its adaptability and this reconciliation to a new normal should be considered. Studies on acquired severe sensory loss explore how conscious control, at the body image level, may partially replace the deafferented body schema. There is little evidence, however, for these subjects extending access to previously non-conscious motor schema. Lastly, some narratives from those with congenital absence of movement of facial muscles describe reduced emotional experience and felt embodiment as children. These can be developed as young adults, through shared social interactions. The importance of the social in elaboration of the body image is further implicit in a consideration of the stigma associated with facial disfigurement. Others’ responses to one’s body are crucial in developing our body image and sense of self.


2021 ◽  
pp. 73-140
Author(s):  
Michael A. Arbib

Architects design spaces that offer perceptual cues, affordances, for our various effectivities. Lina Bo Bardi’s São Paulo Museum demonstrates how praxic and contemplative actions are interleaved—space is effective and affective. Navigation often extends beyond wayfinding to support ongoing behavior. Scripts set out the general rules for a particular kind of behavior, and may suggest places that a building must provide. Cognitive maps support wayfinding. Other maps in the brain represent sensory or motor patterns of activity. Juhani Pallasmaa’s reflections on The Thinking Hand lead into a view of how the brain mediates that thinking, modeling hand–eye coordination at two levels. The first coordinates perceptual and motor schemas. The body schema is an adaptable collage of perceptual and motor skills. The second coordinates the ventral “what” pathway that can support planning of actions, and the dorsal “how” pathway that links affordance-related details to motor control. A complementary challenge is understanding how schemas in the head relate to social schemas. Finally, the chapter compares the cognitive challenges in designing a building and in developing a computational brain model of cognitive processes.


2021 ◽  
pp. 133-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noriaki Kanayama ◽  
Kentaro Hiromitsu

Is the body reducible to neural representation in the brain? There is some evidence that the brain contributes to the functioning of the body from neuroimaging, neurophysiological, and lesion studies. Well-known dyadic taxonomy of the body schema and the body image (hereafter BSBI) is based primarily on the evidence in brain-damaged patients. Although there is a growing consensus that the BSBI exists, there is little agreement on the dyadic taxonomy because it is not a concrete and common concept across various research fields. This chapter tries to investigate the body representation in the cortex and nervous system in terms of sensory modality and psychological function using two different approaches. The first approach is to review the neurological evidence and cortical area which is related to body representation, regardless of the BSBI, and then to reconsider how we postulate the BSBI in our brain. It can be considered that our body representation could be constructed by the whole of the neural system, including the cortex and peripheral nerves. The second approach is to revisit the BSBI conception from the viewpoint of recent neuropsychology and propose three types of body representation: body schema, body structural description, and body semantics. This triadic taxonomy is considered consistent with the cortical networks based on the evidence of bodily disorders due to brain lesions. These two approaches allow to reconsider the BSBI more carefully and deeply and to give us the possibility that the body representation could be underpinned with the network in the brain.


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucilla Cardinali ◽  
Andrea Serino ◽  
Monica Gori

Abstract Cortical body size representations are distorted in the adult, from low-level motor and sensory maps to higher levels multisensory and cognitive representations. Little is known about how such representations are built and evolve during infancy and childhood. Here we investigated how hand size is represented in typically developing children aged 6 to 10. Participants were asked to estimate their hand size using two different sensory modalities (visual or haptic). We found a distortion (underestimation) already present in the youngest children. Crucially, such distortion increases with age and regardless of the sensory modality used to access the representation. Finally, underestimation is specific for the body as no bias was found for object estimation. This study suggests that the brain does not keep up with the natural body growth. However, since motor behavior nor perception were impaired, the distortion seems functional and/or compensated for, for proper interaction with the external environment.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document