Constitutional Uncertainties
The Calculus of Consent by Buchanan and Tullock was the first book to apply the contract method to questions of public choice, particularly in respect of voting, in the modern era. Their contractual construction imagines individuals in an original position of a laissez-faire economy, where the individuals have to determine rules for the making of collective choices in respect of the reduction of economic externalities and the provision of public goods. Those individuals calculate the costs and benefits of different decision rules. Faced with proposals with which they disagree, individuals would prefer a high threshold of agreement; faced with proposals with which they agree, individuals would prefer a low threshold of agreement. The constitutional question such individuals confront is to determine a general decision rule when they are uncertain about the future stream of choices the members of their community will face. Buchanan and Tullock are defended against the criticism that their original position lacks justification and that it presupposes a requirement of unanimity to secure change. However, they are less convincing in their attack on the simple majority principle, and in their attempt to show that supermajority decision-making does not give too much power to minorities. Indeed, sometimes the supermajority devices they support should be used to protect minorities, as shown in the literature on consociational democracy.