Foundations and Applications of Social Epistemology

Author(s):  
Sanford C. Goldberg

This book collects twelve recent papers by the author on social epistemology. Roughly half of them propose a research program for social epistemology—including an animating vision, foundational questions, and core concepts—and the other half are applications of this vision to particular topics. The author characterizes the research program itself as the exploration of the epistemic significance of other minds. Such a program will enumerate the various ways in which we depend epistemically on others, it will describe the proper way to evaluate beliefs according to the sort of dependence they exhibit, and it will provide the basis for identifying and characterizing various dysfunctions of our epistemic communities. The book suggests that several core concepts will be helpful as part of this exploration: epistemic dependence (direct and diffuse); entitlements (epistemic as well as those deriving from our social practices); the normative expectations we have of one another as epistemic subjects; and the socio-epistemic practices in which we participate. It goes on to put this program and these concepts into practice by exploring such topics as the epistemic agency exhibited in inquiry, the practices that constitute news coverage, the basis for allegations of what we or others should have known, how reliance on another’s testimony contrasts with reliance on an instrument, our reliance on others as consumers of testimony, and the epistemic upshot of non-epistemic social norms (whether these are moral, political, professional, or relationship-based).

2021 ◽  
pp. 100-114
Author(s):  
Sanford C. Goldberg

This chapter builds on the author’s programmatic approach to research in social epistemology, according to which such research involves the systematic investigation of the epistemic significance of other minds. This research program is developed by appeal to the thesis of the Division of Epistemic Labor. After formulating this thesis as a thesis of epistemic dependence, the chapter illustrates several ways in which individual subjects are epistemically dependent on one or more of the members of their community in the process of knowledge acquisition. Such an account supports various conclusions about the cognitively distributed nature of some knowledge acquisition, and the chapter ends with these.


Author(s):  
Harvey Siegel

The Western philosophical tradition has historically valorized the cultivation of reason as a fundamental intellectual ideal. This ideal continues to be defended by many as educationally basic. However, recent philosophical work has challenged it on several fronts, including worries stemming from relativistic tendencies in the philosophy of science, the apparent ubiquity of epistemic dependence in social epistemology, and broad critiques of objectionable hegemony launched from feminist and postmodernist perspectives. This chapter briefly reviews the historical record, connects the cultivation of reason to the educational ideal of critical thinking, spells out the latter ideal, and evaluates these challenges. It ends by sketching a general, “transcendental” reply to all such critiques of reason.


2008 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Czarina Saloma-Akpedonu

AbstractThere is a lack of understanding of the forms of knowledge and expertise in so-called developing societies such as Malaysia. This paper addresses this issue by suggesting a framework—based on Schutz and Luckmann's (1973) concept of social distribution of knowledge and Knorr Cetina's (1999) notion of epistemic communities—for examining the Malaysian automotive and information technology industries. These industries are central to Malaysia's agenda of becoming a knowledge society in the context of Vision 2020. Vital to these industries is a group of Malaysian professionals who possess knowledge and expertise: the “technological elite.” is group, the technological elite, includes, but is not limited to, engineers working for Proton, as well as professionals working in the Multimedia Super Corridor. Using professional biographies and narratives, this paper illuminates the context and culture of knowledge in Malaysia. Similarities in the principles that inform epistemic practices and relations within an “old” industry (i.e., automotive) and a “new” industry (i.e., ICT) call for the recognition of epistemic work characterized by the mixing of specialist knowledge with other forms of knowledge, and of localized knowledge in nascent epistemic communities with knowledge developed from an established tradition of technological practice.


Author(s):  
Rubens Ramón Méndez

Cuando el Trabajo Social comenzó a sistematizarse y a organizarse a partir de Mary Richmond, se proponía como un programa de investigación distinto dentro de las Ciencias Sociales (Lakatos, 1999). Distinto porque toma los planteos teóricos dados en las Ciencias Sociales desde �las circunstancias históricamente determinadas y existencialmente posicionadas; creando nuevas perspectivas sobre esos planteos teóricos� (Méndez, 2006) y porque con su práctica profesional, evalúa y muestra el problema de las consecuencias efectivas y potenciales de la utilización de los conocimientos (Dewey, 1967) en la construcción de las prácticas sociales (discursivas o no discursivas).Presentar la emergencia de un discurso propio de las personas y documentar lo real de las prácticas sociales, mostrar cómo es que a algunos enunciados que no son en sí mismos ni verdaderos ni falsos, se les otorgan el �estatuto de verdad�; es lo que hace que el Trabajo Social deba ser vigilado y desarmado en sus efectos.Si el discurso no es el medio por lo que se establecen las luchas en esta sociedad de discursos; sino que es por el discurso, por lo que se lucha. Si el discurso es �aquel poder del que quiere uno adueñarse� (Foucault, 1983), las Ciencias Sociales no podían dejar al azar el discurso del Trabajo Social.When Social Work became systematized and organized after Mary Richmond, it was described as a different research program within the social sciences (Lakatos, 1999). It was different because it considered the theoretical propositions in the social sciences from �historically determined and existentially positioned circumstances, thereby creating new perspectives on those theoretical propositions� (Méndez, 2006) and because through professional practice Social Work assesses and highlights the problem of the real and potential consequences of the use of knowledge in the construction of social practices (Dewey, 1967), whether discursive or non-discursive.As Social Work presents the emergence of people�s own discourse and documents the reality of social practices while it also presents statements which are neither true nor false as necessary truths, Social Work should be watched and disarmed in its consequences.Discourse is not the means through which fights are established in our discourse society; it is discourse that is fought about. If discourse is �that power we wish to get hold of� (Foucault, 1983), then the social sciences should not ignore the discourse of Social Work.


Episteme ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alvin I. Goldman

Social epistemology is a many-splendored subject. Different theorists adopt different approaches and the options are quite diverse, often orthogonal to one another. The approach I favor is to examine social practices in terms of their impact on knowledge acquisition (Goldman 1999). This has at least two virtues: it displays continuity with traditional epistemology, which historically focuses on knowledge, and it intersects with the concerns of practical life, which are pervasively affected by what people know or don't know. In making this choice, I am not blind to the allure of alternative approaches. In this paper I explain and motivate the knowledge-centered approach by contrasting it with a newly emerging alternative that has a definite appeal of its own. According to this alternative, the chief dimension of social epistemological interest would be rationality rather than knowledge.


2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 172-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris McVittie ◽  
Andy McKinlay

Gaffes are actions or events that are treated as problematic in subsequent news coverage through the production of what we term here ‘gaffe-announcements’. In an analysis of news media interviews conducted with members of the Trump administration during its first 100 days, we examine how interviewees respond to interviewer gaffe-announcements. Interviewees are seen to challenge the making of an announcement, to attempt to rework the ontological status of infelicitous talk, or to introduce the views of others who view the prior talk as felicitous. These responses lead in subsequent turns to reformulation of the gaffe-announcement, rejection of the response, or the views introduced being treated as irrelevant. These forms of response allow interviewees to avoid accepting that gaffes have occurred and allow the interviews to continue in line with normative expectations but discussion continues on matters that are treated as negative and detrimental to the interests of the administration.


Proceedings ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Raffaela Giovagnoli

Traditional epistemology rests on sources of information and knowledge such as perception, memory, ways of reasoning etc. In social epistemology, we find the primacy of an “indirect” form of information and knowledge, namely “testimony”: a justified belief can be acquired by hearing what others say or write. We focus on the contemporary debate, and in particular, on “communitarian” views.


2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Hindriks

Abstract Institutions are norm-governed social practices, or so I propose. But what does it mean for a norm to govern a social practice? Theories that analyze institutions as equilibria equate norms with sanctions and model them as costs. The idea is that the sanctions change preferences and thereby behavior. This view fails to capture the fact that people are often motivated by social norms as such, when they regard them as legitimate. I argue that, in order for a social norm to be perceived as legitimate, agents have to acknowledge reasons for conforming to it other than the sanctions they might incur for violating it. In light of this, I defend a theory of institutions that does not only invoke equilibria, but also normative rules that are supported by normative expectations and, in some cases, normative beliefs.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (19) ◽  
pp. 59-70
Author(s):  
Leon Schlüter

In this paper, I take up the question of how epistemic injustices can be resisted. Miranda Fricker (2007), who introduced the term to describe situations in which subjects are wronged as knowers, has initially advocated an individualist, virtue-based account to counteract epistemic injustices. Epistemic injustices, however, do not merely operate at an individual level but are rooted in social practices and structures. Arguably therefore, individually virtuous epistemic conduct is not enough to uproot patterns of epistemic injustice. Institutional change and collective actions are needed. Recently, Elizabeth Anderson (2012) has proposed such a structural remedy. Diagnosing patterns of social segregation that track existing inequalities to be the principal structural cause of epistemic injustices, Anderson suggests that integration is required to achieve epistemic justice. Pace Anderson, I argue that certain segregated spaces —namely spaces provided by subaltern counter-publics— can function and, in fact, have historically functioned as important sites of epistemic resistance. In particular, I argue that even if integration is sharply distinguished from assimilation, Anderson’s proposal insufficiently acknowledges the subversive potential of those spaces, in which shielded from the gaze of the oppressors, marginally situated subjects can assemble and question hegemonic epistemic practices


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