Conspiracy Theories?

2021 ◽  
pp. 139-148
Author(s):  
Steve Clarke

This chapter examines what, if anything, governments in Western liberal democratic societies should do to reduce rates of acceptance of unwarranted conspiracy theories. It begins by addressing three concerns. One is that it is unclear what counts as a conspiracy theory. A second is that it might be supposed that the acceptance of unwarranted conspiracy theories is not harmful. And if the acceptance of unwarranted conspiracy theories is not harmful then it is unclear why governments should be trying to reduce their rates of acceptance. A third concern is that it is unclear that we should be encouraging governments to undertake the project of reducing the popularity of unwarranted conspiracy theories, given that sometimes governments themselves have been known to mislead us about conspiracy theories. The chapter then looks at short-term and long-term strategies to reduce the popularity of unwarranted conspiracy theories. Long-term strategies include promoting critical reasoning skills through schooling and other forms of public education; promoting knowledge of the media and how it works; and making government operations more transparent and accountable.

2021 ◽  
pp. 194855062110002
Author(s):  
Lotte Pummerer ◽  
Robert Böhm ◽  
Lau Lilleholt ◽  
Kevin Winter ◽  
Ingo Zettler ◽  
...  

During COVID-19, conspiracy theories were intensely discussed in the media. Generally, both believing in conspiracy theories (i.e., explanations for events based on powerholders’ secret arrangements) and being confronted with a conspiracy theory have been found to predict cognition and behavior with negative societal effects, such as low institutional trust. Accordingly, believing in conspiracy theories around COVID-19 should reduce institutional trust, support of governmental regulations and their adoption, and social engagement (e.g., helping members of risk groups). We tested these predictions in a national random sample survey, an experiment, and a longitudinal study ( N total = 1,213; all studies were preregistered). Indeed, believing in and being confronted with a COVID-19 conspiracy theory decreased institutional trust, support of governmental regulations, adoption of physical distancing, and—to some extent—social engagement. Findings underscore the severe societal effects of conspiracy theories in the context of COVID-19.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Rück ◽  
David Mataix-Cols ◽  
Kinda Malki ◽  
Mats Adler ◽  
Oskar Flygare ◽  
...  

ABSTRACTBackgroundVarious surveys have documented a negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the population’s mental health. There is widespread concern about a surge of suicides, but evidence supporting a link between global pandemics and suicide is very limited. Using historical data from the three major influenza pandemics of the 20th century, and recently released data from the first half of 2020, we aimed to investigate whether an association exists between influenza deaths and suicide deaths.MethodsAnnual data on influenza death rates and suicide rates were extracted from the Statistical Yearbook of Sweden from 1910-1978, covering the three 20th century pandemics, and from Statistics Sweden for the period from January to June of each year during 2000-2020. COVID-19 death data were available for the first half of 2020. We implemented non-linear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL) models to explore if there is a short-term and/or long-term effect of increases and decreases in influenza death rates on suicide rates during 1910-1978. Analyses were done separately for men and women. Descriptive analyses were used for the available 2020 data.FindingsBetween 1910-1978, there was no evidence of either short-term or long-term significant associations between influenza death rates and changes in suicides. The same pattern emerged in separate analyses for men and women. Suicide rates in January-June 2020 revealed a slight decrease compared to the corresponding rates in January-June 2019 (relative decrease by −1.2% among men and −12.8% among women).InterpretationWe found no evidence of short or long-term association between influenza death rates and suicide death rates across three 20th century pandemics or during the first six months of 2020 (when the first wave of COVID-19 occurred). Concerns about a substantial increase of suicides may be exaggerated. The media should be cautious when reporting news about suicides during the current pandemic.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 101
Author(s):  
Vesna Srnic ◽  
Emina Berbic Kolar ◽  
Igor Ilic

<p><em>In addition to the well-known classification of long-term and short-term memory, we are also interested in distinguishing episodic, semantic and procedural memory in the areas of linguistic narrative and multimedial semantic deconstruction in postmodernism. We compare the liveliness of memorization in literary tradition and literature art with postmodernist divisions and reverberations of traditional memorizations through human multitasking and performative multimedia art, as well as formulate the existence of creative, intuitive and superhuman paradigms.</em></p><em>Since the memory can be physical, psychological or spiritual, according to neurobiologist Dr. J. Bauer (Das Gedächtnis des Körpers, 2004), the greatest importance for memorizing has the social role of collaboration, and consequently the personal transformation and remodelling of genomic architecture, yet the media theorist Mark Hansen thinks technology brings different solutions of framing function (Hansen, 2000). We believe that postmodern deconstruction does not necessarily damage memory, especially in the field of human multitasking that utilizes multimedia performative art by means of anthropologization of technology, thereby enhancing artistic and affective pre&amp;post-linguistic experience while unifying technology and humans through intuitive empathy in society.</em>


10.5912/jcb31 ◽  
1969 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Vivian Moses

This study was not intended as a catalogue, but as a comparative overview of the range of opportunities for education in biotechnology open to citizens in the various member states of the EU – opportunities organised by governments and their agencies, by educational establishments, by a wide variety of organisations and institutions variously interested in informing/influencing public attitudes and, of course, by the media in its many forms. Switzerland was included because of its experience of a referendum on genetics and biotechnology as well as the USA, where it all started. A number of suggestions are made for improving public understanding of biotechnology and for establishing a code of best practice taking into account the cultural differences between countries. Perhaps the most important is that biotechnology education is a long-term issue requiring a long-term view; it should not be constrained by short-term funding.


Author(s):  
Andrei A. Khokhlov ◽  

The article deals with the issue of spreading conspiratorial ideas in social networks and in the media, in connection with the COVID19 epidemic in the Russian Federation. A brief overview of the most well-known scientific approaches to the study of non-conventional concepts and various “conspiracy theories” is given. Special attention is paid to the connection of the conspiracy theories with postmodern ideas and a critical attitude to any official information from authoritative sources. It is emphasized that the equality of statements, that was insisted on by the supporters of postmodernism, leads to an increase in information noise and blurring the boundaries between fact and fiction. Modern conspiracy theory is the audience’s reaction to alarmism in official media publications. The author denotes an increase in such perceptions in the context of the crises, catastrophes and epidemics. An attempt is made to identify typical conspiracy versions for the causes of the coronavirus epidemic in the Russian segment of the social network Facebook. The article examines the fact of the growing popularity of “alternative theories” in the context of social fears of Russians, in connection with the deepening economic crisis and the prospect of losing their jobs. The growth of conspiracy ideas is analyzed in connection with the phenomenon of media influence on public consciousness. The functions of modern media are determined by the gradual replacement of the social reality of media with a reality that replicates simulacra, and is not only engaged in informing The article states that the influence of media materials on consumers of the news content is quite strong, which is one of the reasons for the spread of conspiracy theories in various groups and communities of media users.


Author(s):  
David Wood

This chapter deals with the question of historical mood: how to diagnose a mood, how to avoid obvious simplifications or idealizations, how to think through the relationships between a mood and its underlying conditions, what possibilities for transformation there are, and how moods affect agency. Trawling the media for comments about the present age it is hard to escape the language of passion and mood. Notable among these moral emotions are anger and ressentiment. Heidegger’s extended treatment of boredom opens up a deeper look at the significance of mood. Todays “mood” (anxiety, anger, ressentiment…) is tied both to short-term frustration (which may be cultural as well as economic), long term anxiety (what are our prospects?), and ultimate unsustainability (perhaps only dimly glimpsed). It is too easy to say that these are all problems of calculative time. But security, predictability (up to a point), and confidence in our ability to plan ahead enable a range of virtues. Finally, the relation between mood and agency—my frustration being tied to knowing that I alone cannot make much difference (though perhaps together we can)—is linked to the multiplicities of “we” in play, not only of agency, but also of constituency and impact.


Author(s):  
Matthew Whiting

This chapter traces how electoral participation contributed to the moderation of republicanism. It argues that liberal democratic elections simply do not allow for revolution. The decision by Irish republicans to participate in elections in 1981 was a critical juncture. The path it chose pushed the movement in an increasingly moderate direction, moving away from parallel states and outright rejection in favour of ambivalent electoral participation. Once this path was chosen republicans became locked-in, resulting in republicans fractionalising their long-term goal into short-term aims, courting voters beyond their core supporters, increasing engagement with ruling institutions, and using the existing system rather than trying to overthrow it. This electoral direction was later reinforced by the power-sharing arrangements which brought republicans into government. Moderation occurred in spite of republicans rejecting the legitimacy of the electoral institutions in which they were now competing. Electoral participation was a rational choice by republicans to pursue their goals through a new means in the hope of avoiding marginalisation.


2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
IKUO KABASHIMA ◽  
GILL STEEL

In this paper, we examine some of the ways in which Koizumi Junichiro took advantage of changes in television news to win the 2001 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential election and become prime minister of Japan. Koizumi adopted a strategy of political populism to increase his exposure in the media and develop a public reputation. Changes in the LDP selection procedure, in combination with long-term social and economic change and political reform, meant that the media mattered more to his campaign than had previously been the case. We use data from the Japan Election Study II (JES II) to show that the effects of Koizumi' media-driven popularity and style of politics reversed the LDP' electoral fortunes in the Upper House Election in 2001.


Philosophy ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 77 (4) ◽  
pp. 481-482

There are, it seems, 30 or more philosophical societies in Britain. Some, such as the Aristotelian Society or the Mind Association, are mostly for professional philosophers, but of all stripes. Others, such as the Royal Institute of Philosophy, are for anyone interested in philosophy, whether professional or, in the best sense, amateur—that is, not paid for their philosophy. Then there are those smaller, but by no means unworthy bodies, which cater for interest in some special branch of philosophy, such as phenomenology or philosophy of religion or of science. There are societies for European philosophy, for the history of philosophy, for applied philosophy, for women in philosophy, and for much else besides.If not exactly chaos, it all testifies to a real and possibly fruitful diversity in the British philosophical world. But in the last year or so, leading figures in many of the societies have been meeting to discuss forming an umbrella organization to encompass the whole lot. Whether this umbrella is to provide shelter for philosophers from squalls raining down on us from above, or whether it is for some other purpose, is not entirely clear.That there are squalls, at least for those teaching the subject in universities and elsewhere is clear. Teachers everywhere, from universities to primary schools, suffer from a deluge of managerial irrelevance, much of it apparently predicated on the latest managerial nostrum. According to the Government's own guru of ‘delivery’, managers no longer need to ‘win hearts and minds’, but should rather push through short term measures for long term gains, come what may. We have little idea what this means, but it sounds unpleasant. There may well be a case for an Association to speak with one voice on behalf of a profession which needs a degree of freedom from management in which to teach and to think, and which is increasingly called on to respond as a profession to managerial initiatives.But not, we would hope, to speak with one voice on anything else. A one voice philosophy is a contradiction in terms, even were there only one philosopher. Nor does philosophy need a slate of people to speak to the media and the general public. It would be too much like a list of officially licensed authorities where there should be no authority. And it will not work anyway. Good producers and editors will continue to consult the philosophers they know and like, just as they always have.


Diogenes ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 039219212092453
Author(s):  
Emmanuel Kreis

The terrorist attack against the satirical weekly newspaper Charlie Hebdo and the subsequent hostage-taking in the kosher supermarket in Paris on the 7th and 9th January 2015 profoundly shocked the French public. The term ‘conspiracy theory’ very rapidly came to be used in the media to account for accusations of a ‘false flag operation’ and for the circulation of doubts concerning certain details relating to these events. The use of the term ‘conspiracy theory’ in these contexts seemed to show up an extremely broad application of it, an application, which, in some cases, was accompanied by a rather impassioned approach to the events and one not always free from ideological presuppositions which aligned phenomena which, even though linkages between them could be shown, should more properly be distinguished one from another. This article proposes to examine the media and institutional applications of this term during the episode of the ‘anti-conspiracy theory panic’, which followed upon the Paris incidents. This study will permit the very notion of ‘conspiracy theory’ to be brought into question, both on the level of definition and from a heuristic perspective.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document