Necessity and Proportionality and Armed Attacks by Non-State Actors

Author(s):  
Chris O'Meara

Chapter 4 builds on the analysis of the previous chapters by considering how necessity and proportionality are adapted to apply to defensive action against NSAs. With a particular focus on international terrorism, including the ongoing Global Coalition intervention in Syria against Daesh and other terrorist groups, the potential and limitations of necessity and proportionality are brought to the fore. In particular, this chapter examines the position of the ‘host state’ (being the state in whose territory military action is taken), which includes a review of the controversial ‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine. The duration and geographical scope of the right of self-defence are also considered in this context. A worrying trend is identified regarding how states appear to take a more permissive attitude towards anti-terrorist operations. This state practice has serious implications for the meaningful application of proportionality, whilst highlighting the potential for specific necessity to act as a restraint on state action.

Author(s):  
Starski Paulina

This contribution analyses the normative implications of the US raid against the headquarters of the Iraqi Intelligence Service in 1993 in reaction to a foiled assassination attempt against former President Bush. It examines the legality of the operation, its precedential value and its evolutive potential regarding the regime on the ius contra bellum and specifically the right to self-defence. After dissecting the multiple contentious dimensions of the US claim of justification, the article concludes that the raid constituted an illegal ‘armed reprisal’. In light of observable state practice, its precedent-setting nature should not be overstated. However, albeit qualified as an ‘one-off incident’ the US raid did not leave the prohibition on the use of force and the contemporary discourse surrounding it untouched. Hence, it appears essential to demystify its frequently asserted evolutive potential particularly regarding the temporal limitations of Article 51 UN Charter to which this article is dedicated.


Author(s):  
Chris O'Meara

States invariably justify using force extraterritorially by reference to their inherent right of self-defence. In so doing, they accept that the exercise of such right is conditioned by the customary international law requirements of necessity and proportionality. To date, these requirements have received little attention. They are notorious for being normatively indeterminate and operationally complex. As a breach of either requirement renders ostensibly defensive action unlawful, increased determinacy regarding their scope and content is crucial to how international law constrains military force. This book examines the conceptual meaning, substance and practical application of necessity and proportionality as they relate to the right of self-defence following the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945. It provides a coherent and up-to-date description of the applicable contemporary international law and proposes an analytical framework to guide its operation and appraisal. This book contends that necessity and proportionality are conceptually distinct and must be applied in the foregoing order to avoid an insufficient ‘catch-all’ description of (il)legality. Necessity determines whether defensive force may be used to respond to an armed attack and where it must be directed. Proportionality governs how much total force is permissible and prohibits excessive responses. Both requirements are shown to apply on an ongoing basis throughout the duration of an armed conflict prompted by self-defence. Compliance with necessity and proportionality ensures that the purposes of self-defence are met (and nothing more) and that defensive force is not unduly disruptive to third-party interests and to international peace and security.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Łukasz Kułaga

The Use of Drones in Combating International Terrorism from the Perspective of ‘ius ad bellum’Summary The increasing practice of using armed unmanned aerial vehicles (military UAVs, commonly known as drones) by some countries to eliminate suspected terrorists raises a number of controversies from the perspective of international law. These controversies are also related to the specific features of military UAVs, which make it possible to kill targeted individuals without risk to the military personnel of the country concerned, and thereby may encourage the abusive interpretation of the applicable legal regulations. This article discusses these issues from the perspective of ius ad bellum, in particular the right to self-defence. It shows the main controversial points on the scope of invoking the right to self-defence in such cases, in particular the possibility of invoking the right to self-defence in response to an attack by a non-state entity, the question of pre-emptive self-defence, the importance of the severity of the force used as a condition allowing for the use of force in self-defence, and the relevance of the principles of proportionality and necessity. The article also presents an outline of the vast and highly controversial issues associated with the definition of terrorism from the point of view of international law.


Author(s):  
Kammerhofer Jörg

This chapter focuses on the US intervention in Nicaragua from 1981 to 1988, as a contribution to the state practice on the law on the use of force and the right to self-defence under both UN Charter and customary law. After an overview of the background of the so-called ‘contra war’ and of the salient facts regarding the US intervention in that conflict, it discusses the positions of the two parties on the facts and law, and takes note of the reaction of the international community, focusing on the debates at the UN. The next section focuses on the legality of the operation; the ICJ’s holdings in its 1986 Nicaragua judgment form the backbone of that discussion, while taking note of dissent and comment both inside and outside the Court. The contribution concludes by discussing the precedential value and effect of this conflict, and of the ICJ case.


Author(s):  
I.M. LOBO DE SOUZA

AbstractThis article explores and appraises international legal developments regarding the right to self-defence against vicarious aggression — that is, armed attacks by non-state entities that are sponsored or hosted by a foreign state. Despite efforts to develop a normative framework and mechanisms of accountability to curb states’ use of non-state entities as proxies for armed activity, some states continue to view these entities as valuable tools for the realization of their foreign policy goals. Consequently, international practice shows general recognition of a right of self-defence against non-state armed entities. There is also an emerging body of authoritative opinion, backed by an evolving state practice, that supports the extension of the application of this right against a non-state entity’s host or sponsoring state, provided some conditions are met.


2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 183-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
RAPHAËL VAN STEENBERGHE

AbstractThis article analyses the recent state practice in which the right of self-defence has been invoked in order to justify the use of force in response to attacks by non-state actors. The main purpose of this analysis is to determine whether the law of self-defence has evolved through this practice. It is submitted that the latter confirms the tendency, evidenced by the US operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan in 2001, towards allowing states to respond in self-defence to private armed attacks, that is, attacks which are committed by non-state actors only. The article also aims to shed some light on other fundamental conditions of the law of self-defence which played a significant role in the legal assessment of the recent state practice. It is argued in this respect that this practice confirms that any armed attack must reach some level of gravity – which may be assessed by accumulating minor uses of force – in order to trigger the right of self-defence, and that proportionality of the action taken in self-defence may be assessed in quantitative terms, but only as a means of making a prima facie judgement about the necessity of this action.


2016 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDRÉ DE HOOGH

AbstractThis contribution investigates restrictivist reasoning on the origin of armed attacks, and concentrates on the interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter and the use of state practice. One particular aspect is examined: the linkage of the armed activities of non-state actors to a state required for an exercise of the right of self-defence to be justified in relation to that state. Many authors have moved away from a restrictive interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter and customary international law, and have proposed various legal constructs –complicity, aiding and abetting, harbour and support, unwillingness or inability to act– to allow for the invocation of self-defence even when armed activities of non-state actors cannot be attributed to a state and its substantial involvement is doubtful. Noticeable among authors generally, with certain exceptions, is a certain lack of concern to account for whatever method of interpretation or analysis they employ.


Author(s):  
Corey Brettschneider

How should a liberal democracy respond to hate groups and others that oppose the ideal of free and equal citizenship? The democratic state faces the hard choice of either protecting the rights of hate groups and allowing their views to spread, or banning their views and violating citizens' rights to freedoms of expression, association, and religion. Avoiding the familiar yet problematic responses to these issues, this book proposes a new approach called value democracy. The theory of value democracy argues that the state should protect the right to express illiberal beliefs, but the state should also engage in democratic persuasion when it speaks through its various expressive capacities: publicly criticizing, and giving reasons to reject, hate-based or other discriminatory viewpoints. Distinguishing between two kinds of state action—expressive and coercive—the book contends that public criticism of viewpoints advocating discrimination based on race, gender, or sexual orientation should be pursued through the state's expressive capacities as speaker, educator, and spender. When the state uses its expressive capacities to promote the values of free and equal citizenship, it engages in democratic persuasion. By using democratic persuasion, the state can both respect rights and counter hateful or discriminatory viewpoints. The book extends this analysis from freedom of expression to the freedoms of religion and association, and shows that value democracy can uphold the protection of these freedoms while promoting equality for all citizens.


2021 ◽  
Vol 95 (2) ◽  
pp. 335-340
Author(s):  
Laura Phillips Sawyer

A long-standing, and deeply controversial, question in constitutional law is whether or not the Constitution's protections for “persons” and “people” extend to corporations. Law professor Adam Winkler's We the Corporations chronicles the most important legal battles launched by corporations to “win their constitutional rights,” by which he means both civil rights against discriminatory state action and civil liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights and the Constitution (p. xvii). Today, we think of the former as the right to be free from unequal treatment, often protected by statutory laws, and the latter as liberties that affect the ability to live one's life fully, such as the freedom of religion, speech, or association. The vim in Winkler's argument is that the court blurred this distinction when it applied liberty rights to nonprofit corporations and then, through a series of twentieth-century rulings, corporations were able to advance greater claims to liberty rights. Ultimately, those liberty rights have been employed to strike down significant bipartisan regulations, such as campaign finance laws, which were intended to advance democratic participation in the political process. At its core, this book asks, to what extent do “we the people” rule corporations and to what extent do they rule us?


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