Electoral Systems in Context

2018 ◽  
pp. 850-870 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gianluca Passarelli
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
System Change ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Divided Government ◽  
Postwar Period ◽  
Industrialized Democracies ◽  
First Republic ◽  
Electoral Reforms ◽  
Major Reform

Italy stands out among advanced industrialized democracies because of its frequency of major electoral reforms. In the postwar period, Italy has experienced four major electoral systems: the proportional representation (PR) system of the First Republic (1948–1992), mixed-member majoritarian (MMM, 1993–2005), and two varieties of PR with majority bonus (2005–2015, 2015–). In addition, there have been many failed attempts at electoral reform through legislation or referendum. The frequency of electoral reform makes Italy an important case for investigating the causes and effects of electoral system change. However, the path to each change has been somewhat idiosyncratic: the major reform of 1993 came against the backdrop of revelations of massive corruption, while the 2005 reform can be understood as an attempt to engineer divided government by an incumbent coalition expecting losses in the next election. The effects of the electoral reforms have also not always been as expected.

An intra-party account of electoral system choice

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-267 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentin Schröder ◽  
Philip Manow
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
District Level ◽  
Early 20Th Century ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Electoral Reforms

AbstractWe present an intra-party account of electoral reform, contrasting the incentives of legislators (MPs) with those of party leaders. We develop our argument along the switch to proportional representation (PR) in early 20th century Europe. District-level electoral alliances allowed bourgeois MPs to counter the “socialist threat” under the electoral systems in place. PR was thus unnecessary from the seat-maximizing perspective that dominates previous accounts—intra-party considerations were crucial: candidate nomination and legislative cohesion. We show our argument to hold empirically both for the prototypical case of Germany, 1890–1920, using encompassing district-level data on candidatures, elections, electoral alliances, roll call votes and a series of simulations on reform effects; and for the implementation of electoral reforms in 29 countries, 1900–31.

Wahlsystemreform in Deutschland

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peggy Matauschek
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Parallel Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Suitable Alternative ◽  
Representation Systems ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Alternative Vote

Is plurality or majority electoral reform a sensible option in Germany’s muddled electoral system debate? Yes, it is. Since Germany’s mixed-member proportional system fails to concentrate the party system in a sufficient way, Peggy Matauschek searches for a suitable alternative to the principle of proportional representation. She discusses the following options according to their contextual conditions: single-member plurality and majority electoral systems—like the alternative vote system—, parallel systems, proportional representation systems with a low district magnitude and majority bonus systems. In light of its balanced performance, the study advocates the introduction of a system with a majority bonus for a coalition.

The Electoral System, the Party System and Accountability in Parliamentary Government

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (3) ◽  
pp. 744-760 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER KAM ◽  
ANTHONY M. BERTELLI ◽  
ALEXANDER HELD
Keyword(s):  
Policy Making ◽  
Party System ◽  
Necessary Conditions ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Electoral Accountability ◽  
Parliamentary Elections ◽  
Parliamentary Government

Electoral accountability requires that voters have the ability to constrain the incumbent government’s policy-making power. We express the necessary conditions for this claim as an accountability identity in which the electoral system and the party system interact to shape the accountability of parliamentary governments. Data from 400 parliamentary elections between 1948 and 2012 show that electoral accountability is contingent on the party system’s bipolarity, for example, with parties arrayed in two distinct blocs. Proportional electoral systems achieve accountability as well as majoritarian ones when bipolarity is strong but not when it is weak. This is because bipolarity decreases the number of connected coalitions that incumbent parties can join to preserve their policy-making power. Our results underscore the limitations that party systems place on electoral reform and the benefits that bipolarity offers for clarifying voters’ choices and intensifying electoral competition.

Explaining the unexpected: electoral reform and democratic governance in Burkina Faso

2003 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 395-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Santiso ◽  
Augustin Loada
Keyword(s):  
Burkina Faso ◽  
Critical Role ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Democratic Governance ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Political Outcomes ◽  
Electoral Reforms ◽  
Modes Of Governance ◽  
First Time ◽  
Ruling Party

The parliamentary elections of May 2002 in Burkina Faso saw the ruling party loose its exclusionary grip on power. For the first time since the restoration of democracy in 1991, the parliamentary opposition now represents a sizeable group. While it retains the majority, the ruling party has to share legislative power with the opposition. These elections marginally alter the structure of power in a deeply presidential system of government. Several institutional and electoral reforms have played a critical role in strengthening the mechanisms of ‘vertical accountability’ and representative democracy. By assessing recent electoral reforms in Burkina Faso, the article underlines the importance of the electoral system in multiparty elections and thus contributes to our understanding of the effects of changes in electoral rules on the distribution of political outcomes. In particular, it underscores the contribution that institutional engineering and electoral reform can make to further democratisation in a semi-authoritarian context. While many challenges to democratic governance and the rule of law remain, the new political landscape holds the promise of changes in the style of government and the emergence of more consensual modes of governance.

scholarly journals Electoral Reform in Asia: Institutional Engineering against ‘Money Politics’

2014 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
OLLI HELLMANN
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Global Trends ◽  
The Ideal

AbstractThis article argues that major cases of electoral reform across democracies in Asia in recent years can be explained as institutional measures aimed at curbing corruption and ‘money politics’. More specifically, Japan, Taiwan, and Thailand rid themselves of their extreme candidate-centered electoral systems as a means to encourage politicians to invest in ‘clean’ collective party labels, while Indonesia discarded its extremely party-centered electoral system to increase the accountability of individual politicians. The article thus disagrees with scholars who argue that recent electoral reform should be understood as part of a wider project by Asian governments to engineer a majoritarian form of democracy. Instead, the comparative analysis shows that democracies across Asia, in line with global trends in institutional design, have been ‘normalizing’ their electoral systems, moving them closer towards the ideal of electoral ‘efficiency’.

Electoral Systems in the Making

2019 ◽  
pp. 193-218
Author(s):  
Daniel Bochsler
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Cultural Heterogeneity ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Electoral Reforms ◽  
History Of ◽  
Structural Theories

Most research on electoral systems deals with the effects of institutions on political representation. However, political parties design the electoral systems, and thereby navigate between self-interest and multiple, often nonreconcilable normative ideals. This chapter reviews the growing literature on the choice of electoral systems from different perspectives. Structural theories explain that the choice of electoral systems is closely linked to the history of suffrage extensions, cultural heterogeneity and the organization of the economy. Agency-based theories highlight how parliamentary majorities strategically pass electoral reforms in order to consolidate their power in the long run—for instance, in order to avoid future losses in elections. However, often lawmakers fail to predict their electoral fortunes and therefore pass reforms that turn out not to be in their favor, or they even contribute to undermining their own reforms later with strategic maneuvers. Finally, the chapter analyzes the choice of electoral system in the context of transitions toward democracies and in former colonies.

The Jenkins Commission and the Implications of Electoral Reform for the UK Constitution

1999 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain McLean
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Democratic Theory ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
The Other ◽  
Choice Sets ◽  
The Uk

THERE ARE TWO MAIN CONCEPTIONS OF ‘REPRESENTATION’ IN democratic theory, and they are not wholly compatible. All democratic electoral systems implicitly appeal to one or the other conception of representation. Therefore, the nature of an ideal electoral system is an essentially contested question. Furthermore, the mathematics of social choice sets severe limits on what an electoral system — any electoral system — can achieve. Though the implications of social choice are not so nihilistic as some would have us believe, they are relevant and serious.

Electoral Systems in Context

2017 ◽  
pp. 556-580 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristof Jacobs
Keyword(s):  
The Netherlands ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Historical Background ◽  
Government Formation ◽  
The World ◽  
The Government

The Netherlands has one of the most proportional electoral systems in the world. This chapter details the origins, functioning, and effects of the Dutch electoral system. After providing the historical background of the electoral system, the chapter discusses the allocation of seats both to parties and to candidates and gives practical examples. Afterward, the chapter outlines the effects of the electoral system on the party system, the parties themselves, the composition of the parliament, and the government formation. Lastly, the chapter covers historical and more recent electoral reform debates. It turns out that in the Netherlands, electoral reform is a Sisyphean task: because of the low electoral threshold, electoral reform is always on the table, but given the broad coalitions and rigid constitution, reform attempts typically fail, and the reform discussions have to start all over again.

Electoral System Change

2017 ◽  
pp. 112-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Renwick
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
System Change ◽  
Complete Picture ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Systemic Level ◽  
System Changes ◽  
Core Issues

Most research into electoral systems focuses on their effects. Only recently has a significant literature emerged examining how they are chosen. This chapter explores four core issues in that literature. First, it considers what is meant by “electoral system change.” This can refer to changes of any scale to any electoral rules in any context, but typically—including here—a narrower definition is used. Second, the chapter investigates what electoral system changes happen. It considers the frequency of reforms and patterns in those reforms. Third, it examines the determinants of electoral system change. Most studies focus on the microfoundations of reform. Others highlight the systemic level. Both perspectives are needed to develop a complete picture. Finally, the chapter gauges the effects of electoral system change and assesses why such changes, notwithstanding important effects, often fail to deliver on their promoters’ expectations.

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