Electoral System Change

2017 ◽  
pp. 112-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Renwick
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
System Change ◽  
Complete Picture ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Systemic Level ◽  
System Changes ◽  
Core Issues

Most research into electoral systems focuses on their effects. Only recently has a significant literature emerged examining how they are chosen. This chapter explores four core issues in that literature. First, it considers what is meant by “electoral system change.” This can refer to changes of any scale to any electoral rules in any context, but typically—including here—a narrower definition is used. Second, the chapter investigates what electoral system changes happen. It considers the frequency of reforms and patterns in those reforms. Third, it examines the determinants of electoral system change. Most studies focus on the microfoundations of reform. Others highlight the systemic level. Both perspectives are needed to develop a complete picture. Finally, the chapter gauges the effects of electoral system change and assesses why such changes, notwithstanding important effects, often fail to deliver on their promoters’ expectations.

Electoral Systems, Voters’ Interests and Geographic Dispersion

2012 ◽  
Vol 42 (4) ◽  
pp. 855-877 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie J. Rickard
Keyword(s):  
Government Spending ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Empirical Support ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Developed Countries ◽  
Democratic Institutions ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Geographic Dispersion ◽  
Proportional Systems

There is general agreement that democratic institutions shape politicians’ incentives to cater to certain constituencies, but which electoral system causes politicians to be most responsive to narrow interests is still debateable. Some argue that plurality electoral rules provide the greatest incentives for politicians to cater to the interests of a few; others say proportional systems prompt politicians to be relatively more prone to narrow interests. This study suggests that both positions can be correct under different conditions. Politicians competing in plurality systems privilege voters with a shared narrow interest when such voters are geographically concentrated, but when they are geographically diffuse, such voters have greater political influence in proportional electoral systems. Government spending on subsidies in fourteen developed countries provides empirical support for this argument.

scholarly journals Electoral Systems, Political Career Paths and Legislative Behavior: Evidence from South Korea's Mixed-Member System

2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
HAE-WON JUN ◽  
SIMON HIX
Keyword(s):  
South Korea ◽  
Career Paths ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
Legislative Behavior ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Party Leadership ◽  
National Assembly

AbstractA growing literature looks at how the design of the electoral system shapes the voting behavior of politicians in parliaments. Existing research tends to confirm that in mixed-member systems the politicians elected in the single-member districts are more likely to vote against their parties than the politicians elected on the party lists. However, we find that in South Korea, the members of the Korean National Assembly who were elected on PR lists are more likely to vote against their party leadership than the members elected in single-member districts (SMDs). This counterintuitive behavior stems from the particular structure of candidate selection and politicians' career paths. This suggests that any theory of how electoral systems shape individual parliamentary behavior needs to look beyond the opportunities provided by the electoral rules for voters to reward or punish individual politicians (as opposed to parties), to the structure of candidate selection inside parties and the related career paths of politicians.

Electoral Systems in Context

2017 ◽  
pp. 920-942 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan Allen
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Party System ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
The Other ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Political Outcomes ◽  
The Face ◽  
Over Time

This chapter examines the evolution of the Indonesian electoral system and its effects on political outcomes. Although Indonesia has repeatedly chosen to conduct elections using proportional representation, electoral rules have changed considerably over time. The chapter traces two trajectories of reform in the post-Suharto era: one restricting opportunities for small parties and the other restricting the power of party leadership. Efforts to shape party system outcomes using electoral rules have succeeded in some areas, particularly in preventing the formation of regional partisan cleavages. Yet the proliferation of political parties in the face of reforms meant to consolidate the party system underline the limits of institutional design.

Electoral Rules, Interest Group Pressures, and the Price of Democratic Default

2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 987-1000
Author(s):  
Brendan J Connell
Keyword(s):  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
The Political ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Economic Interests ◽  
Political Incentives ◽  
International Commitments ◽  
Sovereign Defaults ◽  
Foreign Credit

Abstract Conventional wisdom dictates that democracies are reliable in upholding their international commitments. However, this assertion is at odds with democratic behavior in sovereign borrowing where democracies have sometimes imposed considerable losses on foreign creditors. Why do some democracies choose to renege on extremely large portions of their sovereign debt during economic crisis? This article argues that costs incurred by creditors are dependent on how the borrowing state's electoral system aggregates competing domestic economic interests. Internationally oriented economic interests prefer to minimize creditor losses since sizeable debt reductions are more likely to compromise access to foreign credit. Conversely, workers and domestic-oriented economic interests prefer to maximize losses faced by foreign creditors in order to ease the costs of austerity at home. By shaping the political incentives of policymakers, I argue that democracies with candidate-centric electoral systems should be associated with sovereign defaults that are less costly for foreign creditors. Under these electoral systems, governments hold incentives to cater primarily to internationally oriented economic interests that are best able to overcome the costs of collective action. Statistical evidence from 53 sovereign debt restructurings between 1978 and 2012 supports the main argument.

Perfect timing: Leveraging the timing of defection to assess the effect of electoral rules on party switching

2021 ◽  
pp. 135406882199372
Author(s):  
Marius Radean
Keyword(s):  
Research Design ◽  
Experimental Research ◽  
Time Horizon ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Quasi Experimental ◽  
Party Switching ◽  
Do So

When legislators switch parties between elections this may be viewed as undemocratic since, bypassing voters, they are changing the outcomes of elections. Do electoral institutions affect the likelihood of party switching? I argue that legislators are less likely to switch in candidate-centered electoral systems where, because of personal voting, parties cannot insulate defectors from voter retribution. When they switch though, legislators do so early in the term to exploit voters’ short retrospective time horizon. These expectations are tested using a quasi experimental research design that estimates the effect of the 2008 Romanian electoral reform on party switching. In 2008 Romania changed its electoral system from a closed-list PR to a candidate-centered electoral system, where all candidates compete in single-member districts. Both hypotheses are supported by empirics. This helps weed out competing explanations which now have to account for both the decrease in and the different timing of party switching.

Electoral Systems in Context

2018 ◽  
pp. 850-870 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gianluca Passarelli
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
System Change ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Divided Government ◽  
Postwar Period ◽  
Industrialized Democracies ◽  
First Republic ◽  
Electoral Reforms ◽  
Major Reform

Italy stands out among advanced industrialized democracies because of its frequency of major electoral reforms. In the postwar period, Italy has experienced four major electoral systems: the proportional representation (PR) system of the First Republic (1948–1992), mixed-member majoritarian (MMM, 1993–2005), and two varieties of PR with majority bonus (2005–2015, 2015–). In addition, there have been many failed attempts at electoral reform through legislation or referendum. The frequency of electoral reform makes Italy an important case for investigating the causes and effects of electoral system change. However, the path to each change has been somewhat idiosyncratic: the major reform of 1993 came against the backdrop of revelations of massive corruption, while the 2005 reform can be understood as an attempt to engineer divided government by an incumbent coalition expecting losses in the next election. The effects of the electoral reforms have also not always been as expected.

Electoral Systems in Context

2017 ◽  
pp. 698-720
Author(s):  
Adam Ziegfeld
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Ethnic Groups ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Local Level ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Historically Disadvantaged

Throughout its history, India has employed first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral rules for nearly all of its legislative elections. Though India uses a relatively common set of electoral rules, three features of India’s FPTP electoral system stand out. First, India’s election constituencies exhibit persistent malapportionment, even after a recent redrawing of constituency boundaries. Second, India mandates representation for historically disadvantaged ethnic groups—and, more recently, women at the local level—by setting aside, or “reserving,” seats in which only members of certain groups may compete for office. Third, political parties often form pre-election alliances in which multiple parties agree not to field candidates against one another. As a result of frequent pre-election alliances, India’s party system exhibits a number of characteristics rarely found in countries using FPTP rules.

scholarly journals Monotonicity in Electoral Systems

1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 531-537 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Austen-Smith ◽  
Jeffrey Banks
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Behavioral Model ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Individual Decision ◽  
Individual Decision Making ◽  
Important Concern ◽  
Electoral Rule ◽  
Legislative Choice ◽  
Selection Of

Much of the literature concerning the relative merits of alternative electoral rules is centered around the extent to which particular rules select “representative” legislatures. And an important concern in evaluating the “representativeness” of an electoral rule is whether or not the rule responds positively to changes in individuals' preferences, that is, whether or not the rule is monotonic. By explicitly considering electoral rules in the context of a complete electoral system—voting, selection of legislature, and legislative choice of policy—we argue that monotonicity in electoral systems is a nonissue: depending on the behavioral model governing individual decision making, either everything is monotonic or nothing is monotonic.

Electoral Systems and Voter Turnout

2017 ◽  
pp. 192-212
Author(s):  
Daniel M. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Voter Turnout ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
General Question ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
The Relationship

What is the relationship between electoral rules and voter turnout? To answer this question, this chapter begins with the more general question of why voters turn out on Election Day at all. The chapter then reviews the main theoretical arguments and empirical evidence of how electoral rules affect voters’ turnout decisions, as well as the puzzles that have emerged from that literature. It then highlights some recent theoretical, methodological, and empirical advancements using subnational data and electoral system reforms that have refined our understanding about the interaction between electoral rules, competitiveness, and turnout. Finally, the chapter explores new and promising directions for further research.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document