Fichte and Schopenhauer on Knowledge, Ethics, Right, and Religion

2020 ◽  
pp. 66-87
Author(s):  
Yolanda Estes
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Natural Right ◽  
Academic Lectures ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

In 1811, Schopenhauer moved to Berlin, where he remained until 1813. During this time, he encountered J. G. Fichte, attending his lectures on The Facts of Consciousness (1812) and the Wissenschaftslehre (1812). Moreover, he read many of Fichte’s earlier works, including System of Ethics: According to the Principles of the Wissenschaftslehre (1798) and Foundations of Natural Right: According to the Principles of the Wissenschaftslehre (1796/97). In addition to these more academic lectures and writings, he read one of Fichte’s last popular works, Way to the Blessed Life: Or also, the Religionslehre (1806). Schopenhauer soon managed to familiarize himself with the main parts of the Wissenschaftslehre: theoretical philosophy, practical philosophy, and philosophy of the postulates. He kept notes—found in his Manuscript Remains—of his sojourns in Fichte’s transcendental idealism, or Wissenschaftsleere as he deridingly called it. In later years, he returned to Fichte’s philosophy—sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly—in the Basis of Morality (1840) and the World as Will and Representation (1859). In this chapter, the author uses both Schopenhauer’s early notes in the Manuscript Remains and his later published writings to show how he understood Fichte’s transcendental idealism, where he disagreed with it, and where he (sometimes grudgingly) acknowledged its value. The author argues that while Fichte and Schopenhauer share many assumptions about philosophy and subjectivity, they arrive at quite different conclusions about the ultimate value of human striving.

Mathematics and the Good Life

2018 ◽  
pp. 52-78
Author(s):  
Jacqueline Feke
Keyword(s):  
Good Life ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
The Good Life ◽  
Contemporary Debate ◽  
Continuous Activity ◽  
Good Order ◽  
Ultimate Objective ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Ordered State ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

This chapter demonstrates how Ptolemy's distinctly mathematical ethics emerges from his response to a contemporary debate over the relationship between theoretical and practical philosophy. He first asserts that the two are independent, differentiated by the manner in which one attains virtues in each domain, whether by instruction or continuous activity. Thereafter, he diminishes the distinction by revealing how they relate. Theoretical philosophy, specifically mathematics, transforms the soul. The study of astronomical objects—the movements and configurations of heavenly bodies—reveals their constancy, good order, commensurability, and calm. Mathematicians, aided by habit, come to appreciate these qualities and transform their souls into a fine and well-ordered state. Organizing their actions in accordance with astronomical theories, they never forget their ultimate objective, the divine-like condition of the soul. The study of mathematics is crucial to obtaining this good life.

Some Persistent Presumptions of Hegelian Anti-Subjectivism

2019 ◽  
pp. 139-152
Author(s):  
Karl Ameriks
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Recent Criticism ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Critical System ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

This chapter responds primarily to a recent criticism of Kant by Stephen Houlgate. Like many other recent Hegelian accounts, Houlgate’s severe critique of Kant’s theoretical philosophy contends that, in contrast to Hegel, Kant’s Critical system, especially because of its doctrine of transcendental idealism, presupposes a subjectivist and therefore inadequate position. On the basis of a moderate interpretation of Kant’s idealism and his general Critical procedure, the chapter defends Kant from the charge of subjectivism, and also gives an account of how subjectivist interpretations in general can arise from a series of understandable misunderstandings of difficult passages in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.

Herbart, Johann Friedrich (1776–1841)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred Langewand
Keyword(s):  
Educational Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

From 1798, Herbart developed a ‘realistic’ alternative to the idealistic philosophy of Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. His theoretical philosophy, which centres around metaphysics and psychology, is sharply critical of the idealistic concept of subjectivity. His practical philosophy rests on ethics and educational theory, each of which presumes the existence of the other.

Receiving Autonomy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Norris
Keyword(s):  
Everyday Life ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

This chapter presents Cavell’s Emersonian perfectionism as a response to and interpretation of Kant. For Cavell, receptivity is the key to Emerson’s inheritance of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, as partiality is the key to his inheritance of Kant’s practical philosophy. Partiality for Emerson names both the individual agent’s inherent lack and its want for change and growth. The shameful experience of lack is the precondition for the transformative encounter with an exemplary other who enables the self’s conversion of the nihilistic conformity of everyday life as it is now lived. The chapter argues that Cavell’s insistence that Emersonian perfectionism sets itself against any idea of ultimate perfection does not condemn Cavell’s agents to an endless and hence nihilistic pursuit of an unrealizable telos, as it might seem, but instead furnishes the basis for democratic hope.

‘The understanding prescribes laws to nature’: Spontaneity, Legislation, and Kant’s Transcendental Hylomorphism

Kant-Studien ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 105 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Konstantin Pollok
Keyword(s):  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Natural Right

Abstract:In this paper I argue for the following two related claims. First, a successor version of the scholastic ‘forma-non-afficit’ theorem functions as the key to Kant’s transcendental idealism. Second, drawing on the ‘natural right’ tradition which Kant sees himself being part of, the relation between our cognitive spontaneity and the legislation of the understanding is one of acknowledgment (rather than creation) of the laws of the understanding. This interpretation allows us to make sense of pure concepts and principles of the understanding as the fundamental laws of nature. They rationally constrain our empirical concepts and judgments, and thus warrant the ‘lawfulness in the connection of appearances.’ (Prol, AA 04:§ 36)

scholarly journals Aristóteles y la democracia

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 119
Author(s):  
José Solana Dueso
Keyword(s):  
Moral Virtue ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Deep Roots ◽  
Linear Tension ◽  
Political Ideas ◽  
Democratic System ◽  
Sobre Todo ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

El objeto de este texto es abordar algunos aspectos de las ideas políticas de Aristóteles y, en particular, de su actitud y de sus argumentos sobre la democracia. A diferencia de Jaeger, el trabajo se desarrolla desde el supuesto de que el pensamiento de Aristóteles se configura en un proceso de tensión constante, y no necesariamente lineal, entre los dos grandes pensadores que le precedieron: Protágoras y Platón.  Esta doble tensión hace emerger todo un entramado teórico, relacionado sobre todo con la filosofía práctica, pero con profundas raíces en la filosofía teórica, en el que Aristóteles se alinea con las tesis protagóricas. Una de ellas es la defensa del sistema democrático. El artículo muestra, no solo que Aristóteles es partidario de la democracia como mejor forma de constitución, sino que solo la democracia satisface las condiciones de una autoridad política, por el hecho de que es la justicia, virtud moral por antonomasia, la que exige ejercer el mando por turno y que todos los ciudadanos manden en un momento y obedezcan en otro. TITLE: Aristotle and Democracy ABSTRACTThe purpose of this paper is to address some aspects of Aristotle's political ideas and, in particular, his attitude and his arguments about democracy. Unlike Jaeger's approach, the paper starts from the assumption that Aristotle's thinking is shaped by a process of constant, and not necessarily linear, tension between the two great thinkers who preceded him: not only Plato but also Protagoras. This dual tension brings to the surface a theoretical framework, related above all to practical philosophy, but with deep roots in theoretical philosophy, in which Aristotle is aligned with theses of Protagoras. One of them is the defense of the democratic system. The article shows, not only that Aristotle favors democracy as the best form of constitution, but that only democracy satisfies the conditions of a political authority, because it is justice, the moral virtue par excellence, which demands to exercise the command by turn and that all the citizens command in one moment and obey in another. 

scholarly journals Filosofía práctica. Una antigua y nueva forma de hacer filosofía

2014 ◽  
pp. 140
Author(s):  
Francisco Castillo Ávila
Keyword(s):  
Systematic Study ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Or Groups ◽  
Common Problems ◽  
Siglo Xx ◽  
Systematic Practice ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

Resumen:La filosofía en tanto ejercicio sistemático del pensamiento ha sido entendi- da de diferentes formas a través de la historia. El presente artículo examina las diversas maneras de concebir la filosofía. Así como la ciencia se divide en ciencia teórica y ciencia práctica, la filosofía también puede ocupar esta división, es decir, teórica o especulativa y filosofía práctica o sapiencial. La filosofía teórica, propia de la academia y los especialistas, comienza con el estudio riguroso y sistemático de las obras de los grandes filósofos, de sus discípulos y críticos; en cambio, la filosofía práctica se inicia con el lema “conócete a ti mismo”. Esta última trata de resolver los problemas cotidianos de las personas con filosofía, ocupando el pensamiento de los filósofos y pensadores de todos los tiempos. A fines del siglo XX surge dentro de la filosofía práctica, lo que se ha denominado asesoramiento filosófico o consejería filosófica o terapia filosófica que tiene como ob- jetivo ayudar a las personas o grupos a resolver o enfrentar situaciones existenciales a partir de los pensamientos de los filósofos.Palabras clave: Filosofía - filosofía práctica - asesoramiento filosófico - asesor filosófico.Abstract:Philosophy, due to several systematic practice of thinking, has been understood in different ways through history. The present paper exa- mines diverse forms of philosophy conception. As the science is divided in theoretical and practical; philosophy also may use this classification, i.e. theoretical or speculative and practical or sapiental philosophy. Theoretical philosophy, proper to the academy and specialists starts the exhaustive and systematic study of great thinkers, their disciples and their critics work. Instead, practical philosophy begins with the motto “know yourself”. This one intends to solve common problems of people with philosophy, using thoughts of philosophers and thinkers of all ti- mes. In late XX century emerged within the practical philosophy, which has been called philosophic consulting, advicing or therapy that has as objective to help people or groups to solve or face existential situations from philosophers thinking.Keywords: Philosophy – practical philosophy – philosophic consulting – philosophic consult

IN THE SHADOW OF “PROPHETIC LEGISLATION”: THE VENTURE OF PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY AFTER AVICENNA

2014 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 269-296 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Cüneyt Kaya
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual History ◽  
Strong Influence ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Modern Times ◽  
Islamic Tradition ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

AbstractThe article aims to demonstrate that Avicenna's (d. 428/1037) centrality in Islamic intellectual history is not restricted to the branches of theoretical philosophy; rather, he also has had a deep and strong influence on the conception of practical philosophy until modern times. I will discuss the impact of Avicenna's view of practical philosophy by analyzing his different classifications of practical philosophy throughout his career and the factors behind his disregard for practical philosophy in his philosophicalsummason the basis of his view of the relationship between philosophy andšarīʿa. To demonstrate my argument regarding Avicenna's influence on the conception of practical philosophy in Islamic tradition, I will refer to major works on the classification of sciences, and the commentaries (šurūḥ) and glosses (ḥāwāšī) on the two most important and widely circulated philosophicalsummasin the post-Avicennan philosophy, which are al-Abharī's (d. 663/1264)Hidāyat al-ḥikmaand al-Kātibī's (d. 675/1276)Ḥikmat al-ʿayn.

Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy

Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Watkins
Keyword(s):  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Current Situation ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Philosophical Thought ◽  
Present Context ◽  
Systematic Importance ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

The historical and systematic importance of Kant’s philosophy can hardly be exaggerated. The revolutionary contribution it made to earlier modern philosophy, the influence it had on the subsequent course of philosophical thought, and the significance it has for an understanding of our current situation are unparalleled. Given its importance, it is not surprising that scholarship on Kant’s philosophy has also been extremely rich, with attention being paid both to specific sections of Kant’s famous Critique of Pure Reason and to the systematic topics that are treated therein. While Kant’s practical philosophy and aesthetics are revolutionary in their own right, the focus in the present context is on Kant’s theoretical philosophy, which is expressed primarily, though not exclusively, in the Critique of Pure Reason.

Analysis in the Critique of Pure Reason

2007 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melissa McBay Merritt
Keyword(s):  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
No Innovation ◽  
Principal Task ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

It is widely supposed that the principal task of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is to carry out some kind of analysis of experience. Commentators as profoundly at odds on fundamental points of interpretation as P. F. Strawson and Patricia Kitcher share this supposition. In a letter to J. S. Beck, Kant seems to endorse this view himself, referring to some unspecified stretch of the Critique as an ‘analysis of experience in general’. The idea that the Critique is engaged in an analysis of experience accords well with an attractive conception of Critical philosophy as making something explicit that is generally only implicit in our cognitive lives. After all, the categorical imperative is no innovation of Kant's practical philosophy, but rather is meant to be revealed as the animating principle of ‘ordinary moral rational cognition’. Likewise, the principles revealed in Kant's theoretical philosophy should be nothing other than the principles that necessarily animate ordinary empirical cognition; and Kant says that experience is, or is a mode of, empirical cognition. For this reason, it is undeniably compelling to think of the Critique as offering some kind of analysis of experience.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document