Herbart, Johann Friedrich (1776–1841)

Author(s):  
Alfred Langewand

From 1798, Herbart developed a ‘realistic’ alternative to the idealistic philosophy of Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. His theoretical philosophy, which centres around metaphysics and psychology, is sharply critical of the idealistic concept of subjectivity. His practical philosophy rests on ethics and educational theory, each of which presumes the existence of the other.

2011 ◽  
Vol 2011 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-28
Author(s):  
Jens Bonnemann

In ethics, when discussing problems of justice and a just social existence one question arises obviously: What is the normal case of the relation between I and you we start from? In moral philosophy, each position includes basic socio-anthropological convictions in that we understand the other, for example, primarily as competitor in the fight for essential resources or as a partner in communication. Thus, it is not the human being as isolated individual, or as specimen of the human species or socialised member of a historical society what needs to be understood. Instead, the individual in its relation to the other or others has been studied in phenomenology and the philosophy of dialogue of the twentieth century. In the following essay I focus on Martin Buber’s and Jean-Paul Sartre’s theories of intersubjectivity which I use in order to explore the meaning of recognition and disrespect for an individual. They offer a valuable contribution to questions of practical philosophy and the socio-philosophical diagnosis of our time.


2003 ◽  
pp. 33-59
Author(s):  
Danilo Basta

Fichte's theory of the state, comprising and integral part of his practical philosophy, is built on the key premises of his metaphysics. Therefore the clarification of this problem in Fichte's later philosophy intends to point, on one hand, to a representative metaphysical project of the state with great speculative power, and on the other to a way of thinking about the state which is today taken to be anachronistic, unscientific, outdated, and hence worthy of being mentioned as a "negative example". Though these qualifications should not be totally discarded or questioned in advance, revisiting Fichte's late metaphysics of the state is philosophically productive even in our times. Nowadays it can be extremely helpful to anyone who has not yet been trodden over by a scientific political science and whose cognitive interest is still sufficiently open for a strongly philosophical consideration of the state, who wishes to philosophically enrich or sharpens his/her view of the state. Although Fichte's theory of the state is unified and coherent, it underwent - especially in its last phase - a significant transformation. It was so much visible that the state is relegated to the background even terminologically. In Fichte's later philosophy the keyword is no longer the state but the "realm of freedom". The state is here talked about intentionally, as it were, always with a glance aimed at this realm, at the possibility and prospects for its establishment. Although this terminological and cognitive primacy of the realm of freedom pushed the state into the background, it was not denied any importance. On the contrary, on the way to freedom the state is for Fichte an important point of development that must be passed. And precisely in this transiency lies its inevitability. .


2021 ◽  
Vol 55 ◽  
pp. e055005
Author(s):  
Elena Theodoropoulou

The connection between a non philosophical work and its reception in education through its transformation into a learning/teaching material and a possible philosophical reading, in order to recognize and define the philosophical stance of this very material, could not but be a challenge for philosophy of education itself, namely, in its relation to (or as) practical philosophy. This kind of reduction to the state of material could instrumentalize the latter raising practical, ethical and methodological issues about the pedagogical intention itself; subsequently, the art, literature, philosophy, and science lying behind materials become equally instrumentalized and evacuated. This article attempts, on the one hand, to circumscribe and describe this movement of “becoming material” as a question philosophically and pedagogically challenging and, on the other, to reflect about a critical understanding of this very question as an example of research in practical philosophy. 


Author(s):  
Jacqueline Feke

This chapter demonstrates how Ptolemy's distinctly mathematical ethics emerges from his response to a contemporary debate over the relationship between theoretical and practical philosophy. He first asserts that the two are independent, differentiated by the manner in which one attains virtues in each domain, whether by instruction or continuous activity. Thereafter, he diminishes the distinction by revealing how they relate. Theoretical philosophy, specifically mathematics, transforms the soul. The study of astronomical objects—the movements and configurations of heavenly bodies—reveals their constancy, good order, commensurability, and calm. Mathematicians, aided by habit, come to appreciate these qualities and transform their souls into a fine and well-ordered state. Organizing their actions in accordance with astronomical theories, they never forget their ultimate objective, the divine-like condition of the soul. The study of mathematics is crucial to obtaining this good life.


Author(s):  
Patricia Mindus

Technologies carry politics since they embed values. It is therefore surprising that mainstream political and legal theory have taken the issue so lightly. Compared to what has been going on over the past few decades in the other branches of practical thought, namely ethics, economics, and the law, political theory lags behind. Yet the current emphasis on Internet politics that polarizes the apologists holding the Web to overcome the one-to-many architecture of opinion building in traditional representative democracy, and the critics who warn that cyber-optimism entails authoritarian technocracy has acted as a wake up call. This chapter sets the problem, “What is it about ICTs, as opposed to previous technical devices, that impact on politics and determine uncertainty about democratic matters?,” into the broad context of practical philosophy by offering a conceptual map of clusters of micro-problems and concrete examples relating to “e-democracy.” The point is to highlight when and why the hyphen of e-democracy has a conjunctive or a disjunctive function in respect to stocktaking from past experiences and settled democratic theories. The chapter's claim is that there is considerable scope to analyse how and why online politics fail or succeed. The field needs both further empirical and theoretical work.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 82-91
Author(s):  
Krzysztof Piotr Skowroński

Abstract The present paper is a response, of sorts, to the challenges of the coronavirus pandemic (COVID) and lockdown that we all must face. We have an idea of what doctors, nurses, teachers, among many of the other professions, do for the general public, but one may ask whether there is something substantial that philosophers and ethicists can offer in these circumstances. The thesis of this paper is that the stoic attitude towards times of trouble and the pragmatist way of finding out what is possible to elevate the quality of living against all odds, if skilfully interwoven, could be an important tool in keeping mental health in good shape and, additionally, could contribute to the cultural scene at large. If this is the case, stoic pragmatists can indeed offer an interesting example of practical philosophy for many audiences, especially during the pandemic lockdown and, perhaps, for other serious difficulties or problems. To be effective in delivering their message, stoic pragmatists, as most with philosophers today, should enrich their textual and oral modes of traditional transmission of knowledge and become digital-culture public intellectuals that can recognize and reach more general audiences by, among other things, visual modes of digital communication.


2007 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 45-51
Author(s):  
Nerijus Čepulis

Metafizikos terminas yra priskiriamas Aristoteliui, nors pačiuose jo tekstuose nepasirodo. Istoriškai jis buvo pradėtas vartoti grupuojant Aristotelio veikalus. Graikiškai t„ met„ t„ fusik@ ir reikštų tai, kas eina po fizikos. Metafizikos autorius teorinę filosofiją suskirsto į tris šakas: matematiką, fiziką ir teologiją. Teoriniai mokslai yra iškilesni už visus kitus mokslus, tuo tarpu paskutinioji iš teorinių yra iškilesnė už pirmąsias dvi. Jei nebūtų jokios esmės, kuri viršytų gamtą, tada fizikai tektų pirmoji vieta tarp mokslų. Jei tačiau egzistuoja kokia nors nekintama esmė, tai mokslas apie ją, be abejo, iškils virš visų kitų ir bus vadinamas pirmąja filosofija (filosof%a pr_th). Būtent šis mokslas turi žiūrėti į būtybę kaip tokią, graikiškai tariant, kaθ ’aÑtÊ.Anot Levino, metafizinis mąstymas siekia mąstyti būtybę kaip radikaliai atskirtą, pavienę ir vienintelę (kaθ ’aÑtÊ), o tam reikalingas ypatingas dėmesys absoliučiam išoriškumui ir nesutotalinamam Kitkam. Metafizinis judesys yra transcendentinis, nes kaip gėrio ir dosnumo geismas neįveikia ir nesiekia įveikti pirmapradės distancijos iki Kitko. Metafizinis santykis su Kitkuo Levinui yra socialinio pobūdžio. Absoliučiai Kitkas visų pirma yra Kitas – kitas žmogus, su kuriuo manęs nesieja nei pasisavinimo, nei sąvokos, nei apskritai kokio nors bendro lygmens sąsaja. Tarp mūsų plyti neužlyginamas atstumas, skiriantis Tą Patį ir Kitką. Galimybė ar būdas susisiekti per šį atstumą, nepanaikinant ir neįveikiant jo, yra kalba (le langage). To Paties santykyje su absoliučiai Kitkuo anapus totalybės Levinas aptinka religijos esmę. Čia religija sutampa ar bent jau glaudžiai siejasi su metafizika. Iš to plauktų, kad religija gali užimti pirmosios filosofijos vietą, nepamirštant, kad tiek metafizikos, tiek religijos esmę sudaro pamatinis socialumas.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Levinas, pirmoji filosofija, religija, metafizika, Kitas.RELIGIOUS AS A FIRST PHILOSOPHY ACCORDERING TO LEVINASNerijus ČepulisSummary The term metaphysics is ascribed to Aristotle, although it does not appear in his own texts. Historically it was introduced while sorting Aristotle’s works. In Greek t„ met„ t„ fusik@ means that which follows after physics. The author of the Metaphysics groups theoretical philosophy into three branches: mathematics, physics and theology. Theoretical sciences are more elevated than the other sciences, while the last one of the three is more elevated than the other two. If there were no substance that would superseed the nature, then physics would be the first among the sciences. If, however, there is sume unchanging substance, then the science of it undoubtedly will rise above all the other and will be called the first philosophy (filosof%a pr_th). Precisely this science has to look at the being as such,kaθ ’aÑtÊ in Greek.According to Levinas, the metaphtysical thinking seeks to think the being as radically separated, solitary and single (kaθ ’aÑtÊ), and this requires a special attention to the absolute exteriority and the other that refuses to be totalized. The metaphysical movement is transcendental, because as a desire for the goodness and generosity does not overcome and does not seek to overcome the primordial distance from the other. The metaphysical relation to the other for Levinas is a social one. The absolutely other first of all is the Other – the other person that is not bound with me neither by appropriation, nor by term, nor by any general level. Between us there is a distance separating the same and the other that is not to be covered. The possibility or the way to relate in this distance without abolishing or overcoming it is language. In the relation of the same to the absolutely other beyond the totality Levinas finds the essence of religion. Here religion coincides or at least closely relates to metaphysics. From this follows that religion can take the place of the first philosophy, without forgetting that the essence of both metaphysics and religion is the fundamental sociability.Keywords: Levinas, first philosophy, religion, metaphysics, the other.


Author(s):  
Andrew Norris

This chapter presents Cavell’s Emersonian perfectionism as a response to and interpretation of Kant. For Cavell, receptivity is the key to Emerson’s inheritance of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, as partiality is the key to his inheritance of Kant’s practical philosophy. Partiality for Emerson names both the individual agent’s inherent lack and its want for change and growth. The shameful experience of lack is the precondition for the transformative encounter with an exemplary other who enables the self’s conversion of the nihilistic conformity of everyday life as it is now lived. The chapter argues that Cavell’s insistence that Emersonian perfectionism sets itself against any idea of ultimate perfection does not condemn Cavell’s agents to an endless and hence nihilistic pursuit of an unrealizable telos, as it might seem, but instead furnishes the basis for democratic hope.


Author(s):  
Gretchen Reydams-Schils

This chapter develops the contrast between Musonius Rufus and Dio of Prusa in their mode of self-representation. The later Stoics Seneca, Musonius Rufus, and Epictetus embrace a low-authority profile and recommend discretion for the philosopher (recommendations which Marcus Aurelius adopts in his own manner). In doing so they consciously resist the traditional status markers without giving up altogether on the notion of socio-political responsibility. Dio, on the other hand, in his role as public speaker makes full use of these status markers in the hope of increasing his effectiveness (as does Plutarch to some extent in his works on practical philosophy). Hence the contrast represents a cultural dilemma.


Persons ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 187-231
Author(s):  
Udo Thiel

Most seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers, including major players such as Locke and Leibniz, discuss the concept of a person in the context of theological and moral questions. Particularly prominent are questions about the immortality of the soul and a life after death and about moral responsibility. These questions in turn connect to metaphysical issues, such as individuation and diachronic identity. This chapter examines how the three most important eighteenth-century German philosophers, Leibniz, Wolff, and Kant, deal with these themes. Apart from many significant differences between these philosophers, especially with respect to Kant versus Leibniz and Wolff, there are also several important positive connections. These relate to the question of animal and human souls, the role consciousness plays in the constitution of personhood, and the link between the concept of a person in epistemology and metaphysics on the one hand and in practical philosophy on the other.


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