“Contract Clause” Litigation in Colombia; A Comparative Study in Judicial Review

1948 ◽  
Vol 42 (6) ◽  
pp. 1103-1126 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. C. Grant

The 1910 amendments to the Colombian constitution provided:Art. 40. In every case of incompatibility between the Constitution and the law the constitutional provisions shall be applied by preference.Art. 41. To the Supreme Court of Justice is confided the guardianship of the integrity of the Constitution. Consequently, in addition to the powers conferred upon it by this Constitution and the statutes, it shall have the following: To decide definitively as to the enforceability of bills that have been vetoed as unconstitutional by the Government, or as to all laws and decrees accused before it by any citizen as unconstitutional, first hearing the Attorney-General of the Nation.The first function, “to decide definitively as to the enforceability of bills that have been vetoed as unconstitutional,” was merely a restatement of the plan copied from Ecuador in 1886 and still in use, although it has proved a major disappointment.

1998 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-178
Author(s):  
Omi Morgenstern Leissner

Israel Women's Network v. The Government of Israel (1994) 48(v) P.D. 501The petitioner, the Israel Women's Network, petitioned the Supreme Court of Justice against the appointment of a new member to the Ports and Railways Council and against the appointment of two new directors on behalf of the State to the board of directors of the State-controlled Oil Refinery. All three of the new appointees were men, such that neither of the two councils included a single woman in their composition. The petitioner disputed the constitutionality of these appointments arguing that in the particular circumstances and in line with sec. 18A of the Government Companies Law, the appointees ought to have been women. By a majority decision the Supreme Court held that the respondent did not fulfill the duty of affirmative action required by sec. 18A of the Law, and that the cancellation of the appointments made was justified.


2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 2102-2117
Author(s):  
Alda Rifada Rizqi

Democracy with integrity will be realized if carried out in accordance with the will of the people as holders of sovereignty, the KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum) as the election organizer has the authority to make regulations that support a better democracy. KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum) Regulation No. 20 of 2018 as evidence that the KPU is committed to participating in preventing corrupt behavior. It was considered to have been considered as an effort to protect the interests of the people, but the regulation was submitted to a judicial review at the Supreme Court. Then, based on legal-formal considerations and based on the legal positivism of the Supreme Court, the request for the test is granted. The decision distanced itself from progressive legal values that justified the denial of what was regulated in legislation in order to put forward the values of public justice, because basically the law was made to fulfill human interests, accommodating the will of the people for the sake of order.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-148
Author(s):  
Endri Ismail

Penelitian ini berupaya memaparkan legalitas Qanun Aceh Nomor 6 Tahun 2014 tentang Hukum Jinayat (Qanun Jinayah) dalam konstruksi hukum tata negara Indonesia. Untuk menganalisis hal tersebut, penelitian ini akan meninjau legalitas Qanun Jinayah dari dua sudut pandang, yaitu formalitas pembentukan peraturan perundang-undangan dan konsep negara kesatuan. Qanun Jinayah menuai banyak perdebatan disebabkan kedudukannya sebagai peraturan daerah (perda) namun bermateri muatan pidana Islam (jinayah) yang sama sekali belum diatur dalam peraturan perundang-undangan di level nasional. Tahun 2015, Qanun Jinayah dilakukan uji materiil ke Mahkamah Agung oleh Perkumpulan Masyarakat Pembaharuan Peradilan Pidana (ICJR) namun permohonan uji materiil ini dinyatakan tidak dapat diterima dengan alasan prematur (belum waktunya). Analisis yuridis dari perspektif hukum ketatanegaraan ini penting dilakukan mengingat legalitas sebuah peraturan perundang-undangan menentukan validitas dan kekuatan berlakunya. Yuridical Analysis of the Legality of Qanun Aceh Number 6 Year 2014 on Jinayat Law This research attempts to describe the legality of Qanun Aceh Number 6 Year 2014 on Jinayat Law (Qanun Jinayah) in the construction of Indonesian constitutional law. To analyze it, this study will examine the legality of Qanun Jinayah from two perspectives, those are the formality of the formulation of legislation and the concept of a unitary state. Qanun Jinayah gets  a lot of debate because of its position as a Regional Regulation (Peraturan Daerah), but the material of Islamic criminal content (Jinayah) which has not been regulated in national legislation. In 2015, Qanun Jinayat is subjected to a judicial review to the Supreme Court by the Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (ICJR), but this petition is declared unacceptable on a premature reason (unspecified). Judicial analysis from the perspective of constitutional law is important to do due to the legality of a legislation determines the validity and strenght of the law.


2021 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-144
Author(s):  
Alexander Lindvall

The Texas Legislature recently passed what the Supreme Court describes as an “unprecedented” statutory scheme. Texas’s new law allows private, everyday citizens to sue anyone who assists a woman in obtaining an abortion after her sixth week of pregnancy. It’s clear that Texas chose this unusual enforcement mechanism to try to circumvent the Constitution’s “state action” requirement. Before a plaintiff can challenge a policy or action on constitutional grounds, they must show that the government somehow had a hand in causing their harm. But this Texas law strips the government of its enforcement power and instead gives it to everyday citizens, thereby allowing the law’s defenders to argue that the law does not trigger constitutional protections. This short article argues that the courts should have little trouble concluding that this law and its unusual enforcement mechanism amount to state action, meaning this law is subject to normal constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Shelley v. Kraemer, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., and Terry v. Adams make clear that private parties can be considered state actors, especially when they are working with the express approval of the government and when the courts are required to hand down rulings that seemingly infringe on well-settled constitutional protections. These decisions, among others, show that the private-citizen plaintiffs deputized under this new Texas law must be treated as state actors who are subject to constitutional limitations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 37
Author(s):  
Asep Syarifuddin Hidayat

Abstract.Article 13 paragraph 1 of Act Number 48 of 2009 concerning Judicial Power states that all court hearings are open to the public, unless the Act says otherwise. Therefore, a judicial review trial must be open to the public. If the trial process of the judicial review is carried out in a closed manner, it can be considered a legal defect, because it is contrary to Article 13 paragraph (3) of the Law. The Law of the Supreme Court is not regulated that the judicial review is closed, because in the judicial review there is a need for openness or principle of audiences of parties or litigants must be given the opportunity to provide information and express their opinions, including the defendant as the maker of Legislation invitation under the law, so that the impact of the decision will need to be involved.Keywords: Judicial Review, Audi Alteram Et Partem Principle, Supreme Court, Constitutional Court Abstrak.Pasal 13 ayat 1 Undang-Undang Nomor 48 Tahun 2009 tentang Kekuasaan Kehakiman menyebutkan semua sidang pemeriksaan pengadilan terbuka untuk umum, kecuali Undang-Undang berkata lain. Oleh karena itu,  judicial review persidangan harus dilakukan terbuka untuk umum. Apabila proses persidangan judicial review ini dilakukan secara tertutup, maka dapat dinilai cacat hukum karena bertentangan dengan Pasal 13 ayat (3) Undang-Undang tersebut. Undang-Undang Mahkamah Agung pun tidak diatur bahwa persidangan judicial review bersifat tertutup, karena dalam judicial review perlu adanya keterbukaan atau asas audi alteram et partem atau pihak-pihak yang berperkara harus diberi kesempatan untuk memberikan keterangan dan menyampaikan pendapatnya termasuk pihak termohon sebagai  pembuat Peraturan Perundang-Undangan di bawah Undang-Undang sehingga akan terkena dampak putusan perlu dilibatkan.Kata Kunci: Judicial Review, Asas Audi Alteram Et Partem, Mahkamah Agung, Mahkamah Konstitusi.


2021 ◽  
pp. 115-132
Author(s):  
Steven Gow Calabresi

This chapter looks at the Japanese experience with judicial review. The Supreme Court of Japan does not enforce those parts of the Japanese Constitution, like Article 9, which prohibits war making; Article 21, which protects freedom of speech; or Article 89, which forbids taxpayer money from being used to hire Shinto priests. The Supreme Court of Japan thus refuses to enforce important articles in the Constitution of Japan. It does rubber stamp and thus legitimize actions taken by the political branches of the government. Why has judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation failed to take root in Japan? Japan does not need either a federal or a separation of powers umpire, since Japan is, firstly, a unitary nation-state with no need for a federalism umpire; and, secondly, a parliamentary democracy with a weak upper house of the legislature. Moreover, Japan has never atoned for the wrongs it committed during World War II nor has it truly admitted to even having done the horrible things that Japan did. A nation cannot get rights from wrongs judicial review and a Bill of Rights unless it admits it has done something wrong. Finally, the Japanese Constitution contains an inadequate system of checks and balances. As a result, the Supreme Court of Japan may not have the political space within which it can assert power.


2008 ◽  
Vol 102 (3) ◽  
pp. 551-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Charnovitz

Although “[tjreaties are the law of the land, and a rule of decision in all courts,” the president and the courts may sometimes be powerless to achieve compliance with a U.S. treaty. That was the puzzling outcome of Medellin v. Texas. Even though the Supreme Court declared that the United States has an international obligation to comply with the Avena judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Court invalidated the president’s memorandum directing Texas and other errant states to comply.


1930 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 652-658 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank M. Stewart

The Ferguson case in 1917 represents the only instance of the impeachment and conviction of a state official in Texas. The law of impeachment must then be sought in the proceedings of the Ferguson trial, the opinions of the attorney-general, and the opinion of the supreme court in 1924 in the case of Ferguson v. Maddox, which reviewed the legality of the 1917 proceedings in determining whether Mr. Ferguson was eligible to have his name placed on the primary election ballot as a candidate for governor.Impeachment at a Special Session. The constitution provides that the governor may on extraordinary occasions convene the legislature in special sessions limited to thirty days' duration, during which there shall be no legislation upon subjects other than those designated in the proclamation of the governor calling the session or presented by him. The facts in the Ferguson case may be reviewed briefly. The speaker of the House of Representatives, on his own motion, had issued a call for the House to meet in special session on August 1, 1917, to consider the impeachment of the governor. Before the members could assemble, the governor issued a call for a special session of the legislature to meet at the same time as that set by the speaker's call for the purpose of considering the matter of university appropriations. The House proceeded with the investigation and impeached the governor, who was thereupon suspended from office.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 169-216
Author(s):  
Brian A. Langille

Judicial review of the decisions of labour relations boards has been a nagging problem for the Supreme Court of Canada for decades. The decision of the Court in Le Syndicat des Employés de Production du Québec et de L’Acadie v. Canada Labour Relations Board et al. provides an opportunity for and indeed provokes review of the work of the Court in dealing with this recurring problem. This essay begins by placing in perspective the concrete issue posed in the L’Acadie decision. But the particular facts of that case are used only as a vehicle to explore the nature of the problem of judicial review of labour decisionmakers and the history of the Court's handling of it. A fundamental thesis of this essay is that the Court's work can be best understood as comprising two distinct periods, the early years (pre-1979) and the new era (1979-1984?). This essay articulates the view that during the early years the Court developed a law of judicial review which was wholly inadequate both in functional and doctrinal terms. In the new era the Court simplified and reformed the law of judicial review of labour boards and labour arbitrators. It is only from the perspective of the Court's previous handling of the issue that the decision in L’Acadie can be truly understood. When so viewed the decision is perfectly inadequate. The case creates a new distinction based upon the old confusion of “jurisdiction”. This essay then develops the view that no theory of judicial review which revolves around the notion of “jurisdiction” can ever satisfactorily deal with the issues presented. In this respect the Court's own cases from the “new era” represent a much more sensible, if still a second best approach. Finally, suggestions for a legislative solution to the problem posed by L’Acadie are briefly explored.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 391
Author(s):  
Firdaus Firdaus

Peraturan Daerah (Perda) sebagai produk hukum pemerintahan daerah untuk mengatur dan memerintah sendiri sebagai manifestasi otonomi, tetapi dalam praktiknya sering kali dihadapkan dengan penundaan atau pembatalan akibat fungsi pengawasan preventif atau represif oleh Pemerintah. Melalui Putusan Nomor 137/PUU-XIII/2015, Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) meneguhkan fungsi pengawasan preventif dan membatalkan fungsi pengawasan represif dengan harapan: pertama mengakhiri dilema konstitusional fungsi Pengawasan Pemerintah terhadap Perda; kedua, memperkuat otonomi daerah; dan ketiga, meneguhkan pengujian perda sebagai kompetensi Mahkamah Agung (MA). Namun hal tersebut justru menciptakan dikotomi baru, baik terkait hubungan Pemerintah Pusat dengan pemerintahan daerah maupun dalam memaknai fungsi pengawasan represif dihubungkan dengan kompetensi MA menguji peraturan perundang-undangan di bawah undang-undang terhadap undang-undang. Bentuk dikotomi baru yang dimaksud; pertama, merevitalisasi instrumen sentralisme; dan kedua mereduksi otonomi dan fungsi kekuasaan Pemerintah dengan karakteristik yang bersifat aktif, sepihak (bersegi satu) dalam mengawasi dan memastikan pelaksanaan undangundang. Dimensi konstitusional yang harus dipastikan, bahwa pelaksanaan fungsi pengawasan represif terhadap Perda memberi kedudukan hukum bagi Pemerintah Daerah otonom untuk dapat mengajukan permohonan pengujian kepada MA.Local Regulation (Perda) as a legal product of local government is to regulate and govern itself as a manifestation of autonomy. Yet, in practice it is often confronted with delays or cancellations due to the Government's preventive or repressive supervision functions. Through Decision Number 137 / PUU-XIII / 2015, the Constitutional Court (MK) affirmed the function of preventive supervision and canceled the repressive supervision function in the hope of: first, ending the constitutional dilemma of the Government Oversight function on Local Regulations; second, strengthening local autonomy; and third, confirm the perda review as Supreme Court (MA) competency. However, this actually creates a new dichotomy, both in relation to the relationship between the Central Government and the local government and in interpreting the repressive monitoring function associated with the MA competency in examining the legislation under the regulations toward the statute. The form of the new dichotomy in intended; firstly, revitalize the instrument of centralism; and secondly reducing the autonomy and function of the Government's power with active, unilateral (onesided) characteristics in supervising and ensuring the implementation of the statute. The constitutional dimension that must be ensured is that the implementation of the repressive oversight function of the Local Regulation gives a legal standing for the autonomous local Government to be able to submit an application for judicial review to the Supreme Court.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document