Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars

Author(s):  
Terry Nardin

Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars remains the standard account of just war theory despite the criticism it has received. Much of that criticism denies the political character of just war discourse by substituting general moral principles for principles generated in reflecting on the use of military force. It challenges Walzer’s view of the relationship between morality and politics and his conclusions about the moral standing of states, the moral equality of soldiers, the moral basis of humanitarian intervention, and the limits of morality in emergencies. Instead of providing a foundational argument, the book reconstructs a tradition of discourse that transcends particular contexts because of the range of historical experience on which it draws. The critics raise genuine issues but their objections do not undermine the book’s argument. That argument stands in a complex relationship with political realism, which it rejects in some ways and embraces in others.

2013 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Kelsay

The abstract for the International Studies Association panel that gave rise to this special section of Ethics & International Affairs referred to the “triumph” of just war theory. However, I think we ought rather to speak of just war discourse as occupying a particular niche. This is especially so with respect to discussions about policy: when and where governments should make use of military force, what type, and so on. In that context, appeals to the criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello complement (or sometimes compete with) thinking that draws on international law, various strategic doctrines (for example, counterinsurgency warfare, or COIN), notions of reciprocity between states, and a host of other considerations. The notion of “triumph” claims too much. At the same time, for advocates of the just war framework, the kind of recognition indicated by presidential and other official mentions of the idea is worthy of note. Some of these are due to constituency politics—that is, to the idea that “institutional” advocates of just war (say, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops) may influence blocs of voters. Other invocations are better interpreted as a recognition that the vocabulary of just war can serve (along with other ways of speaking) in the attempt to craft wise policy.


2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher J. Finlay

AbstractHow do members of the general public come to regard some uses of violence as legitimate and others as illegitimate? And how do they learn to use widely recognised normative principles in doing so such as those encapsulated in the laws of war and debated by just war theorists? This article argues that popular cinema is likely to be a major source of influence especially through a subgenre that I call ‘Just War Cinema’. Since the 1950s, many films have addressed the moral drama at the centre of contemporary Just War Theory through the figure of the enemy in the Second World War, offering often explicit and sophisticated treatments of the relationship between thejus ad bellumand thejus in bellothat anticipate or echo the arguments of philosophers. But whereas Cold War-era films may have supported Just War Theory’s ambitions to shape public understanding, a strongly revisionary tendency in Just War Cinema since the late 1990s is just as likely to thwart them. The potential of Just War Cinema to vitiate efforts to shape wider attitudes is a matter that both moral philosophers and those concerned with disseminating the law of war ought to pay close attention to.


2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (35) ◽  
pp. 549-569
Author(s):  
Zivorad Rasevic

The COVID-19 pandemic has been mobilizing the full capacities of societies worldwide to respond to unprecedented threats to national and human security. In many cases, emergency measures have involved military support to civil institutions, including law enforcement operations. This paper aims to understand the legality and legitimacy of these military operations better, using hermeneutic, comparative, and survey methodology. It is based on the assumptions that international human rights standards crucially determine moral requirements for domestic use of military force and that just war theory can be equally helpful in the decision-making on domestic military operations in such circumstances. This study assesses the justification of current military enforcement and recommends criteria for future emergencies.


Author(s):  
Anna Stilz

Both just war theory and international law recognize the defence of one’s own state and its territory as the core example of just cause for war. Yet just war theorists have done little to explore what might give the state a territorial right of this kind. This chapter argues that a state has a right to territorial integrity when it meets three conditions: (1) its citizens have a right to occupy its territory, (2) its scheme of law is minimally just, and (3) the relationship of political cooperation that supports its institutions is reasonably and widely affirmed. This chapter then considers whether a state that satisfies these conditions may defend its territorial integrity with lethal force. This account does not support the common-sense conviction that defending one’s state against aggression is always morally permitted or even required. But it can establish a defensive privilege in a central range of cases.


Author(s):  
Daniel R. Brunstetter

Jus in vi is the set of moral principles governing how limited force is used. Taking the traditionalist jus in bello principles as a starting point, this chapter interrogates what necessity, proportionality, and distinction look like in a limited force context and makes the case for the novel psychological risk principle by evaluating how concepts such as “excessive,” “military advantage,” and “harms” and “goods” fit into our thinking about vim. The keystone of jus in vi is the predisposition toward maximal restraint maxim. The chapter thus begins by making the case for why jus in vi principles should be more restrictive than their jus in bello counterparts. It continues by exploring how a circumscribed view of necessity sets the groundwork for constraining proportionality calculations and shaping the way we think about distinction in more restricted ways. The notion of jus in vi proportionality is then explored, with concerns about escalation and psychological risk driving the analysis. Drawing insights from revisionist just war theory to consider jus in vi distinction, the chapter concludes by making the case for affording greater protections to both combatants and non-combatants compared to standard just war accounts. Unlike war, in which almost any soldier can be targeted, in a context of limited force only those who are an active threat can be justly targeted. Both innocent non-combatants and non-threatening combatants should be preserved from the more predictable harms of limited force, though this differs depending on whether the use of limited force is protective, preventive, or punitive.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cian O'Driscoll

AbstractBy claiming that “just war is just war,” critics suggest that just war theory both distracts from and sanitizes the horror of modern warfare by dressing it up in the language of moral principles. However, the phrase can also be taken as a reminder of why we need just war theory in the first place. It is precisely because just war is just war, with all that this implies, that we must think so carefully and so judiciously about it. Of course, one could argue that the rump of just war scholarship over the past decade has been characterized by disinterest regarding the material realities of warfare. But is this still the case? This essay examines a series of benchmark books on the ethics of war published over the past year. All three exemplify an effort to grapple with the hard facts of modern violent conflict, and they all skillfully bring diverse traditions of just war thinking into conversation with one another.


Author(s):  
Lonneke Peperkamp

While a ‘just and lasting peace’ is the axiomatic goal of a just war, it is not clear what that means exactly. The central question of this chapter is: How should a just war theorist understand peace, insofar that peace is the goal of just war theory, taking into account the theory’s middle position between political realism and moral idealism? In the first part of this chapter, the contemporary debate is mapped and various positions on peace are made explicit. This reveals a shift towards a more positive concept of peace. How far should this shift go? The second part of this chapter places the peace continuum in a lively debate in political philosophy on the role of feasibility constraints in normative theory. This chapter argues that a ‘just and lasting peace’ must be understood as a decent peace that is ‘just enough’.


Author(s):  
Allen Buchanan

This book challenges traditional and contemporary just war theorizing, by taking seriously the role of social practices and institutions in decisions to go to war. It argues that which substantive moral principles regarding the initiation of war are valid can depend upon the institutional processes within which the decisions are made. Traditional and mainstream contemporary just war theorists proceed as if institutions don’t exist or as if existing institutional resources for influencing decision-making are so negligible that they may be disregarded. They fail to consider the possibility that institutional innovations could improve recourse to war decisions and that the fact that this is so has important implications for the morality of war-making. The first six chapters of the book lay out the case for institutionalizing the just war—for rethinking just war theory with due regard for the fact that institutional realities and possibilities shape the morality of war. The last two chapters advance concrete, feasible proposals for much-needed institutional innovation.


2020 ◽  
pp. 109-134
Author(s):  
Anna L. Peterson

This chapter argues that pacifism is not merely an applied ethic—a narrow approach to the particular moral problem of war—but rather a comprehensive ethical theory. The same is true of just war theory, the other main approach to the morality of war. The chapter looks at several pacifist traditions, beginning with the Radical Reformation or Anabaptist stream within Christianity. It also explores the pacifist thought of Martin Luther King Jr., who emphasized the relationship between means and ends, a theme that is also central to the thought of Mohandas K. Gandhi. Gandhi insisted that practices are not just tools for achieving predetermined goals, however, but shape the ways we conceive of those ends and of the possibilities and obstacles we face in achieving them. This offers a novel way of conceiving not just of means and ends but of ethics generally, in which practices are central from start to finish


J-Institute ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Jinman Kim ◽  

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