Semi-Formal Diplomacy

2021 ◽  
pp. 530-542
Author(s):  
Nigel Inkster

This chapter assesses semi-official diplomacy in the cyber domain. It begins by describing Track 2 and Track 1.5 diplomacy. Track 2 diplomacy consists of a broad spectrum of activities ranging from academic conferences designed to address specific conflict-related diplomatic issues to much more generic people-to-people contacts designed to create a climate of greater mutual understanding. Meanwhile, Track 1.5 diplomacy seeks to leverage the strengths of both Track 1 and Track 2 diplomacy. It became clear from an early stage that the United States, Russia, and China were in a position to determine the strategic evolution of the cyber domain due to their status as global geo-political actors, their advanced cyber capabilities, their possession of nuclear weapons, and their differences in values and ideology. Russia was the first to make a move towards semi-official diplomacy. Whereas Russia has taken a leading role in international negotiations on cyber governance and cybersecurity, China has arguably become more consequential in terms of how its relationship with the United States will shape the normative culture of the cyber domain. The chapter then considers other examples of semi-official diplomacy as well as prospects for further semi-official diplomacy in the cyber domain.

2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 300-320 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jong Hee Park ◽  
Kentaro Hirose

The argument that reputational concerns promote compliance is at the center of the literature of international cooperation. In this paper, we study how reputational sanctions affect compliance when domestic parties carry their own reputations in international negotiations. We showed that the prospect of international cooperation varies a lot depending on who sits at the negotiation table, how partisan preferences for compliance are different, and how much international audiences discriminate between different types of noncompliance. We illustrate implications of our model using episodes from the negotiations between the United States and North Korea over North Korea's nuclear weapons program.


2005 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 187-208
Author(s):  
Richard L. Russell

Iraq's experience with chemical weapons provides ample lessons for nation-states looking to redress their conventional military shortcomings. Nation-states are likely to learn from Saddam that chemical weapons are useful for waging war against nation-states ill-prepared to fight on a chemical battlefield as well as against internal insurgents and rebellious civilians. Most significantly, nation-states studying Iraq's experience are likely to conclude that chemical weapons are not a “poor man's nuclear weapon” and that only nuclear weapons can deter potential adversaries including the United States.


Public Voices ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 115
Author(s):  
Mary Coleman

The author of this article argues that the two-decades-long litigation struggle was necessary to push the political actors in Mississippi into a more virtuous than vicious legal/political negotiation. The second and related argument, however, is that neither the 1992 United States Supreme Court decision in Fordice nor the negotiation provided an adequate riposte to plaintiffs’ claims. The author shows that their chief counsel for the first phase of the litigation wanted equality of opportunity for historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs), as did the plaintiffs. In the course of explicating the role of a legal grass-roots humanitarian, Coleman suggests lessons learned and trade-offs from that case/negotiation, describing the tradeoffs as part of the political vestiges of legal racism in black public higher education and the need to move HBCUs to a higher level of opportunity at a critical juncture in the life of tuition-dependent colleges and universities in the United States. Throughout the essay the following questions pose themselves: In thinking about the Road to Fordice and to political settlement, would the Justice Department lawyers and the plaintiffs’ lawyers connect at the point of their shared strength? Would the timing of the settlement benefit the plaintiffs and/or the State? Could plaintiffs’ lawyers hold together for the length of the case and move each piece of the case forward in a winning strategy? Who were plaintiffs’ opponents and what was their strategy? With these questions in mind, the author offers an analysis of how the campaign— political/legal arguments and political/legal remedies to remove the vestiges of de jure segregation in higher education—unfolded in Mississippi, with special emphasis on the initiating lawyer in Ayers v. Waller and Fordice, Isaiah Madison


Author(s):  
Geir Lundestad

There are no laws in history. Realists, liberals, and others are both right and wrong. Although no one can be certain that military incidents may not happen, for the foreseeable future China and the United States are unlikely to favor major war. They have cooperated well for almost four decades now. China is likely to continue to focus on its economic modernization. It has far to go to measure up to the West. The American-Chinese economies are still complementary. A conflict with the United States or even with China’s neighbors would have damaging repercussions for China’s economic goals. The United States is so strong that it would make little sense for China to take it on militarily. There are also other deterrents against war, from nuclear weapons to emerging norms about international relations. It is anybody’s guess what will happen after the next few decades. History indicates anything is possible.


Author(s):  
Wendy Thompson ◽  
Leanne Teoh ◽  
Colin C. Hubbard ◽  
Fawziah Marra ◽  
David M. Patrick ◽  
...  

Abstract Objective: Our objective was to compare patterns of dental antibiotic prescribing in Australia, England, and North America (United States and British Columbia, Canada). Design: Population-level analysis of antibiotic prescription. Setting: Outpatient prescribing by dentists in 2017. Participants: Patients receiving an antibiotic dispensed by an outpatient pharmacy. Methods: Prescription-based rates adjusted by population were compared overall and by antibiotic class. Contingency tables assessed differences in the proportion of antibiotic class by country. Results: In 2017, dentists in the United States had the highest antibiotic prescribing rate per 1,000 population and Australia had the lowest rate. The penicillin class, particularly amoxicillin, was the most frequently prescribed for all countries. The second most common agents prescribed were clindamycin in the United States and British Columbia (Canada) and metronidazole in Australia and England. Broad-spectrum agents, amoxicillin-clavulanic acid, and azithromycin were the highest in Australia and the United States, respectively. Conclusion: Extreme differences exist in antibiotics prescribed by dentists in Australia, England, the United States, and British Columbia. The United States had twice the antibiotic prescription rate of Australia and the most frequently prescribed antibiotic in the US was clindamycin. Significant opportunities exist for the global dental community to update their prescribing behavior relating to second-line agents for penicillin allergic patients and to contribute to international efforts addressing antibiotic resistance. Patient safety improvements will result from optimizing dental antibiotic prescribing, especially for antibiotics associated with resistance (broad-spectrum agents) or C. difficile (clindamycin). Dental antibiotic stewardship programs are urgently needed worldwide.


Author(s):  
Esteban Correa-Agudelo ◽  
Tesfaye B. Mersha ◽  
Adam J. Branscum ◽  
Neil J. MacKinnon ◽  
Diego F. Cuadros

We characterized vulnerable populations located in areas at higher risk of COVID-19-related mortality and low critical healthcare capacity during the early stage of the epidemic in the United States. We analyze data obtained from a Johns Hopkins University COVID-19 database to assess the county-level spatial variation of COVID-19-related mortality risk during the early stage of the epidemic in relation to health determinants and health infrastructure. Overall, we identified highly populated and polluted areas, regional air hub areas, race minorities (non-white population), and Hispanic or Latino population with an increased risk of COVID-19-related death during the first phase of the epidemic. The 10 highest COVID-19 mortality risk areas in highly populated counties had on average a lower proportion of white population (48.0%) and higher proportions of black population (18.7%) and other races (33.3%) compared to the national averages of 83.0%, 9.1%, and 7.9%, respectively. The Hispanic and Latino population proportion was higher in these 10 counties (29.3%, compared to the national average of 9.3%). Counties with major air hubs had a 31% increase in mortality risk compared to counties with no airport connectivity. Sixty-eight percent of the counties with high COVID-19-related mortality risk also had lower critical care capacity than the national average. The disparity in health and environmental risk factors might have exacerbated the COVID-19-related mortality risk in vulnerable groups during the early stage of the epidemic.


1971 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 836-844 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph I. Coffey

On March 5, 1970, the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) went into effect, having been ratified by 47 states including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The treaty legally bars these three nuclear powers from transferring atomic weapons to nonnuclear states and formally pledges those nonnuclear states signing the treaty to refrain from developing such weapons or acquiring them from other powers. It thus caps a long effort by the United States to inhibit—so long as it could not preclude—the spread of nuclear weapons and to avoid the potential instabilities associated with that spread.


1993 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael T. Hatch

The United States chose an approach to global warming that came to be viewed by much of the international community as a barrier to effective action. In explaining why, this article analyzes the interaction of the domestic political process and international negotiations. It argues that—while external pressures brought to bear through the negotiations leading up to UNCED pushed the domestic agenda on global warming—the nature of the political process, in combination with the nature of the global warming issue itself, set the general limits for U.S. participation in cooperative international arrangements to manage global warming. That is, given the broad set of interests activated by global warming concerns and the ready access those interests had to decision-making bodies through a pluralist policy process, consensus on an approach to global warming proved impossible. The U.S., unwilling to accept international commitments that obligated it to domestic actions, thwarted efforts to get an international treaty containing firm targets and timetables.


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