Sovereignty

Author(s):  
Michel Troper

The idea that the state possesses and exercises a supreme and absolute power is central to constitutional law. It is almost impossible for anyone writing in the field to avoid discussing it, even if in some cases the discussion leads to denying that it is a meaningful concept. This article discusses the external and internal sovereignty of the state and sovereignty in the state. It argues that the question whether the theory of sovereignty is valid must be answered in the affirmative for two different reasons, both connected to fundamental conceptions of constitutional theory. First, we can see the task of constitutional theory as a general description of positive constitutional law. Constitutional theory also describes the law through an analysis of legal discourse and it is an empirical fact that actors use the language of sovereignty.

2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (5) ◽  
pp. 453-477 ◽  
Author(s):  
András Jakab

A foreign jurist, on looking into the German literature on constitutional law, will soon and suddenly be struck by a peculiarity of this scholarship: the unusually strong emphasis on a marginal area of constitutional law, namely, the state of emergency. The inquiry is, of course, well-known in other countries, but the passion for, and the theoretical effort expended on, this marginal area is unique to Germany.However, this disinterest on the part of other constitutional lawyers, and the recent decline in interest on Germany's part, could yet change, turning the marginal area into a highly current issue. Combating terrorism raises questions for which the German patterns of argumentation, fine-tuned in the academic debate on the law of state of emergency, may provide a useful framework for discussion. The questions arising in the context of the struggle against terrorism test the limits of positive regulations in extreme situations, leading ultimately to the same underlying dilemma as the law on state of emergency, though with different terminology. In this sense, the constellation of legal issues involved in combating terrorism could be considered as the law on state of emergency “incognito.” However, the various argumentative patterns for law on state of emergency have not yet been directly transferred into the very timely legal discourse on counterterrorism (and no such attempt is made here), but such a transfer of argumentation suggests itself. As such, the topic has a “potential currency,” even if traditional issues of state of emergency themselves no longer count among the most current issues.


Grotiana ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 396-415 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gustaaf van Nifterik

AbstractAn important aspect of any constitutional theory is the state's power to punish transgressions of the law, or the ius gladii. Although Grotius never formulated a complete, comprehensive constitutional theory, traces of such a theory can be found in many of his writings not explicitly devoted to constitutional law. Punishment even plays an important role in his books on war (and peace), since to punish transgressions of the law is ranked among the just causes of war.Given the fact that a state may punish transgressions of the law – transgressions by individuals within and even outside the state, but also transgressions of the law by other states – the question may arise concerning the origin of such a right to punish. It will be shown that Grotius did not give the same answer to this question in his various works. As the right to punish is concerned, we find a theory that seems to be akin to the one of John Locke in the De iure praedae (around 1605), one akin to the theories of the Spanish late-scholastics in De satisfactione and De imperio (around 1615), and a theory coming close to what Thomas Hobbes had said on the ruler's right to punish in the De iure belli ac pacis (around 1625).Of course, Grotius can only have been familiar with the theory of the Spanish late-scholastics, since those of Locke and Hobbes were still to be written by the time Grotius had passed away.


Author(s):  
Luis I. Gordillo Pérez ◽  
Giuseppe Martinico

El objetivo de este artículo es ofrecer una reflexión sobre el estado del Derecho constitucional europeo en el año del quincuagésimo aniversario de Van Gend en Loos, la histórica decisión del Tribunal de Justicia (TJ) que ha puesto las bases para la constitucionalización del Derecho de la Unión Europea. Para ello, y tras profundizar en la teoría del constitucionalismo comunitario, se analiza el proceso de constitucionalización de la UE a través de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Luxemburgo desde dos puntos de vista: constitucionalización como «federalización» y constitucionalización como «humanización».This article reflects on the state of the art of the EU Constitutional Law on the 50th anniversary of Van Gend en Loos, the founding constitutional decision of the ECJ. After analyzing the fundamentals of EU constitutional theory, the authors move towards the constitutionalization process of the EU through the case law of the ECJ from a double perspective: constitutionalization as federalization and constitutionalization as «humanization of EU Law».


Semiotica ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 (209) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
Augusto Ponzio

AbstractIt is not with the State that personal responsibility arises towards the other. According to Emmanuel Levinas, the other is every single human being I am responsible for, and I am this responsibility for him. The other, my fellow, is the first comer. But I do not live in a world with just one single “first comer”; there is always another other, a third, who is also my other, my fellow. Otherness, beginning with this third, is a plurality. Proximity as responsibility is a plurality. There is a need for justice. There is the obligation to compare unique and incomparable others. This is what is hidden, unsaid, implied in legal discourse. But recourse to comparison among that which cannot be compared, among that which is incomparable is justified by love of justice for the other. It is this justification that confers a sense to law, which is always dura lex, and to the statement that citizens are equal before the law. From this point of view, State justice is always imperfect with respect to human rights understood as the rights of the other, of every other in his absolute difference, in his incomparable otherness.


Author(s):  
Fox Hazel

This chapter provides an account of the immunities of the State, its officials, and state agencies in international law. It first offers a general description of the plea of state immunity and a brief historical account of the development of the law of state immunity. Then it briefly sets out the law relating to the immunities of the State itself as a legal person, followed by the law applicable to its officials and to state agencies. In addition an account based on customary international law will be provided on the immunities of senior state officials. The chapter concludes by taking note of the extent to which the practice of diplomatic missions at the present time accords with requirements of state immunity law as now set out in written form in the 2004 UN Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property.


2008 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Tomlins

Over the last fifteen years, legal historians have been exploring conceptualizations of the state and state capacity as phenomena of police. In this essay, I offer a genealogy of police in nineteenth-century American constitutional law. I examine relationships among several distinct strands of development: domestic regulatory law, notably the commerce power; the law of indigenous peoples and immigrants; and the law of territorial acquisition. I show that in state and federal juridical discourse, police expresses unrestricted and undefined powers of governance rooted in a discourse of sovereign inheritance and state necessity, culminating in the increasingly pointed claim that as a nation-state the United States possesses limitless capacity “to do all acts and things which independent states may of right do.”


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (XVIII) ◽  
pp. 19-38
Author(s):  
Wojciech Papis ◽  
Krzysztof Kijowski

This article is devoted to the problem of the state’s neutrality of the state - as a guarantee of freedom of conscience and religion. An additional element - to be able to speak about the guarantee of freedom of freedom of conscience and religion - is the question of separating churches and religious associations from institutions and state authorities, from the state as a whole and from the law-making process. The authors point to a deep “anchoring” of the legal issues regarding the guarantee of the freedom of conscience and religion in international law. However, the authors indicate that this does not mean that churches and religious associations should not have a moral right of expression on issues of human values and their protection in the law


1937 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-242
Author(s):  
H. Arthur Steiner

In the one-party states, of which the U.S.S.R., Germany, and Italy may be taken as the best examples, the definition of relationships between the party and the state has presented a major problem of constitutional theory. No two of these states have solved the problem in the same way. The C.P.S.U., engineering the dictatorship of the proletariat, depends upon methods which are constitutionally indirect. Only in the Commission for Soviet Control is there a constitutionalized inter-relationship between the mechanisms of the party and the state; for the rest, the party relies upon its political discipline over the public personnel. Indirect reference to the Communist party is contained in the new Soviet constitution, in the guarantee to citizens of the right of “uniting in the Communist party of the U.S.S.R.,” and in the incorporation of the hammer and sickle and the slogan of the party into the emblem of the state. On the other hand, the Nazi régime in Germany prohibited the formation of other parties than the N.S.D.A.P. by the law of July 14, 1933, and, by the law of December 1, 1933, proclaimed the formal union of the party and the state.


Author(s):  
Yuriy Kyrychenko ◽  
Viktor Kyrychenko

The article considers the principle of equality, which is discussed in Part 4 of Art. 13; st.st.21, 24; Part 2 of Art.38; Part 2 of Art.43; Part 1 of Art.51; Part 1 of Art.52; Part 1 of Art.71; Part 2 of Art. 129 of the Constitution of Ukraine and is mentioned in most constitutions of European states, and it is proved that it is not only a principle of constitutional law, but also one of the fundamental principles on which human rights and freedoms are exercised and their place in society and state is determined. It is noted that the terms «equality» and «equality», although used interchangeably to denote the full range of rights and freedoms, are not identical. Equality is a broader concept than equality and includes the latter. It is proved that in Art. 24 of the Constitution of Ukraine identifies three main aspects of this principle: 1) equality of citizens in rights; 2) equality of citizens before the law; 3) equality of rights of women and men, and it is emphasized that the state provides only legal, formal equality between people. That is, there is no and cannot be actual equality between people, because everyone differs in their individual abilities. Therefore, the analyzed principle legally justifies the actual inequality between people. It is substantiated that the provision, which is enshrined in Part 1 of Art. 24 of the Constitution of Ukraine guarantees only the equality of citizens before the law and their equal rights and freedoms. At the same time, there are examples that this principle applies to every person who is enshrined in the constitutions of continental Europe by the term «all», «all people» or a term meaning nationality (Belgians, Greeks, Spaniards, Luxembourgers, Monegasques). In this regard, it is proposed to replace the term «citizens» in the analyzed part with the term «all people», as well as to remove the word «constitutional» from the terminological phrase «constitutional rights and freedoms». It is emphasized that there can be no privileges or restrictions on the grounds listed in Part 2 of Art. 24 of the Constitution of Ukraine (eleven in total). The same and other similar features are enshrined in the constitutional market in 25 of the 42 European states belonging to the Romano-Germanic system of law. It is concluded that it is necessary to strengthen the wording of this part through the establishment of guarantees by the state. In Part 3 of Art. 24 of the Constitution of Ukraine reflected the provision, which separately emphasizes the equality of women's and men's rights through the consolidation of requirements, conditions and benefits, ie proposed a wording that does not have the vast majority of continental Europe. And therefore it is offered to state this part in other way. The expediency from the point of view of logic and legal technique, and also taking into account the constitutional practice of foreign countries and researches of domestic scientists of statement of Art. 24 of the Constitution of Ukraine in a new edition, which will give it the opportunity to have a more perfect look.


Grotiana ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-95
Author(s):  
Gustaaf van Nifterik

It is not always easy to interpret Grotius’s constitutional theory that lies hidden within his book on the law of war and peace. After a very concise discussion of this constitutional framework, this study turns to various interpretations and conclusions by contemporary scholars that sit awkwardly within the theory. The interpretations of Richard Tuck, Peter Borschberg, Knud Haakonson, Frank Grunert, Deborah Baumgold, Marco Barducci, Daniel Lee and Gustaaf van Nifterik are discussed critically.


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