FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION IN POLISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL NEUTRALITY OF THE STATE

2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (XVIII) ◽  
pp. 19-38
Author(s):  
Wojciech Papis ◽  
Krzysztof Kijowski

This article is devoted to the problem of the state’s neutrality of the state - as a guarantee of freedom of conscience and religion. An additional element - to be able to speak about the guarantee of freedom of freedom of conscience and religion - is the question of separating churches and religious associations from institutions and state authorities, from the state as a whole and from the law-making process. The authors point to a deep “anchoring” of the legal issues regarding the guarantee of the freedom of conscience and religion in international law. However, the authors indicate that this does not mean that churches and religious associations should not have a moral right of expression on issues of human values and their protection in the law

2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (5) ◽  
pp. 453-477 ◽  
Author(s):  
András Jakab

A foreign jurist, on looking into the German literature on constitutional law, will soon and suddenly be struck by a peculiarity of this scholarship: the unusually strong emphasis on a marginal area of constitutional law, namely, the state of emergency. The inquiry is, of course, well-known in other countries, but the passion for, and the theoretical effort expended on, this marginal area is unique to Germany.However, this disinterest on the part of other constitutional lawyers, and the recent decline in interest on Germany's part, could yet change, turning the marginal area into a highly current issue. Combating terrorism raises questions for which the German patterns of argumentation, fine-tuned in the academic debate on the law of state of emergency, may provide a useful framework for discussion. The questions arising in the context of the struggle against terrorism test the limits of positive regulations in extreme situations, leading ultimately to the same underlying dilemma as the law on state of emergency, though with different terminology. In this sense, the constellation of legal issues involved in combating terrorism could be considered as the law on state of emergency “incognito.” However, the various argumentative patterns for law on state of emergency have not yet been directly transferred into the very timely legal discourse on counterterrorism (and no such attempt is made here), but such a transfer of argumentation suggests itself. As such, the topic has a “potential currency,” even if traditional issues of state of emergency themselves no longer count among the most current issues.


1999 ◽  
pp. 66-76
Author(s):  
A. V. Pchelyntsev ◽  
V. V. Ryakhovsʹkyy

Legal assessment of the provisions of the Federal Law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations" (adopted by the State Duma of the Russian Federation on September 19, 1997, approved by the Federation Council on September 24, 1997, signed by the President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin on September 26, 1997, was officially published and legalized the forces of October 1, 1997), which contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation and generally accepted norms of international law


Author(s):  
David Boucher

The classic foundational status that Hobbes has been afforded by contemporary international relations theorists is largely the work of Hans Morgenthau, Martin Wight, and Hedley Bull. They were not unaware that they were to some extent creating a convenient fiction, an emblematic realist, a shorthand for all of the features encapsulated in the term. The detachment of international law from the law of nature by nineteenth-century positivists opened Hobbes up, even among international jurists, to be portrayed as almost exclusively a mechanistic theorist of absolute state sovereignty. If we are to endow him with a foundational place at all it is not because he was an uncompromising realist equating might with right, on the analogy of the state of nature, but instead to his complete identification of natural law with the law of nations. It was simply a matter of subject that distinguished them, the individual and the state.


2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 122-126
Author(s):  
Daniel Ştefan Paraschiv ◽  
Elena Paraschiv

From the oldest times, there appeared certain norms of penal international law meantto prevent the committing of serious offenses, as well as for sanctioning them. This distinctbranch of the public international law is called upon to protect - by sanctioning personsguilty of committing serious offenses - peace and security of the whole humanity, thedevelopment in conformity with the norms of the law and moral of the international relations,the existence and perenniality of fundamental human values.


2021 ◽  
Vol 66 (05) ◽  
pp. 145-148
Author(s):  
Ниджат Рафаэль оглу Джафаров ◽  

It can be accepted that the classification of human rights, its division, types, and groups, is of particular importance. The syllogism for human rights can be taken as follows: law belongs to man; human beings are the highest beings on earth like living beings. Therefore, the regulation prevails. The right to freedom is conditional. Man is free. Consequently, human rights are dependent. Morality is the limit of the law. Morality is the limit and content of human actions. Therefore, the law is the limit of human activities. Morality is related to law. Law is the norm of human behavior. Thereby, human behavior and direction are related to morality. The people create the state. The state has the right. Therefore, the right of the state is the right of the people. The state is an institution made up of citizens. Citizens have the privilege. Such blessings as Dignity, honor, conscience, zeal, honor, etc., and values are a part of morality and spiritual life. Morality is united with law. Therefore, moral values are part of the law. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and conscience. Space is about the law. Therefore, everyone has the right to opinion and conscience. Key words: human rights, freedom of conscience, conceptuality, citizenship


Author(s):  
Andreas Motzfeldt Kravik

Abstract The article explores the current stagnation in multilateral law-making based on an analysis of recent treaty attempts across various subfields of international law. It further examines why the law of the sea has continued to evolve despite this trend. The article demonstrates that states still regularly seek multilateral treaties to address new challenges. While there is some evidence of general treaty saturation, it is the current inability of traditional great powers to negotiate new binding norms which is the most constraining factor on multilateral law-making. This in turn is related to deeper geopolitical shifts by which traditional great powers, notably the United States and its allies, have seen their relative influence decline. Until the current great power competition ends or settles into a new mode of international co-operation, new multilateral treaties with actual regulatory effect will rarely emerge. The law of the sea has avoided the current trend of stagnation for primarily three reasons (i) a global commitment to the basic tenets of the law of the sea; (ii) a legal framework that affords rights and obligations somewhat evenly disbursed, allowing less powerful states to use their collective leverage to advance multilateral negotiations, despite intermittent great power opposition; and (iii) the avoidance of entrenched multilateral forums where decisions are reached by consensus only.


1976 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 516-562 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Feinstein

Dean Acheson frankly reconfirmed the right of self-preservation, when he asserted, “…law simply does not deal with … questions of ultimate power—power that comes close to the sources of sovereignty…. No law can destroy the state creating the law. The survival of states is not a matter of law”. It is beyond the law.Given the existence of man's elementary loyalty to autonomous states, the necessity for using force springs from the need of states to depend fundamentally on self-help in order to guarantee their survival and welfare. This search for security in a system of politics without government, forces the state to be dependent upon military self-help.


Grotiana ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 396-415 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gustaaf van Nifterik

AbstractAn important aspect of any constitutional theory is the state's power to punish transgressions of the law, or the ius gladii. Although Grotius never formulated a complete, comprehensive constitutional theory, traces of such a theory can be found in many of his writings not explicitly devoted to constitutional law. Punishment even plays an important role in his books on war (and peace), since to punish transgressions of the law is ranked among the just causes of war.Given the fact that a state may punish transgressions of the law – transgressions by individuals within and even outside the state, but also transgressions of the law by other states – the question may arise concerning the origin of such a right to punish. It will be shown that Grotius did not give the same answer to this question in his various works. As the right to punish is concerned, we find a theory that seems to be akin to the one of John Locke in the De iure praedae (around 1605), one akin to the theories of the Spanish late-scholastics in De satisfactione and De imperio (around 1615), and a theory coming close to what Thomas Hobbes had said on the ruler's right to punish in the De iure belli ac pacis (around 1625).Of course, Grotius can only have been familiar with the theory of the Spanish late-scholastics, since those of Locke and Hobbes were still to be written by the time Grotius had passed away.


Author(s):  
Dominique Gaurier

This chapter observes that early writers on the law of war or on the law of peace offered their contributions in an intellectual context that was very different from our own. They were attempting to provide explanations for the questions related to war and peace, and in doing so drew upon interesting elements in Roman or canon law. Yet, none of the sources available to them were sufficient to offer a comprehensive response to related legal issues. Although these authors were all largely relying on the Bible and on ancient or contemporaneous history, some also drew information from their own life experiences. The majority, however, built their theories on the basis of their own readings and legal knowledge. Furthermore, only very few authors addressed the question of the sources of international law.


Author(s):  
Fox Hazel

This chapter provides an account of the immunities of the State, its officials, and state agencies in international law. It first offers a general description of the plea of state immunity and a brief historical account of the development of the law of state immunity. Then it briefly sets out the law relating to the immunities of the State itself as a legal person, followed by the law applicable to its officials and to state agencies. In addition an account based on customary international law will be provided on the immunities of senior state officials. The chapter concludes by taking note of the extent to which the practice of diplomatic missions at the present time accords with requirements of state immunity law as now set out in written form in the 2004 UN Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property.


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