scholarly journals Constitutional regulation of the principle of equality of rights and freedoms of man and citizen in Ukraine and the countries of continental Europe: comparative legal analysis

Author(s):  
Yuriy Kyrychenko ◽  
Viktor Kyrychenko

The article considers the principle of equality, which is discussed in Part 4 of Art. 13; st.st.21, 24; Part 2 of Art.38; Part 2 of Art.43; Part 1 of Art.51; Part 1 of Art.52; Part 1 of Art.71; Part 2 of Art. 129 of the Constitution of Ukraine and is mentioned in most constitutions of European states, and it is proved that it is not only a principle of constitutional law, but also one of the fundamental principles on which human rights and freedoms are exercised and their place in society and state is determined. It is noted that the terms «equality» and «equality», although used interchangeably to denote the full range of rights and freedoms, are not identical. Equality is a broader concept than equality and includes the latter. It is proved that in Art. 24 of the Constitution of Ukraine identifies three main aspects of this principle: 1) equality of citizens in rights; 2) equality of citizens before the law; 3) equality of rights of women and men, and it is emphasized that the state provides only legal, formal equality between people. That is, there is no and cannot be actual equality between people, because everyone differs in their individual abilities. Therefore, the analyzed principle legally justifies the actual inequality between people. It is substantiated that the provision, which is enshrined in Part 1 of Art. 24 of the Constitution of Ukraine guarantees only the equality of citizens before the law and their equal rights and freedoms. At the same time, there are examples that this principle applies to every person who is enshrined in the constitutions of continental Europe by the term «all», «all people» or a term meaning nationality (Belgians, Greeks, Spaniards, Luxembourgers, Monegasques). In this regard, it is proposed to replace the term «citizens» in the analyzed part with the term «all people», as well as to remove the word «constitutional» from the terminological phrase «constitutional rights and freedoms». It is emphasized that there can be no privileges or restrictions on the grounds listed in Part 2 of Art. 24 of the Constitution of Ukraine (eleven in total). The same and other similar features are enshrined in the constitutional market in 25 of the 42 European states belonging to the Romano-Germanic system of law. It is concluded that it is necessary to strengthen the wording of this part through the establishment of guarantees by the state. In Part 3 of Art. 24 of the Constitution of Ukraine reflected the provision, which separately emphasizes the equality of women's and men's rights through the consolidation of requirements, conditions and benefits, ie proposed a wording that does not have the vast majority of continental Europe. And therefore it is offered to state this part in other way. The expediency from the point of view of logic and legal technique, and also taking into account the constitutional practice of foreign countries and researches of domestic scientists of statement of Art. 24 of the Constitution of Ukraine in a new edition, which will give it the opportunity to have a more perfect look.

2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-48
Author(s):  
Whitney K. Taylor

When do individuals choose to advance legal claims to social welfare goods? To explore this question, I turn to the case of South Africa, where, despite the adoption of a "transformative" constitution in 1996, access to social welfare goods remains sorely lacking. Drawing on an original 551-person survey, I examine patterns of legal claims-making, focusing on beliefs individuals hold about the law, rights, and the state, and how those beliefs relate to decisions about whether and how to make claims. I find striking differences between the factors that influence when people say they should file a legal claim and when they actually do so. The way that individuals interpret their own material conditions and neighborhood context are important, yet under-acknowledged, factors for explaining claims-making.


2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 547-571
Author(s):  
Andrey V. Skorobogatov ◽  
Alexandr V. Krasnov

The article explores the legal nature of law principles from the perspective of philosophical and legal analysis. The purpose of the article is to form scientifically based knowledge on the philosophical and legal nature of the category law principle using postclassical methodological tools. Research Methods: The methodology of the article is based on the postclassical scientific rationality. The authors use an integrative approach to the study of legal reality in combination with a phenomenological and synergetic methodology, thereby using a number of general scientific and special scientific methods in a particular logical system, which makes it possible to study law principles both ontologically, in terms of their role in law in general, and epistemologically as well as axiologically. Moreover, the content, functioning and development of law principles are considered phenomenologically, as well as in the context of law communication. Results: The law principle in the ontological aspect is a fundamental form of law, reflecting the most significant ideas concerning regulation of public relations; the law principle is used as a direct regulator along with the rule of law. The epistemological law principle can be interpreted as a generalizing category, reflecting interpretation and assessment of legal reality from the standpoint of postclassical methodology. From an axiological point of view, the law principle embodies the law and social values and traditions that are dominant within the framework of a given socio-cultural chronotope, and is also used as one of the fundamental tools for constructing legal reality and its development. Conclusions: the law nature of law principles is determined with the account of postclassical methodology onto-logically, epistemologically and axiologically, in terms of their dual role in formation, development and construction of legal reality at all of its levels, in the context of both objective and subjective factors. The findings can be applied in drawing up concepts of legal and judicial reforms in terms of targeted construction of legal reality, as well as in the process of predicting the development of the Russian legal system.


2006 ◽  
Vol 7 (5) ◽  
pp. 453-477 ◽  
Author(s):  
András Jakab

A foreign jurist, on looking into the German literature on constitutional law, will soon and suddenly be struck by a peculiarity of this scholarship: the unusually strong emphasis on a marginal area of constitutional law, namely, the state of emergency. The inquiry is, of course, well-known in other countries, but the passion for, and the theoretical effort expended on, this marginal area is unique to Germany.However, this disinterest on the part of other constitutional lawyers, and the recent decline in interest on Germany's part, could yet change, turning the marginal area into a highly current issue. Combating terrorism raises questions for which the German patterns of argumentation, fine-tuned in the academic debate on the law of state of emergency, may provide a useful framework for discussion. The questions arising in the context of the struggle against terrorism test the limits of positive regulations in extreme situations, leading ultimately to the same underlying dilemma as the law on state of emergency, though with different terminology. In this sense, the constellation of legal issues involved in combating terrorism could be considered as the law on state of emergency “incognito.” However, the various argumentative patterns for law on state of emergency have not yet been directly transferred into the very timely legal discourse on counterterrorism (and no such attempt is made here), but such a transfer of argumentation suggests itself. As such, the topic has a “potential currency,” even if traditional issues of state of emergency themselves no longer count among the most current issues.


Grotiana ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 396-415 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gustaaf van Nifterik

AbstractAn important aspect of any constitutional theory is the state's power to punish transgressions of the law, or the ius gladii. Although Grotius never formulated a complete, comprehensive constitutional theory, traces of such a theory can be found in many of his writings not explicitly devoted to constitutional law. Punishment even plays an important role in his books on war (and peace), since to punish transgressions of the law is ranked among the just causes of war.Given the fact that a state may punish transgressions of the law – transgressions by individuals within and even outside the state, but also transgressions of the law by other states – the question may arise concerning the origin of such a right to punish. It will be shown that Grotius did not give the same answer to this question in his various works. As the right to punish is concerned, we find a theory that seems to be akin to the one of John Locke in the De iure praedae (around 1605), one akin to the theories of the Spanish late-scholastics in De satisfactione and De imperio (around 1615), and a theory coming close to what Thomas Hobbes had said on the ruler's right to punish in the De iure belli ac pacis (around 1625).Of course, Grotius can only have been familiar with the theory of the Spanish late-scholastics, since those of Locke and Hobbes were still to be written by the time Grotius had passed away.


Semiotica ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 (209) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
Augusto Ponzio

AbstractIt is not with the State that personal responsibility arises towards the other. According to Emmanuel Levinas, the other is every single human being I am responsible for, and I am this responsibility for him. The other, my fellow, is the first comer. But I do not live in a world with just one single “first comer”; there is always another other, a third, who is also my other, my fellow. Otherness, beginning with this third, is a plurality. Proximity as responsibility is a plurality. There is a need for justice. There is the obligation to compare unique and incomparable others. This is what is hidden, unsaid, implied in legal discourse. But recourse to comparison among that which cannot be compared, among that which is incomparable is justified by love of justice for the other. It is this justification that confers a sense to law, which is always dura lex, and to the statement that citizens are equal before the law. From this point of view, State justice is always imperfect with respect to human rights understood as the rights of the other, of every other in his absolute difference, in his incomparable otherness.


2008 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Tomlins

Over the last fifteen years, legal historians have been exploring conceptualizations of the state and state capacity as phenomena of police. In this essay, I offer a genealogy of police in nineteenth-century American constitutional law. I examine relationships among several distinct strands of development: domestic regulatory law, notably the commerce power; the law of indigenous peoples and immigrants; and the law of territorial acquisition. I show that in state and federal juridical discourse, police expresses unrestricted and undefined powers of governance rooted in a discourse of sovereign inheritance and state necessity, culminating in the increasingly pointed claim that as a nation-state the United States possesses limitless capacity “to do all acts and things which independent states may of right do.”


Author(s):  
Helmy Yahya Rahma Aji ◽  
Raden Muhammad Arvy Ilyasa

Indonesia as a state of the law has guaranteed the constitutional rights of each of its citizens without exception as a form of protection of human rights contained in Article 1 paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution. Providing legal assistance to citizens who are unable as constitutional rights of every citizen and the State is obliged to protect the constitutional rights regarding obtaining guarantees, protections, and certainty of law that is fair and equal treatment before the law. Legal aid legally in Law Number 16 of 2011 is a legal service free of charge to legal aid recipients. The thing that becomes the basis for the provision of legal assistance by the State is because the State is responsible for providing legal assistance to disadvantaged citizens as a form of access to justice and equality before the law. The state has a role in terms of establishing regulations as the legal basis for implementing legal assistance for disadvantaged citizens. But in reality, in the development of legal aid, there are several problems between legal aid providers (advocates) and the State as a guarantor of the constitutional right to the realization of justice and equality before the law for every Indonesian citizen, including the poor.


ALQALAM ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 193
Author(s):  
Jaih Mubarok

AI-Ijarah al-Muntahiyyah bi al-Tamlik (IMBT) is conceptually almost the same as leasing which is conducted by world financial institutions, including those of in Indonesia. IMBT is a service product of syari'a financial institution which is transparant and is able to involve the third party whenever it is necessary. In the context of Indonesia, economic syari'a is culturally designed and run by the Coumil of Indonesian Ulama (MUI). In order to regulate the bussiness in the syari'a system, MUI forms the Council of National Syari'a (DSN) issuing the fatwas; in order to give monitoring, DSN places The Board ef Syari'a Controller (DPS) in every business unit which uses syari'a system; in order to solve the syari'a business disputation, MUI forms the Arbitration Board of National Syari'a (Basyarnas). Moreover, The State has structurally accomodated the system of syari'a business in law and regulation. Therefore, The openess characteristics (the principle of free based contract) which is also practiced in the contract of IMBT is restricted by the law and regulation and considered appropriate in syari'a point of view based on DSN-MUI fatwas.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (4(73)) ◽  
Author(s):  
S.N. Keramova

Article considers the experience of the state structure of the state service of the Russian Federation and foreign countries. The purpose of this article is a comparative legal study of the problems of the Institute of state service in Russia and abroad in several foreign countries: USA, UK, France, Germany. The analysis oflegal regulation of the state service of foreign countries and the Federal state service of the Russian Federation is conditioned by the possibility of improving the legislation of the Russian Federation. The result of the study is the formulation of conclusions and proposals for improving the administrative legislation regulating the structure of the public service of the Russian Federation, using the experience of foreign countries


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