scholarly journals The moral standing of the dead

2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1754) ◽  
pp. 20170270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Luper
Keyword(s):  
The Dead ◽  

In choosing to do certain things, we appear to presuppose that we can act in the interests the dead, and that we have a duty to do so. For example, some of us go to great lengths to carry out their final wishes. Given that the dead no longer exist, however, it seems that nothing can be good or bad for them: they lack prudential interests. In that case, it is hard to see how we could owe them anything. They seem to lack moral standing altogether. In this essay, I will rebut this line of thought. I will claim that in some cases things that happen after people die are indeed good or bad for them. Their interests can still be advanced or hindered, so the dead have moral standing. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Evolutionary thanatology: impacts of the dead on the living in humans and other animals’.

Author(s):  
Christine M. Korsgaard

According to the marginal cases argument, there is no property that might justify making a moral difference between human beings and the other animals that is both uniquely and universally human. It is therefore “speciesist” to treat human beings differently just because we are human beings. While not challenging the conclusion, this chapter argues that the marginal cases argument is metaphysically misguided. It ignores the differences between a life stage and a kind, and between lacking a property and having it in a defective form. The chapter then argues for a view of moral standing that attributes it to the subject of a life conceived as an atemporal being, and shows how this view can resolve some familiar puzzles such as how death can be a loss to the person who has died, how we can wrong the dead, the “procreation asymmetry,” and the “non-identity problem.”


Author(s):  
Grant J. Rozeboom

We are moral equals, but in virtue of what? The most plausible answers to this question have pointed to our higher agential capacities, but we vary in the degrees to which we possess those capacities. How could they ground our equal moral standing, then? This chapter argues that they do so only indirectly. Our moral equality is most directly grounded in a social practice of equality, a practice that serves the purpose of mitigating our tendencies toward control and domination that interpreters of Rousseau call “inflamed amour-propre.” We qualify as participants in this practice of equality by possessing certain agential capacities, but it is our participation in the practice, and not the capacities themselves, that makes us moral equals. Thus, in contrast with recent accounts that simply posit a threshold above which capacity-variations are ignored, this chapter proposes moving from a capacity-based to a practice-based view of moral equality.


2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1754) ◽  
pp. 20180212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Pettitt

Palaeoanthropology, or more precisely Palaeolithic archaeology, offers the possibility of bridging the gap between mortuary activities that can be observed in the wider animal community and which relate to chemistry and emotion; to the often-elaborate systems of rationalization and symbolic contextualisation that are characteristic of recently observable societies. I draw on ethological studies to provide a core set of mortuary behaviours one might expect hominoids to inherit, and on anthropological observations to explore funerary activity represented in the Middle and Upper Palaeolithic, in order to examine how a distinctly human set of funerary behaviours arose from a more widespread set of mortuary behaviours. I suggest that the most profound innovation of the hominins was the incorporation of places into the commemoration of the dead, and propose a falsifiable mechanism for why this came about; and I suggest that the pattern of the earliest burials fits with modern hunter–gatherer belief systems about death, and how these vary by social complexity. Finally, I propose several research questions pertaining to the social context of funerary practices, suggesting how a hominin evolutionary thanatology may contribute not only to our understanding of human behavioural evolution, but to a wider thanatology of the animal kingdom. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Evolutionary thanatology: impacts of the dead on the living in humans and other animals’.


2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1754) ◽  
pp. 20170259 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaeli Swift ◽  
John M. Marzluff

Observations of some mammals and birds touching their dead provoke questions about the motivation and adaptive value of this potentially risky behaviour. Here, we use controlled experiments to determine if tactile interactions are characteristic of wild American crow responses to dead crows, and what the prevalence and nature of tactile interactions suggests about their motivations. In Experiment 1, we test if food or information acquisition motivates contact by presenting crows with taxidermy-prepared dead crows, and two species crows are known to scavenge: dead pigeons and dead squirrels. In Experiment 2, we test if territoriality motivates tactile interactions by presenting crows with taxidermy crows prepared to look either dead or upright and life-like. In Experiment 1, we find that crows are significantly less likely to make contact but more likely to alarm call and recruit other birds in response to dead crows than to dead pigeons and squirrels. In addition, we find that aggressive and sexual encounters with dead crows are seasonally biased. These findings are inconsistent with feeding or information acquisition-based motivation. In Experiment 2, we find that crows rarely dive-bomb and more often alarm call and recruit other crows to dead than to life-like crows, behaviours inconsistent with responses given to live intruders. Consistent with a danger response hypothesis, our results show that alarm calling and neighbour recruitment occur more frequently in response to dead crows than other stimuli, and that touching dead crows is atypical. Occasional contacts, which take a variety of aggressive and sexual forms, may result from an inability to mediate conflicting stimuli. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Evolutionary thanatology: impacts of the dead on the living in humans and other animals’.


2021 ◽  
pp. 002436392110381
Author(s):  
Thomas A. Cavanaugh

In “Double Effect Donation,” Camosy and Vukov argue that “there are circumstances in which it is morally permissible for a healthy individual to donate their organs even though their death is a foreseeable outcome”. They propose that a living donor could ethically donate an entire, singular, vital organ while knowing that this act would result in death. In reply, I argue that it is not ethical for a living person to donate an entire, singular, vital organ. Moreover, mutatis mutandis, it is not ethical for surgeons and others to perform such a deadly operation. For to do so is “intentionally to cause the death of the donor in disposing of his organs”. Such an act violates the dead donor rule which holds that an entire, singular, vital organ may be taken only from a corpse. Contrary to Camosy and Vukov’s claims, double-effect reasoning does not endorse such organ donation.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 295-312
Author(s):  
Alfredo Joignant ◽  
Mauro Basaure ◽  
Manuel Gárate

This essay explores what has been an undertheorized link between forensic investigations and the sociological concept of charisma. To do so, we examine the deaths of two illustrious men: former Chilean presidents Salvador Allende and Eduardo Frei Montalva. Our interest is not to elucidate the causes of their deaths from a medical or legal point of view, but rather to understand what is constitutive of the investiture of political power. Based on the notion of charisma and the sentiments produced by forensic investigations, this article explores those non-visible elements that emanate from charisma as a concept, vested in the dead leaders’ remains.


2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1754) ◽  
pp. 20170260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melissa A. L. V. Reggente ◽  
Elena Papale ◽  
Niall McGinty ◽  
Lavinia Eddy ◽  
Giuseppe Andrea de Lucia ◽  
...  

Some aquatic mammals appear to care for their dead, whereas others abandon their live offspring when conditions are unfavourable. This incredible variety in behaviours suggests the importance of comparing and contrasting mechanisms driving death-related behaviours among these species. We reviewed 106 cases of aquatic mammals (81 cetaceans and 25 non-cetaceans) reacting to a death event, and extrapolated ‘participant’ ( age class , sex , relationship and decomposition ) and ‘social’ characteristics ( escorting , calf dependence , alloparental care , herding and dispersal patterns ) from published and unpublished literature. A multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) was performed to explore the relationships between these characteristics and death-related behaviours, with species clustered based on MCA scores. Results showed that both cetaceans and non-cetaceans react to death but in different ways. Non-cetaceans, characterized by a short maternal investment, were observed to protect the dead (defending it from external attacks), while cetaceans spent much longer with their offspring and display carrying (hauling, spinning, mouthing with the carcass and diving with it) and breathing-related (lifting and sinking the carcass) activities with the dead generally in association with other conspecifics. Our work emphasizes the need of increased documentation of death-related cases around the world to improve our understanding of aquatic mammals and their responses to death. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Evolutionary thanatology: impacts of the dead on the living in humans and other animals’.


2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Garthoff

Recently there has been a somewhat surprising interest among Kantian theorists in the moral standing of animals, coupled with a no less surprising optimism among these theorists about the prospect of incorporating animal moral standing into Kantian theory without contorting its other attractive features. These theorists contend in particular that animal standing can be incorporated into Kantian moral theory without abandoning its logocentrism: the claim that everything that is valuable depends for its value on its relation to rationality. In this essay I raise doubts about the prospects for accommodating animal moral standing within a logocentric Kantianism. I argue instead that the best way to incorporate animal moral standing into Kantian theory is to admit more radical departures from Kant’s position by maintaining that consciousness is a locus of moral standing independent from rationality.I propose that we should attribute moral standing to all conscious animals because the capacity of consciousness is the criterion distinguishing individuals whose well-being generates reasons from individuals whose well-being fails to do so. We need such a criterion because we speak of the well-being of things, such as artifacts and meteorological phenomena, which clearly lack moral standing. Having already argued against the Kantian view that the criterion of moral standing is rationality, I proceed to argue that consciousness is also superior to its other principal rival for the criterion of moral standing: life.On the view that emerges from this discussion, we have obligations to show concern for conscious individuals by treating their well-being as providing us with reasons for action; the view thus endorses the criterion of moral standing typically advanced by utilitarians. On this view we also have a distinct class of obligations to show respect for conscious rational individuals; the view thus endorses the Kantian claim that persons have a distinctive (and a higher) moral status in virtue of their possession of rational capacities. In this essay thus begin to show how a principal insight of each leading approach to modern moral theory may be captured in a unified theory.


2016 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 529-536 ◽  
Author(s):  
Howard I. Browman

Abstract “Ocean acidification” (OA), a change in seawater chemistry driven by increased uptake of atmospheric CO2 by the oceans, has probably been the most-studied single topic in marine science in recent times. The majority of the literature on OA report negative effects of CO2 on organisms and conclude that OA will be detrimental to marine ecosystems. As is true across all of science, studies that report no effect of OA are typically more difficult to publish. Further, the mechanisms underlying the biological and ecological effects of OA have received little attention in most organismal groups, and some of the key mechanisms (e.g. calcification) are still incompletely understood. For these reasons, the ICES Journal of Marine Science solicited contributions to this special issue. In this introduction, I present a brief overview of the history of research on OA, call for a heightened level of organized (academic) scepticism to be applied to the body of work on OA, and briefly present the 44 contributions that appear in this theme issue. OA research has clearly matured, and is continuing to do so. We hope that our readership will find that, when taken together, the articles that appear herein do indeed move us “Towards a broader perspective on ocean acidification research”.


2018 ◽  
Vol 373 (1761) ◽  
pp. 20170445 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew J. Tanentzap ◽  
Bethany R. Smith

Trophic rewilding involves adding species into ecosystems to restore extinct, top-down interactions, but limited quantitative data have prevented a systematic attempt to quantify its outcomes. Here, we exploit species introductions that have occurred for purposes other than restoration to inform trophic rewilding. We compiled 51 studies with 158 different responses of lower trophic levels to a species introduction that restored an extinct interaction, whether it intended to do so or not. Unintentional introductions were compared with checklists of extinct animals to identify potential analogues. Using the latest meta-analysis techniques, we found that the few cases of intentional rewilding had similar effects to unintentional rewilding, though there were large taxonomic and geographical biases. We also tested predictions from studies on trophic cascades about the factors that should influence rewilding. Unintentional rewilding was stronger where introduced consumers were non-invasive, but there was no effect of time that compared sites differed in introduction status, latitude or coevolution of responses with a taxonomically related analogue. Our study now shows that rewilding can reinstate extinct trophic interactions and highlights remaining data gaps that need closure to restore ecosystems across larger scales than has been previously possible. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Trophic rewilding: consequences for ecosystems under global change’.


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