scholarly journals Sensitivity to sequential regularities in risky decision making

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Kóbor ◽  
Ádám Takács ◽  
Karolina Janacsek ◽  
Zsófia Kardos ◽  
Valéria Csépe ◽  
...  

AbstractProbabilistic sequence learning involves a set of robust mechanisms that enable the extraction of statistical patterns embedded in the environment. It contributes to different perceptual and cognitive processes as well as to effective behavior adaptation, which is a crucial aspect of decision making. Although previous research attempted to model reinforcement learning and reward sensitivity in different risky decision-making paradigms, the basic mechanism of the sensitivity to statistical regularities has not been anchored to external tasks. Therefore, the present study aimed to investigate the statistical learning mechanism underlying individual differences in risky decision making. To reach this goal, we tested whether implicit probabilistic sequence learning and risky decision making share common variance. To have a more complex characterization of individual differences in risky decision making, hierarchical cluster analysis was conducted on performance data obtained in the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) in a large sample of healthy young adults. Implicit probabilistic sequence learning was measured by the Alternating Serial Reaction Time (ASRT) task. According to the results, a four-cluster structure was identified involving average risk-taking, slowly responding, risk-taker, and risk-averse groups of participants, respectively. While the entire sample showed significant learning on the ASRT task, we found greater sensitivity to statistical regularities in the risk-taker and risk-averse groups than in participants with average risk-taking. These findings revealed common mechanisms in risky decision making and implicit probabilistic sequence learning and an adaptive aspect of higher risk taking on the BART. Our results could help to clarify the neurocognitive complexity of decision making and its individual differences.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy G. Freels ◽  
Daniel B. K. Gabriel ◽  
Deranda B. Lester ◽  
Nicholas W. Simon

AbstractThe risky decision-making task (RDT) measures risk-taking in a rat model by assessing preference between a small, safe reward and a large reward with increasing risk of punishment (mild foot shock). It is well-established that dopaminergic drugs modulate risk-taking; however, little is known about how differences in baseline phasic dopamine signaling drive individual differences in risk preference. Here, we usedin vivofixed potential amperometry in male Long-Evans rats to test if phasic nucleus accumbens shell (NACs) dopamine dynamics are associated with risk-taking. We observed a positive correlation between medial forebrain bundle-evoked dopamine release in the NACs and risky decision-making, suggesting that risk-taking is associated with elevated dopamine sensitivity. Moreover, “risk-taking” subjects were found to demonstrate greater phasic dopamine release than “risk-averse” subjects. Risky decision-making also predicted enhanced sensitivity to nomifensine, a dopamine reuptake inhibitor, quantified as elevated latency for dopamine to clear from the synapse. Importantly, this hyperdopaminergic phenotype was selective for risky decision-making, as delay discounting performance was not predictive of phasic dopamine release or dopamine supply. These data identify phasic NACs dopamine release as a possible therapeutic target for alleviating the excessive risk-taking observed across multiple forms of psychopathology.Significance StatementExcessive risky decision-making is a hallmark of addiction, promoting ongoing drug seeking despite the risk of social, financial, and physical consequences. However, punishment-driven risk-taking is understudied in preclinical models. Here, we examined the relationship between individual differences in risk-taking and dopamine release properties in the rat nucleus accumbens shell, a brain region associated with motivation and decision-making. We observed that high risk taking predicted elevated phasic dopamine release and sensitivity to the dopamine transporter blocker nomifensine. This hypersensitive dopamine system was not observed in rats with high impulsive choice, another behavior associated with substance use disorder. This provides critical information about neurobiological factors underlying a form of decision-making that promotes vulnerability to substance abuse.


Author(s):  
Joshua B. Hurwitz

Increased real-time risk-taking under sleep loss could be marked by changes in risk perception or acceptance. Risk-perception processes are those involved in estimating real-time parameters such as the speeds and distances of hazardous objects. Risk-acceptance processes relate to response choices given risk estimates. Risk-taking under fatigue was studied using a simulated intersection-crossing driving task in which subjects decided when it was safe to cross an intersection as an oncoming car approached from the cross street. The subjects performed this task at 3-hour intervals over a 36-hour period without sleep. Results were modeled using a model of real-time risky decision making that has perceptual components that process speed, time and distance information, and a decisional component for accepting risk. Results showed that varying a parameter for the decisional component across sessions best accounted for variations in performance relating to time of day.


2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-109 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kathy T. Do ◽  
Paul B. Sharp ◽  
Eva H. Telzer

Heightened risk taking in adolescence has long been attributed to valuation systems overwhelming the deployment of cognitive control. However, this explanation of why adolescents engage in risk taking is insufficient given increasing evidence that risk-taking behavior can be strategic and involve elevated cognitive control. We argue that applying the expected-value-of-control computational model to adolescent risk taking can clarify under what conditions control is elevated or diminished during risky decision-making. Through this lens, we review research examining when adolescent risk taking might be due to—rather than a failure of—effective cognitive control and suggest compelling ways to test such hypotheses. This effort can resolve when risk taking arises from an immaturity of the control system itself, as opposed to arising from differences in what adolescents value relative to adults. It can also identify promising avenues for channeling cognitive control toward adaptive outcomes in adolescence.


2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivy N. Defoe ◽  
Judith Semon Dubas ◽  
Daniel Romer

Surveys concur that adolescents disproportionately engage in many real-world risk behaviors, compared with children and adults. Recently researchers have employed laboratory risky decision-making tasks to replicate this apparent heightened adolescent risk-taking. This review builds on the main findings of the first meta-analysis of such age differences in risky decision-making in the laboratory. Overall, although adolescents engage in more risky decision-making than adults, adolescents engage in risky decision-making equal to children. However, adolescents take fewer risks than children on tasks that allow the option of opting out of taking a risk. To reconcile findings on age differences in risk-taking in the real-world versus the laboratory, an integrative framework merges theories on neuropsychological development with ecological models that emphasize the importance of risk exposure in explaining age differences in risk-taking. Policy insights and recent developments are discussed.


2020 ◽  
Vol 73 (6) ◽  
pp. 941-956
Author(s):  
Wijnand AP van Tilburg ◽  
Nikhila Mahadevan

We examined the impact of viewing exemplars on people’s behaviour in risky decision-making environments. Specifically, we tested if people disproportionally choose to view and then imitate the behaviour of successful (vs. unsuccessful) others, which in the case of risky decision-making increases risk-taking and can hamper performance. In doing so, our research tested how a fundamental social psychological process (social influence) interacts with a fundamental statistical phenomenon (regression to the mean) to produce biases in decision-making. Experiment 1 ( N = 96) showed that people indeed model their own behaviour after that of a successful exemplar, resulting in more risky behaviour and poorer outcomes. Experiment 2 ( N = 208) indicated that people disproportionately choose to examine and then imitate most successful versus least successful exemplars. Experiment 3 ( N = 381) replicated Experiment 2 in a context where participants were offered the freedom to examine any possible exemplar, or no exemplar whatsoever, and across different incentive conditions. The results have implications for decision-making in a broad range of social contexts, such as education, health, and finances where risk-taking can have detrimental outcomes, and they may be particularly helpful to understand the role of social influence in gambling behaviour.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karita E. Ojala ◽  
Lieneke K. Janssen ◽  
Mahur M. Hashemi ◽  
Monique H. M. Timmer ◽  
Dirk E. M. Geurts ◽  
...  

AbstractDopamine has been associated with risky decision-making, as well as with pathological gambling, a behavioural addiction characterized by excessive risk-taking behaviour. However, the specific mechanisms through which dopamine might act to foster risk-taking and pathological gambling remain elusive. Here we test the hypothesis that this might be achieved, in part, via modulation of subjective probability weighing during decision-making. Healthy controls (n = 21) and pathological gamblers (n = 16) played a decision-making task involving choices between sure monetary options and risky gambles both in the gain and loss domains. Each participant played the task twice, either under placebo or the dopamine D2/D3 receptor antagonist sulpiride, in a double-blind, counter-balanced, design. A prospect theory modelling approach was used to estimate subjective probability weighting and sensitivity to monetary outcomes. Consistent with prospect theory, we found that participants presented a distortion in the subjective weighting of probabilities, i.e. they overweighted low probabilities and underweighted moderate to high probabilities, both in the gain and loss domains. Compared with placebo, sulpiride attenuated this distortion in the gain domain. Across drugs, the groups did not differ in their probability weighting, although in the placebo condition, gamblers consistently underweighted losing probabilities. Overall, our results reveal that dopamine D2/D3 receptor antagonism modulates the subjective weighting of probabilities in the gain domain, in the direction of more objective, economically rational decision-making.Significance statementDopamine has been implicated in risky decision-making and gambling addiction, but the exact mechanisms underlying this influence remain partly elusive. Here we tested the hypothesis that dopamine modulates subjective probability weighting, by examining the effect of a dopaminergic drug on risk-taking behaviour, both in healthy individuals and pathological gamblers. We found that selectively blocking dopamine D2/D3 receptors diminished the typically observed distortion of winning probabilities, characterized by an overweighting of low probabilities and underweighting of high probabilities. This made participants more linear in their subjective estimation of probabilities, and thus more rational in their decision-making behaviour. Healthy participants and pathological gamblers did not differ in their risk-taking behaviour, except in the placebo condition in which gamblers consistently underweighted losing probabilities.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dominic S. Fareri ◽  
Joanne Stasiak ◽  
Peter Sokol-Hessner

Choices under conditions of risk often have consequences not just for ourselves, but for others. Yet, it is unclear how the other’s identity (stranger, close friend, etc.) influences risky choices made on their behalf. Here, two groups of undergraduates made a series of risky economic decisions for themselves, for another person, or for both themselves and another person (i.e., shared outcomes); one group of participants made choices involving a same-sex stranger (n = 29), the other made choices involving a same-sex close friend (n = 28). Hierarchical Bayesian Estimation of computations underlying risky decision-making revealed that relative to choosing for themselves, people were more risk averse, more loss averse, and more consistent when choices involved another person. Interestingly, partner identity differentially modulated decision computations. People became risk neutral and more consistent when choosing for friends relative to strangers. In sum, these findings suggest that the complexity of the social world is mirrored in its nuanced consequences for our choices.


SLEEP ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (Supplement_2) ◽  
pp. A35-A36
Author(s):  
Garrett Hisler ◽  
David Dickinson ◽  
Brant Hasler

Abstract Introduction Cognitive performance and decision making have been shown to suffer under conditions of misalignment between circadian preference and time-of-assessment; however, little is known about how misalignment between the timing of sleep and circadian rhythm impacts decision making. To this end, this study captured naturally occurring degrees of alignment between the timing of sleep and the circadian rhythm (i.e., alignment of sleep-wake timing with circadian phase) to examine if greater misalignment predicts worse behavioral decision making. Methods Over the course of two weeks, 32 participants (18–22 years of age; 61% female; 69% White) continuously wore actigraphs and completed two overnight in-lab visits (Thursday and Sunday) in which both dim light melatonin onset (DLMO) and behavioral decision-making (risk taking, framing, and strategic reasoning tasks) were assessed. Sleep-wake timing was assessed by actigraphic midsleep from the two nights prior to each in-lab visit. Alignment was operationalized as the interval between DLMO and average midsleep. Multilevel modeling was used to predict performance on decision making tasks from circadian alignment during each in-lab visit; nonlinear associations were also examined. Results Misalignment characterized by shorter time between DLMO and midsleep predicted decision-making in a curvilinear fashion (i.e., squared misalignment term predicted performance). Specifically, shorter time between DLMO and midsleep predicted greater risk-taking under conditions of potential loss (B = .10, p = .04), but less risk-taking under conditions of potential reward (B = -.14, p = .04) in a curvilinear fashion. Misalignment did not predict decision-making in the framing and strategic reasoning tasks. Conclusion Findings suggest that naturally occurring degrees of misalignment between the timing of sleep and the circadian rhythm may impact risky decision-making, further extending accumulating evidence that sleep/circadian factors are tied to risk-taking preferences. Future studies will need to replicate findings and experimentally probe whether manipulating alignment influences risky decision making. Support (if any) R21AA023209; R01DA044143


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