Peace keeping in a model of conflict with foreign investments

2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 391-413
Author(s):  
Sajal Lahiri ◽  
Valerica Vlad
Keyword(s):  
Dual Role ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Foreign Investments ◽  
Worst Case ◽  
Economic Implications ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Third ◽  
Multilateral Agreement ◽  
First Case ◽  
Peacekeeping Forces

Purpose This paper aims to examine the role of outside peacekeepers in a bilateral conflict. Design/methodology/approach The authors build upon a trade theoretic framework by incorporating disruptions due to war, which could affect directly the return to investment, both domestic and foreign, and by introducing explicitly peacekeeping forces into the model. Two countries are engaged in a war, with the purpose of capturing capital. A third country plays a dual role: it is the source of investments in the warring countries, and it deploys soldiers on ground for peacekeeping purposes. The authors consider the cases where the levels of foreign investments are exogenous and when they are endogenously determined by free mobility conditions. In the worst case, they find that foreign investment reduces conflict. In the case of endogenous foreign investments, they examine the effect of multilateral agreements where the two warring countries reduce their number of soldiers and the third increases the number of peacekeepers. Findings The authors find that the reform benefits all three countries and increases the level of foreign investments. They consider the cases of exogenous and endogenous foreign direct investment (FDI). In the first case, the authors examine the effect of an exogenous increase in FDI on the war equilibrium and find that it reduces the employment of soldiers in the warring countries and increases the size of the peacekeeping force. They also find that the first-best level of peacekeeping is larger than the equilibrium level. When FDI is endogenous, starting from the initial war equilibrium, they also examine the effect of a multilateral agreement in which the size of the peacekeeping force is increased by the third country and the two warring countries agree to reduce their war efforts. The authors find that the reform makes all three countries better off and increases the level of FDI. Originality/value The paper uses a theoretical model with third-party interventions in a bilateral war. It intends to shed light on some of the missing economic implications of peacekeeping. The paper introduces explicitly peacekeeping forces into the analysis and introduces a factor that represents a disruption to return on investment in both warring countries. The third country has a dual role; it provides investments in the warring countries and deploys soldiers for peacekeeping. Peacekeeping reduces the disruption mentioned above and affects the employment of soldiers by the warring countries. The authors find that a multilateral agreement in which the two warring countries reduce their war efforts and the third party increases its peacekeeping force can increase welfare in all three countries.

Comparison analysis on the bilateral efforts of farmers and the third-party organization under multiple contract modes

Kybernetes ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (5) ◽  
pp. 818-834 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lanying Sun ◽  
Xiaoyan Li
Keyword(s):  
System Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply System ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Purchase Price ◽  
Party Organization ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Agricultural Supply

Purpose The purpose of this paper is under the analysis framework of the system theory, analyzing the optimal contract mode of agricultural supply chain to guarantee the stability of agricultural supply chain and the equilibrium of agricultural product market, to analyze the effect of farmers’ risk attitude on the selection of contract modes and to find the way to encourage farmers’ productive effort and to avoid farmers’ hitchhiking behavior, to guarantee the stability of agricultural supply chain. Design/methodology/approach Under the guidance of the system theory, using the Stackelberg model and the nonlinear programming theory, this paper comparatively analyzes farmers’ effort (productive effort and sales effort), farmers’ income and the stability of agricultural supply system of four types of contract modes between farmers, third-party organizations and market. Findings First, in the agricultural market, market-type contract cannot maximize farmers’ income. The main reason is that farmers do not have enough ability to avoid market risk and to bargain. Second, for farmers of risk seeking, choosing a market-type contract and secondary-income contract can increase their income. Third, under the fixed-purchase price contract, the hitchhiking behavior would happen. Fourth, when farmers’ productive efforts are the same, farmers’ income under the secondary-income contract is higher than under the fixed-purchase price contract. Because under the secondary-income contract, farmers have the opportunity to obtain the secondary distribution of benefits, farmers’ hitchhiking behavior could be avoided. Originality/value Analyzing the contract modes between farmers and the third-party organization in the agricultural market could reduce the influence of price fluctuation, avoid the uncertainty of the relationship between the supply and demand, stimulate the productive effort of farmers and provide theoretical guidance for establishing efficient and stable agricultural supply system.

Optimal trade-in and third-party collection authorization strategies under trade-in subsidy policy

Kybernetes ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (5) ◽  
pp. 854-872 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaiying Cao ◽  
Qiushi Bo ◽  
Yi He
Keyword(s):  
Design Methodology ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
The Other ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Subsidy Policy ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Third ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose This paper aims to study whether the recycling of a third party competes with the trade-in service of a manufacturer, and explores the optimal trade-in and third-party collection authorization strategies for the manufacturer. Design/methodology/approach According to whether to authorize a third party to collect its used products, the manufacturer has two choices: one is not authorization (NA); the other is authorization (A). This paper uses profit-maximization model to investigate the optimal decisions of the manufacturer and the third party under NA and A, respectively, and then explores which choice is better for the manufacturer. Findings It is observed that there is a competition between trade-in service and third-party recycling when the durability parameter of the used product is relatively small. Moreover, when the durability parameter of the used product is relatively large, A is always better choice for the manufacturer; otherwise, NA is a better choice except for the case that the unit trade-in subsidy is low and the salvage of the used product is high. Practical implications These results provide managerial insights for the manufacturer and the third party to make decisions in the field of recycling. Originality/value This paper is among the first papers to study the competition between trade-in program and third party’s collecting program under government’s trade-in subsidy policy. Moreover, this paper presents the conditions under which the manufacturer should authorize or not authorize the third party to collect its used products.

UK election could force fresh poll by 2017

2015 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
General Election ◽  
Third Party ◽  
National Party ◽  
House Of Commons ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Third ◽  
Liberal Democrats ◽  
Scottish National Party ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Opinion Polls

Subject Fresh election scenarios. Significance Opinion polls suggest that no single party will win an overall majority in the House of Commons on May 7. They also imply that the Scottish National Party (SNP) will do extremely well, substantially increasing its representation from its current six seats to around 25-45 seats. Furthermore, polls also indicate that the third party in terms of current parliamentary representation -- the Liberal Democrats, junior partners in the governing coalition -- may struggle to retain that status and could fall as low as 15-25 seats. If that occurred, the formation of a new coalition arrangement led either by the Conservatives or Labour would be much more complicated than in May 2010, when the election ended without an overall majority. This has led to speculation that another general election could follow relatively swiftly after May -- even within this calendar year. Impacts The May 2015 election may well not produce a result that can last for a five-year term. The Fixed Term Parliament Act 2011 makes the swift dissolution of parliament for a fresh election more challenging. Still, there is a scenario in which another contest could occur in 2015. However, a fresh election in 2016-17 is more likely than one held a few months later.

The effect of employer’s moral obligation violation on survivor’s commitment

2016 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jin Feng Uen ◽  
Shu-Yuan Chen ◽  
Hsien-Chun Chen ◽  
Chih-Tang Lin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Affective Commitment ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Third ◽  
Overall Justice ◽  
And Behavior ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Justice Climate

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the cross-level relationship between moral obligation violation, overall justice climate, and survivors’ commitment. Design/methodology/approach – Data were obtained from 25 companies with 261 individual employees’ cases from three main industries in Taiwan (n=25/261). Findings – Organizations which have moral obligation violation during layoff would directly influence survivors’ perceptions of justice and further affect survivors’ level of affective commitment. Originality/value – This is one of the first studies to provide evidence of the relationship between moral obligation violation, overall justice climate and survivors’ affective commitment. Additionally, most studies of survivors’ attitude and behavior are based on the third-party perspective; this study is the first to argue that survivors are also affected by employers’ layoff as well as victims. The influence of layoff will lead to survivors’ subsequent attitude and behavior.

A new coupled ARMA-FGM model and its application in the internet third-party payment forecasting in China

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-198
Author(s):  
Shuhua Mao ◽  
Xianpeng Wang ◽  
Min Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Rapid Development ◽  
Arma Model ◽  
Development Trend ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Percentage Error ◽  
Volume Data ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Third ◽  
Online Payment ◽  
The Third Party

Purpose With the rapid development of e-commerce in China, the third-party payment system greatly improved the efficiency and volume of the entire trading market. The purpose of this paper is to put forward a suitable prediction model to analyse its development trend. Design/methodology/approach The authors analyse internet third-party payments in China, taking into account online payment transaction values coupled with an ARMA model and the fractional grey model (FGM). First, the rolling FGM model is applied in order to characterise the trends of the transaction volume. The influence of the initial value change on the FGM model is analysed. The optimisation mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) model is constructed to determine the optimal translational values, the corresponding optimal accumulation order and optimal inverse accumulation order. Findings This paper uses China’s recent third-party online payment data to quantify its development trend. The authors find the coupling model suitable for the development trend of third-party online payment transaction. The results show that the model is suitable to quantify its development trend of China’s recent third-party online payment. Originality/value Considering the complex influence factors that lead to the third-party online payment volume data of time-varying grey feature, this paper combines the FGM with ARMA model to describe the development of third-party payment mode.

Fostering independent learning and engagement for postgraduate students

2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 390-404 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yvette Blount ◽  
Margot McNeill
Keyword(s):  
Teaching And Learning ◽  
Success Factors ◽  
Evaluation Framework ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Independent Learning ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Postgraduate Students ◽  
The Third ◽  
Critical Success ◽  
The Third Party

PurposeAs educational technologies are more widely adopted in higher education teaching and learning, publishers often include online resources to accompany their textbook offerings. The purpose of this paper is to report the results of a study forming part of a larger ongoing evaluation of the third party software product WileyPLUS.Design/methodology/approachThe paper describes the integration of the publisher's tools into a specific curriculum context and takes a critical look at the pedagogical effectiveness of the software in this context. A mixed‐methods approach is taken in the study, using a small postgraduate accounting unit as a case study.FindingsWhile many students reported positive experiences with the third party resources, technical issues were a barrier to their effectiveness and many students did not engage with the optional resources. The unit convenor's experience was largely positive.Practical implicationsAlthough it may be tempting for unit convenors to adopt these tools and resources as readily available and easy to use, it is important that they are integrated into the curriculum and that students are supported in their use.Originality/valueOutcomes include a list of critical success factors and an evaluation framework that could be of use to other academics seeking to embed third party resources into their teaching.

The competition between B2C platform and third-party seller considering sales effort

Kybernetes ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 45 (7) ◽  
pp. 1084-1108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaiying Cao ◽  
Ping He
Keyword(s):  
Design Methodology ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
The Third ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose By studying the competition between a B2C platform and a third-party seller, the purpose of this paper is to analyze and compare their optimal decisions and profits between cases with and without sales effort of the platform or third-party seller. Design/methodology/approach This paper studies the competition between a B2C platform and a third-party seller. The platform sells a product directly, and allows the third-party seller to sell a competing product on the platform. Based on whether the platform or the third-party seller makes sales effort, there are four scenarios. The paper analyzes the optimal decisions and profits of platform and third-party seller under each scenario, respectively. Findings The transaction fee has a negative effect on third-party seller’s sales effort level. What is more, the platform can take a free riding from the third-party seller’s sales effort, but the platform’s sales effort has a negative effect on the profit of third-party seller. Practical implications These results provide managerial insights for the platform and the third-party seller to make decisions. Originality/value This paper is among the first papers to study the competition between B2C platform and third-party seller.

Agglomeration effect and the “dual-format” e-marketplace pricing scheme

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ping Su ◽  
Shuguang Liu ◽  
Jun Lin
Keyword(s):  
Price Competition ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Feasible Region ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Market Expansion ◽  
The Third ◽  
Agglomeration Effect ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Theoretical Evidence ◽  
The Impact

Purpose This paper aims to study a dominant e-retailer operating its own e-marketplace (B2C) to host peer competitor as well as acting as a traditional retailer (“dual-format” retailing as in Mantin and Krishnan 2014). The dominant retailer offers a two-part tariff charging scheme to a third-party seller. The seller decides whether to join the e-marketplace. The present paper is interested in addressing the following questions: What is the pricing equilibrium before/after the formation of the e-marketplace? What will be the “optimal” charging scheme? What is the impact on the e-marketplace operator if the third-party seller has the option to become “featured”. Design/methodology/approach This paper adopts a stylized model to capture the competition between the two retailers and applies game theory to solve the pricing equilibrium. The authors model the dual-format retailing in a two-stage decision: Stage 1, the e-marketplace operator offers a two-part tariff; Stage 2, if the other retailer is participating, they engage in a pricing competition. They assume that the e-marketplace operator is a profit maximizer by choosing its charging scheme subject to the condition that the participating retailer is no worse off. Findings The authors find that the e-retailer and the third-party seller in the e-marketplace are not always hurt by intensified price competition. They identify conditions under which higher expected prices are charged as a result of agglomeration effect. The authors’ model also provides theoretical evidence on this popular charging scheme, and shows the feasible region in which the e-marketplace operator could allocate the surplus resulted from the formation of the e-marketplace between itself and the participating retailer. Finally, the authors demonstrate that if the third-party seller has the option to become a “featured” retailer (He and Chen, 2006), it can be detrimental to the e-marketplace operator. Originality/value This work is different in three ways: First, the authors model an e-marketplace adopting a “dual-format” retailing, facing the trade-off between its direct retailing revenue and the rents collected from the member store, while the literature mainly focuses on e-marketplaces playing the intermediary role. Second, they explicitly model the “market expansion effect” caused by the agglomeration after the formation of the e-marketplace. The present study complements this stream of research by investigating and providing theoretical evidence on the charging scheme popularly adopted by the e-marketplaces and proposes ways to share the surplus to the participating store.

Managing new and remanufactured products with remanufacturing degree under patent protection

Kybernetes ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 707-731
Author(s):  
Xiaogang Cao ◽  
Xianjia Wang ◽  
Hui Wen
Keyword(s):  
Negative Correlation ◽  
New Products ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Patent Licensing ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Positive Correlation ◽  
The Third ◽  
Second Period

Purpose This paper aims to propose a two-period model, including an original manufacturer, a retailer and a third-party remanufacturer, in which the products manufactured by the original manufacturer are patent-protected and the remanufacturing degree of remanufactured products influences the purchasing decisions of consumers. Design/methodology/approach This paper analyzes the decisions of the original manufacturer, the retailer and the third-party remanufacturer of two periods, using Stackelberg game and obtains the equilibrium solutions of the three parties. Findings The study finds that consumers’ focus degree to the remanufacturing degree has a negative correlation with the equilibrium unit patent-licensing fee, the retail price of remanufactured products, the remanufacturing degree of remanufactured products and the wholesale price of new products in the first period, but has a positive correlation with the retail price of new products in the second period. Originality/value (1) Consumers’ focus degree to the remanufacturing degree has a negative correlation with the equilibrium unit patent-licensing fee, the retail price of remanufactured products, the remanufacturing degree of remanufactured products and the wholesale price of new products in the first period, but has a positive correlation with the retail price of new products in the second period. (2) The remanufacturing action efficiency of the third-party remanufacturer has a positive correlation with the equilibrium unit patent-licensing fee, the retail price of remanufactured products, the remanufacturing degree of remanufactured products and the wholesale and retail prices of new products in the second period.

Service outsourcing contract design under asymmetric information

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu Xia ◽  
Jiqing Xie ◽  
Guangsi Zhang ◽  
Weijun Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Service Provider ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Demand Forecasting ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Incentive Mechanisms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Third

PurposeUpstream suppliers attempt to outsource product after-sales services to midstream third-party service providers while selling the product directly to downstream sellers, forming a networked supply chain. However, a problem of information asymmetry in the market demand among supply chain members exists. The authors investigate the impact of demand information asymmetry among third-party service providers, upstream suppliers and downstream sellers in the supply chain on the supplier's contract selection under the networked framework.Design/methodology/approachThe authors establish a model in which the supplier can use a wholesale price contract and facilitate a signaling game between the third-party service provider and the seller. Conversely, the supplier could use a menu contract to establish an incentive mechanism to solve information asymmetry. The authors propose heuristic algorithms to quickly estimate a supplier's optimal profit.FindingsThe results show that when the demand forecasting bias is relatively small, the use of a menu contract by the supplier could eliminate information asymmetry; when the demand forecasting bias is large enough, the signaling mechanism between the third-party service provider and the seller could alleviate the double marginalization effect in the supply chain. Although it is common to solve the asymmetric information problem by establishing incentive mechanisms, the authors found that in the latter case, the supplier is better off when no incentive mechanisms are implemented in the networked supply chain.Originality/valueThis study compares screening and signaling effects and compares firms' profits in both cases.

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